Margarito Quintero-Maldonado v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 16-70750
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARGARITO QUINTERO- No. 16-70750 MALDONADO, AKA Margarito Quintero, Agency No. A043-781-135 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 4, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Margarito Quintero Maldonado (“Quintero Maldonado”), a native and citizen

of Mexico, seeks review of a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) finding that he is

removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). This court lacks jurisdiction to review the Department of Homeland Security’s

(“DHS”) decision to initiate the 2012 proceeding against Quintero Maldonado. To

start, U.S. courts lack jurisdiction to consider “any cause or claim by or on behalf of

any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence

proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under [the

Immigration and Nationality Act].” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This provision is meant to

shield from judicial review the DHS’s exercise of discretion in determining which

cases to prosecute. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525

U.S. 471, 485 & n.9 (1999); Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2001). We have held that § 1252(g) generally covers decisions to commence

and pursue an immigration proceeding, including prosecutorial decisions regarding

whether and when to initiate it. See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599

(9th Cir. 2002) (“We construe § 1252(g) . . . to include not only a decision in an

individual case whether to commence, but also when to commence, a proceeding.”).

Quintero Maldonado’s petition is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) because he

seeks judicial review of the DHS’s discretionary decision to initiate a second

removal proceeding, rather than reopen the earlier proceeding. Here, the DHS chose

to initiate a proceeding in 2012 against Quintero Maldonado based upon his 1997

conviction for possession of methamphetamine after the 1997 proceeding was

administratively closed. Whether the existence of the earlier proceeding was a factor

2 in the decision to initiate the 2012 proceeding is a question that goes to the heart of

the DHS’s discretion in commencing a proceeding. It is therefore shielded from

review under § 1252(g). See Barahona-Gomez, 236 F.3d at 1119.

PETITION DISMISSED.