Margie R. George v. City of Morro Bay

356 F. App'x 952

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Margie R. George appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral es-toppel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.2002) (res judicata); McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2004) (collateral estoppel). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed George’s claims as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because George could have raised them in her prior bankruptcy proceedings. See Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action.”) (internal citation, quotation marks, and italics omitted). The district court also properly dismissed George’s takings claims as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because they are foreclosed by issues George litigated in her prior bankruptcy proceedings. See McQuillion, 369 F.3d at 1096 (applying collateral estoppel where issues at stake were actually litigated by the party against whom preclusion is asserted and were necessary to the earlier judgment).

George’s remaining contentions are unavailing.

Because appellees’ request for sanctions for a frivolous appeal was not separately filed, we deny the request without prejudice to refiling a timely separate motion. See Fed. R.App. P. 38; 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6; Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 709 (9th Cir.2004) (denying without prejudice a Rule 38 request made in an appellate brief rather than in a separately filed motion).

AFFIRMED.

** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.