NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-201
MARGARITA METAXAS'S CASE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
An administrative judge of the Department of Industrial
Accidents dismissed a claim for total incapacity benefits filed
by Margarita Metaxas. The agency's reviewing board summarily
affirmed, and this appeal ensued. After considering the
administrative judge's findings and reasoning, we discern no
error of law by the reviewing board, nor is the board's decision
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
See Lamport's Case, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 26, 28 (2022);
MacDonnell's Case, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 196, 201 (2012).
Accordingly, we affirm.1
1Metaxas is self-represented and filed an informal brief pursuant to the pilot program for self-represented litigants, but did not file a record appendix as required by that program and Mass. R. A. P. 18, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019), with respect to appellants. Further, her brief does not contain adequate appellate argument within the meaning of the program and Mass. R. A. P. 16, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). Background. Metaxas worked at Wheelhouse Bike Co., LLC
(Wheelhouse), for five days from May 20 to June 2, 2019. On
June 1, Metaxas worked her final full day, and her employment
was terminated on June 2. Neither she nor any other employee
reported or documented that Metaxas had fallen at work on June
1.
On June 2, Metaxas was seen by a doctor at Cape Cod
Hospital's outpatient urgent care clinic, complaining of low
back pain and urinary frequency. She did not report that she had
fallen at work or elsewhere. On June 22, 2019, Metaxas was seen
at the urgent care clinic for complaints that did not include
pain from a fall. On August 4, 2019, Metaxas was seen at the
urgent care clinic and reported she had fallen "three months
earlier," but did not state where she had fallen. On August 21,
2019, Metaxas was again seen at the urgent care clinic and
reported pain from a fall, but she again did not report where
the fall occurred and said that it happened "on Memorial Day."2
Metaxas was seen at the urgent care clinic on August 28, 2019,
These failures are not excused because Metaxas is self- represented, see Davis v. Tabachnick, 425 Mass. 1010, 1010 (1997), and we could summarily affirm the reviewing board's decision on that basis alone. The appellees filed supplemental appendices that provide some basis for reviewing Metaxas's claims, however, and we exercise our discretion and address the merits.
2 Memorial Day was on May 27 in 2019.
2 and reported "that she was carrying equipment and fell backwards
down the stairs and onto her tailbone area" while working at
Wheelhouse on June 1.
Wheelhouse did not carry valid workers' compensation
insurance on the date of Metaxas's alleged injury. Metaxas
filed a claim with the Department of Industrial Accidents
against the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund),
which, in turn, filed a motion to join Wheelhouse, which Metaxas
did not oppose, and the motion was allowed. See G. L. c. 152,
§ 65 (13); 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(1) (2017). Metaxas's
claim for benefits cited injuries to her coccyx, upper back,
hand, head, and neck. Wheelhouse contested liability, average
weekly wage, disability, extent, and causal relationship to
work. Wheelhouse requested discovery from Metaxas. Wheelhouse
also scheduled and gave Metaxas notice of medical examinations,
including one in August 2021, under G. L. c. 152, § 11A (2)
(§ 11A exam). Metaxas did not respond to the requests, and she
failed to attend the August 2021 § 11A exam, prompting
Wheelhouse to file a motion to dismiss the claim for lack of
prosecution. The administrative judge held a hearing on the
motion to dismiss at which Metaxas testified. While the
administrative judge did not find Metaxas credible, she declined
to dismiss the claim and gave the parties a chance to engage in
3 a mediation scheduled for July 7, 2022. The mediation did not
occur; Metaxas informed her attorney one week before that she
would not appear on July 7 due to illness. "At that point," the
administrative judge scheduled a hearing on the merits for 9:15
A.M. on November 17, 2022.
On November 16, 2022, Metaxas sent five e-mail messages to
the administrative judge arguing her case but not asking to
reschedule or saying she could not appear the next day. On
November 17, Metaxas sent e-mail messages before and after the
scheduled time of the hearing but never appeared. "Though
hesitant to prejudice [Metaxas's] rights," the administrative
judge allowed, with prejudice, Wheelhouse's motion to dismiss,
reasoning that Metaxas "has shown no regard for the other
parties involved and has dragged this case on for over three
years" and "has consistently delayed and obfuscated issues to
the cost and detriment of the employer/insurer, the attorneys,
and court personnel," which "conduct has been unreasonable."
