NUMBERS 13-10-00429-CR 13-10-00430-CR 13-10-00431-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
MARGARET YORK, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court of Aransas County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
By three separate indictments, appellant, Margaret York, was charged with
several instances of forgery, a state-jail felony, and one instance of debit-card abuse,
also a state-jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 32.21(b), (d), 32.31(b), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2010). With regard to the first instance of forgery, allegedly occurring on
October 18, 2006, York pleaded guilty, and the trial court placed her on probation for
three years and imposed a $1,000 fine. The State subsequently indicted York with two
additional counts of forgery, allegedly occurring on July 3, 2007. York pleaded guilty to
both counts of forgery, and the trial court sentenced her to confinement in the State Jail
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for one year, probated the
sentence, and imposed a $750 fine for each count. York was later indicted for the
offense of debit-card abuse, allegedly occurring on June 10, 2008. York pleaded guilty
to this offense, and the trial court sentenced her to two years’ confinement in the
StateJail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, probated for five years.
On November 13, 2009, the State filed motions to revoke York’s probation in
each case, alleging that she failed to: (1) report to her probation officer for several
months; (2) submit to random urinalysis for several months; and (3) pay supervisory
fees, fines, and restitution for several months. The State later amended its motions to
revoke to further allege that York recently had been arrested for driving while intoxicated
and unlawfully carrying a weapon, both of which constituted violations of the terms of
her probation.
At the hearing conducted on the State’s motion to revoke, York pleaded “true” to
most of the allegations contained in the State’s motions to revoke. The trial court
accepted York’s pleas of “true” and revoked her probation. In appellate cause number
13-10-00430-CR (the debit-card abuse case), the trial court sentenced York to two
years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice and ordered that she pay $10,000 in restitution. In appellate cause number 13-
2 10-00431-CR (the case involving the two counts of forgery allegedly committed on July
3, 2007), the trial court sentenced York to one years’ confinement with no fine. Finally,
in appellate cause number 13-10-00429-CR (the case involving the first instance of
forgery), the trial court sentenced York to two years’ confinement with a $1,000 fine.
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The trial court certified York’s right to
appeal in all three cause numbers, and these appeals followed. We affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), York=s
court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, addressing each of
the three appellate cause numbers and stating that his review of the record yielded no
grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated in any of the appellate cause
numbers. Although counsel=s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it
does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to be advanced in either appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (AIn Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically
advance >arguable= points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record
references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.@)
(citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no
pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978), York's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,
there are no errors in the trial court's judgments. Counsel has informed this Court that
he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance in any of
3 the three appellate cause numbers; (2) served copies of the brief and counsel=s motions
to withdraw on York; and (3) informed York of her right to review the record and to file a
pro se response in each cause number.1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813
S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an
adequate period of time has passed, and York has not filed a pro se response. See In
re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record in each appellate cause
number and counsel's brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ADue to
the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues
raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the
court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.@);
Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, York=s attorney has asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel in each appellate cause number. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744;
see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d
776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (AIf an attorney believes the appeal is
1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Athe pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.@ In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, no pet.)).
4 frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from
representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a
brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.@) (citations omitted)). We
grant counsel=s motions to withdraw.
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NUMBERS 13-10-00429-CR 13-10-00430-CR 13-10-00431-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
MARGARET YORK, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court of Aransas County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
By three separate indictments, appellant, Margaret York, was charged with
several instances of forgery, a state-jail felony, and one instance of debit-card abuse,
also a state-jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 32.21(b), (d), 32.31(b), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2010). With regard to the first instance of forgery, allegedly occurring on
October 18, 2006, York pleaded guilty, and the trial court placed her on probation for
three years and imposed a $1,000 fine. The State subsequently indicted York with two
additional counts of forgery, allegedly occurring on July 3, 2007. York pleaded guilty to
both counts of forgery, and the trial court sentenced her to confinement in the State Jail
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for one year, probated the
sentence, and imposed a $750 fine for each count. York was later indicted for the
offense of debit-card abuse, allegedly occurring on June 10, 2008. York pleaded guilty
to this offense, and the trial court sentenced her to two years’ confinement in the
StateJail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, probated for five years.
On November 13, 2009, the State filed motions to revoke York’s probation in
each case, alleging that she failed to: (1) report to her probation officer for several
months; (2) submit to random urinalysis for several months; and (3) pay supervisory
fees, fines, and restitution for several months. The State later amended its motions to
revoke to further allege that York recently had been arrested for driving while intoxicated
and unlawfully carrying a weapon, both of which constituted violations of the terms of
her probation.
At the hearing conducted on the State’s motion to revoke, York pleaded “true” to
most of the allegations contained in the State’s motions to revoke. The trial court
accepted York’s pleas of “true” and revoked her probation. In appellate cause number
13-10-00430-CR (the debit-card abuse case), the trial court sentenced York to two
years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice and ordered that she pay $10,000 in restitution. In appellate cause number 13-
2 10-00431-CR (the case involving the two counts of forgery allegedly committed on July
3, 2007), the trial court sentenced York to one years’ confinement with no fine. Finally,
in appellate cause number 13-10-00429-CR (the case involving the first instance of
forgery), the trial court sentenced York to two years’ confinement with a $1,000 fine.
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The trial court certified York’s right to
appeal in all three cause numbers, and these appeals followed. We affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), York=s
court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, addressing each of
the three appellate cause numbers and stating that his review of the record yielded no
grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated in any of the appellate cause
numbers. Although counsel=s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it
does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds to be advanced in either appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (AIn Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically
advance >arguable= points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record
references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.@)
(citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no
pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1978), York's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,
there are no errors in the trial court's judgments. Counsel has informed this Court that
he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance in any of
3 the three appellate cause numbers; (2) served copies of the brief and counsel=s motions
to withdraw on York; and (3) informed York of her right to review the record and to file a
pro se response in each cause number.1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813
S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an
adequate period of time has passed, and York has not filed a pro se response. See In
re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record in each appellate cause
number and counsel's brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ADue to
the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues
raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the
court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.@);
Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, York=s attorney has asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel in each appellate cause number. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744;
see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d
776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (AIf an attorney believes the appeal is
1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Athe pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.@ In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, no pet.)).
4 frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from
representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a
brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.@) (citations omitted)). We
grant counsel=s motions to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court=s opinion,
counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment in each appellate cause
number to York and advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 2
See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte
Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
___________________ ROGELIO VALDEZ Chief Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) Delivered and filed the 14th day of April, 2011.
2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should York wish to seek further review of these cases by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this Court, after which it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.