Margaret Young, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of William R. Young v. Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D. and North Texas Cardiology Center

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 20, 2013
Docket02-05-00350-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Margaret Young, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of William R. Young v. Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D. and North Texas Cardiology Center (Margaret Young, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of William R. Young v. Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D. and North Texas Cardiology Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Margaret Young, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of William R. Young v. Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D. and North Texas Cardiology Center, (Tex. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02-05-00350-CV

MARGARET YOUNG, APPELLANT INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM R. YOUNG

V.

VENKATESWARLU THOTA, M.D. APPELLEES AND NORTH TEXAS CARDIOLOGY CENTER

----------

FROM THE 30TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND 1

This is an appeal from a take-nothing jury verdict in a health care liability

claim. Margaret Young, individually and as representative of the Estate of

William R. (Ronnie) Young, sued Dr. Venkateswarlu Thota for injuries Ronnie

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. sustained after a cardiac catheterization procedure. In a prior opinion, this court

sustained two of appellant’s issues, holding that submission of two improper jury

instructions was harmful, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial.

Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 841 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2008), rev’d, 366

S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2012). But the supreme court reversed this court’s judgment,

holding that any error in the submission of the two instructions was harmless.

366 S.W.3d at 696. The supreme court also directed this court to address the

remaining issues in the appeal. Id.

Background

In our prior opinion, we described the factual background of this case as

follows:

Appellant is Ronnie’s widow. Ronnie died on March 10, 2005. Ronnie had suffered from a blood disorder called Polycythemia Vera (PV) and coronary artery disease, including hypertension and angina. His cardiologist, Dr. Thota, with NTCC (collectively “appellees”), recommended that Ronnie undergo a cardiac catheterization to evaluate his heart condition. The catheterization was scheduled for March 4, 2002 at United Regional Health Care System in Wichita Falls, Texas. Dr. Thota performed the procedure that morning, and Ronnie was discharged that afternoon. At the time, Ronnie was fifty-five years of age.

After Ronnie began feeling poorly at home and fell from his chair around 11:45 p.m., appellant called 911, and Ronnie returned to the hospital's emergency room around 1:15 a.m. Olyn Walker, M.D. ultimately operated on Ronnie that night to repair a tear in his iliac artery and the resulting internal bleeding allegedly caused by the catheterization procedure. During the emergency surgery, Dr. Walker discovered a large hematoma from severe bleeding in the peritoneal cavity. After the surgery, Ronnie was placed on a ventilator, suffered acute renal failure that required dialysis, received multiple blood transfusions, underwent a splenectomy, and

2 underwent surgery to remove his gallbladder once it became gangrenous due to ischemia caused by the bleed. He ultimately lost vision in one eye and suffered numerous strokes and blood clots, all allegedly as a result of the negligent catheterization. Ronnie stayed in the hospital in Wichita Falls for two months and later transferred to Baylor University Medical Center (BUMC) in Dallas, Texas, on May 2, 2002. While at BUMC, he was diagnosed with and treated for thrombocytosis, sepsis, respiratory failure, depression, malnourishment, gout, deep vein thrombosis, and portal vein thrombosis. When he left BUMC, he went to Baylor Specialty Hospital for rehabilitation for an additional two months. Ronnie died on March 10, 2005, about three years after the original procedure, at the age of fifty-eight.

After Ronnie died, appellant brought suit individually and on behalf of his estate against Dr. Thota and NTCC. Appellant alleged appellees were negligent in failing to obtain an accurate medical history on Ronnie, in failing to take into consideration any of Ronnie’s pre-existing conditions that might have exacerbated potential complications, in failing to properly locate the femoral artery and lacerating the right iliac artery instead during the catheterization, in failing to discover the laceration before discharging Ronnie, and in failing to properly diagnose and treat the tear.

Young, 271 S.W.3d at 826–27 (footnote omitted).

Evidence Supporting Jury’s Failure to Find Negligence

In her first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is factually

insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Dr. Thota 2 was not negligent in his

treatment of Ronnie. She also contends that she proved negligence as a matter

of law.

2 Appellant alleged that North Texas Cardiology Center was liable under respondeat superior. Young, 271 S.W.3d at 827 n.1.

3 Standards of Review

If a party is attacking the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which

the party had the burden of proof, and there is no evidence to support the finding,

we review all the evidence to determine whether the contrary proposition is

established as a matter of law. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241

(Tex. 2001); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989).

When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support a finding on which the party had the burden of proof, we set aside the

finding only if, after considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record

pertinent to that finding, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence,

that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor

Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d

175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

Applicable Facts

The standard of care for Dr. Thota was undisputed: to insert the needle

and catheter into the right femoral artery, as opposed to the right external iliac

artery. Young, 271 S.W.3d at 838. Appellant contends that all of the competent

evidence at trial shows that Dr. Thota violated the standard of care by inserting

the needle into the right external iliac artery and that there is no evidence that

Ronnie’s internal bleed was caused by anything other than Dr. Thota’s insertion

of the needle into the wrong artery.

4 According to Dr. Thota, when he performs a cardiac catheterization, he

feels for a bony prominence near the groin under which is usually the inguinal

ligament, and he then feels for a pulse underneath, which is the femoral artery;

he said it is difficult to feel a pulse in the external iliac artery because it is too far

underneath skin, fat, and muscle. He then nicks the artery in that area and

passes a thin wire into the artery at that point. According to Dr. Thota, he can tell

if a patient is bleeding during the procedure by changes in pulse rate and blood

pressure. After the procedure, a scrub tech monitors the blood pressure and

heart rate of the patient, compresses the puncture site for fifteen or twenty

minutes, and, once hemostasis 3 is achieved, puts on a bandage. When

hemostasis is achieved, there is no bleeding from the puncture site. The patient

is discharged if after four to six hours, there is no pain, no bleeding, and blood

pressure and heart rate are stable.

Dr. Thota testified that he had no difficulties inserting the catheter during

Ronnie’s procedure and that he placed the catheter in Ronnie’s right femoral

artery.

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Related

Thota v. Young
366 S.W.3d 678 (Texas Supreme Court, 2012)
Pool v. Ford Motor Co.
715 S.W.2d 629 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)
Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis
46 S.W.3d 237 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Young v. Thota
271 S.W.3d 822 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
Garza v. Alviar
395 S.W.2d 821 (Texas Supreme Court, 1965)
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.
767 S.W.2d 686 (Texas Supreme Court, 1989)
Cain v. Bain
709 S.W.2d 175 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)

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Margaret Young, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of William R. Young v. Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D. and North Texas Cardiology Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/margaret-young-individually-and-as-representative--texapp-2013.