Discussion. Metaxas asserts that Wheelhouse lacked
standing to defend against her claim because it did not carry
valid workers' compensation insurance on the date of Metaxas's
alleged injury. We disagree. Once joinder of Wheelhouse was
allowed, Wheelhouse was entitled to prepare and "raise any and
all . . . reasonable defenses [other than untimeliness where
4 original claim was timely] which would have been available to
[it] had the claimant filed an original claim against [it]."
452 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2). In other words, Wheelhouse was
permitted to stand in the shoes of the trust fund with respect
to Metaxas's claim.
Metaxas also claims that the administrative judge erred in
finding her conduct unreasonable and asks us to review her
conduct independently, but we must decline to do so. This
finding is based on the administrative judge's credibility
determinations and her weighing of the evidence before her,
which are final. See Wilson's Case, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 400
(2016).
Next, Metaxas maintains that even if her conduct was
unreasonable, the administrative judge committed an error of law
by dismissing her claim where G. L. c. 152, § 11A (2), provides
for a "suspension" of benefits if a claimant fails to appear for
their impartial medical examination, but not dismissal of the
claim. Metaxas's argument misses the mark. Section 11A governs
only the procedure for the appointment and use of impartial
medical examiners, just one of "a series of procedural stages in
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-201
MARGARITA METAXAS'S CASE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
An administrative judge of the Department of Industrial
Accidents dismissed a claim for total incapacity benefits filed
by Margarita Metaxas. The agency's reviewing board summarily
affirmed, and this appeal ensued. After considering the
administrative judge's findings and reasoning, we discern no
error of law by the reviewing board, nor is the board's decision
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
See Lamport's Case, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 26, 28 (2022);
MacDonnell's Case, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 196, 201 (2012).
Accordingly, we affirm.1
1Metaxas is self-represented and filed an informal brief pursuant to the pilot program for self-represented litigants, but did not file a record appendix as required by that program and Mass. R. A. P. 18, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019), with respect to appellants. Further, her brief does not contain adequate appellate argument within the meaning of the program and Mass. R. A. P. 16, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). Background. Metaxas worked at Wheelhouse Bike Co., LLC
(Wheelhouse), for five days from May 20 to June 2, 2019. On
June 1, Metaxas worked her final full day, and her employment
was terminated on June 2. Neither she nor any other employee
reported or documented that Metaxas had fallen at work on June
1.
On June 2, Metaxas was seen by a doctor at Cape Cod
Hospital's outpatient urgent care clinic, complaining of low
back pain and urinary frequency. She did not report that she had
fallen at work or elsewhere. On June 22, 2019, Metaxas was seen
at the urgent care clinic for complaints that did not include
pain from a fall. On August 4, 2019, Metaxas was seen at the
urgent care clinic and reported she had fallen "three months
earlier," but did not state where she had fallen. On August 21,
2019, Metaxas was again seen at the urgent care clinic and
reported pain from a fall, but she again did not report where
the fall occurred and said that it happened "on Memorial Day."2
Metaxas was seen at the urgent care clinic on August 28, 2019,
These failures are not excused because Metaxas is self- represented, see Davis v. Tabachnick, 425 Mass. 1010, 1010 (1997), and we could summarily affirm the reviewing board's decision on that basis alone. The appellees filed supplemental appendices that provide some basis for reviewing Metaxas's claims, however, and we exercise our discretion and address the merits.
2 Memorial Day was on May 27 in 2019.
2 and reported "that she was carrying equipment and fell backwards
down the stairs and onto her tailbone area" while working at
Wheelhouse on June 1.
Wheelhouse did not carry valid workers' compensation
insurance on the date of Metaxas's alleged injury. Metaxas
filed a claim with the Department of Industrial Accidents
against the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund),
which, in turn, filed a motion to join Wheelhouse, which Metaxas
did not oppose, and the motion was allowed. See G. L. c. 152,
§ 65 (13); 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(1) (2017). Metaxas's
claim for benefits cited injuries to her coccyx, upper back,
hand, head, and neck. Wheelhouse contested liability, average
weekly wage, disability, extent, and causal relationship to
work. Wheelhouse requested discovery from Metaxas. Wheelhouse
also scheduled and gave Metaxas notice of medical examinations,
including one in August 2021, under G. L. c. 152, § 11A (2)
(§ 11A exam). Metaxas did not respond to the requests, and she
failed to attend the August 2021 § 11A exam, prompting
Wheelhouse to file a motion to dismiss the claim for lack of
prosecution. The administrative judge held a hearing on the
motion to dismiss at which Metaxas testified. While the
administrative judge did not find Metaxas credible, she declined
to dismiss the claim and gave the parties a chance to engage in
3 a mediation scheduled for July 7, 2022. The mediation did not
occur; Metaxas informed her attorney one week before that she
would not appear on July 7 due to illness. "At that point," the
administrative judge scheduled a hearing on the merits for 9:15
A.M. on November 17, 2022.
On November 16, 2022, Metaxas sent five e-mail messages to
the administrative judge arguing her case but not asking to
reschedule or saying she could not appear the next day. On
November 17, Metaxas sent e-mail messages before and after the
scheduled time of the hearing but never appeared. "Though
hesitant to prejudice [Metaxas's] rights," the administrative
judge allowed, with prejudice, Wheelhouse's motion to dismiss,
reasoning that Metaxas "has shown no regard for the other
parties involved and has dragged this case on for over three
years" and "has consistently delayed and obfuscated issues to
the cost and detriment of the employer/insurer, the attorneys,
and court personnel," which "conduct has been unreasonable."
Discussion. Metaxas asserts that Wheelhouse lacked
standing to defend against her claim because it did not carry
valid workers' compensation insurance on the date of Metaxas's
alleged injury. We disagree. Once joinder of Wheelhouse was
allowed, Wheelhouse was entitled to prepare and "raise any and
all . . . reasonable defenses [other than untimeliness where
4 original claim was timely] which would have been available to
[it] had the claimant filed an original claim against [it]."
452 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.20(2). In other words, Wheelhouse was
permitted to stand in the shoes of the trust fund with respect
to Metaxas's claim.
Metaxas also claims that the administrative judge erred in
finding her conduct unreasonable and asks us to review her
conduct independently, but we must decline to do so. This
finding is based on the administrative judge's credibility
determinations and her weighing of the evidence before her,
which are final. See Wilson's Case, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 400
(2016).
Next, Metaxas maintains that even if her conduct was
unreasonable, the administrative judge committed an error of law
by dismissing her claim where G. L. c. 152, § 11A (2), provides
for a "suspension" of benefits if a claimant fails to appear for
their impartial medical examination, but not dismissal of the
claim. Metaxas's argument misses the mark. Section 11A governs
only the procedure for the appointment and use of impartial
medical examiners, just one of "a series of procedural stages in
the [Department of Industrial Accidents] to determine whether
the claimant is entitled to benefits." Mendes's Case, 486 Mass.
139, 141 (2020). When claimants are receiving benefits during
5 the course of their proceeding, failure to appear for the
examination "shall constitute sufficient cause for suspension of
benefits pursuant to section forty-five." G. L. c. 152,
§ 11A (2). Here, Metaxas was not receiving benefits, so they
could not be suspended. Moreover, as found by the
administrative judge, Metaxas's unreasonable conduct went beyond
her failure to appear at the § 11A impartial medical
examination, and included her failure to respond to discovery
and her failure to appear at the final hearing. Where Metaxas
had the evidentiary burden with respect to her claims, and
failed to meet it, the administrative judge was within her
authority to dismiss the action. See G. L. c. 152, § 11
("Failure of a party to appear at a hearing shall not delay the
issuance of a decision"); Ginley's Case, 244 Mass. 346, 348
(1923) ("The statute while conferring the right, has made
recovery of compensation dependent upon compliance with
precedent conditions by the employee").
Finally, Metaxas argues that the claim process was marked
by conspiracy between Wheelhouse, the trust fund, counsel, and
the physicians. We discern no evidence of conspiracy or
malfeasance. To the contrary, after careful review, we conclude
that the administrative judge's decision is well reasoned, and
6 the subsidiary findings of fact are amply supported by the
record.3
Decision of reviewing board affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Massing & Allen, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: November 25, 2025.
3 The administrative judge also properly relied on the record of the motion to dismiss and the Department of Industrial Accidents file.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.