NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-349
MARGARET KELLEY, personal representative,1 & another2
vs.
MARK HURLEY3 & others.4
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Defendant Terri Hurley (Terri)5 appeals from a judgment
entered in the Superior Court and from orders denying four
postjudgment motions. We affirm.
Background. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Margaret Kelley as
personal representative of the estate of Charles Hurley and
Charles Andrew Hurley (Andy), filed a complaint in the Superior
1 Of the estate of Charles Hurley.
2 Charles Andrew Hurley.
3Individually and as trustee of the Charles Hurley Irrevocable Trust.
4 Terri Hurley, Anna Hurley, and Kayla Hurley.
5Because five of the six parties share the same surname, for clarity we refer to the Hurleys by their first names. Court for declaratory judgment concerning the terms of the
Charles Hurley Irrevocable Trust (trust). The complaint named
as defendants Mark Hurley (Mark), who was the trustee of the
trust; Mark's wife, Terri; and their two daughters, Anna Hurley
(Anna) and Kayla Hurley (Kayla), who were both minors at the
time. The plaintiffs alleged that Terri, Anna, and Kayla had
been mistakenly listed as the beneficiaries of the trust and,
therefore, were erroneously given ownership of the trust's
primary asset, the property in Wakefield where Mark, Terri,
Anna, and Kayla resided (property). About the same time, Terri
commenced divorce proceedings against Mark in the Probate and
Family Court.
After years of litigation in both matters, in July 2023 the
parties reached a preliminary settlement agreement in the
declaratory judgment action. The parties agreed that Mark would
pay Terri $301,000, in exchange for which Terri would vacate and
relinquish her rights to the property, and Mark and Andy would
assume title. The preliminary agreement also included terms
regarding the division of the marital estate, alimony, and other
issues relevant to the divorce action. The preliminary
agreement was signed by both plaintiffs and by Mark, Terri, and
2 Anna, who by this time was twenty years old.6 The preliminary
agreement contemplated that the parties would prepare a
"mutually agree[able] comprehensive written settlement
agreement."
When the parties failed to finalize their settlement in
writing, the plaintiffs, aligned with and joined by Mark, filed
an "emergency" joint motion to enforce the preliminary
settlement agreement, which Terri opposed. In an order dated
June 20, 2024, a Superior Court judge (first judge) allowed the
motion to enforce the preliminary agreement, rejecting Terri's
claims that she did not understand the agreement she signed and
that she signed it under duress. A judgment of dismissal was
entered, but then vacated upon Terri's motion. The first judge
ordered the parties to submit a proposed form of judgment by
November 22, 2024.
Still unable to agree on the form of the judgment, on
November 22, 2024, the parties filed separate proposed
judgments. The plaintiffs and Mark proposed a judgment removing
Terri, Anna, and Kayla as beneficiaries of the trust, depriving
them of any interest in the property, and vesting title in Mark
and Andy. Their proposed judgment in the declaratory judgment
6 Kayla, who was sixteen years old at the time, did not sign the agreement. Mark and Terri, as her legal guardians, assented on her behalf.
3 case excluded the terms in the preliminary agreement relating to
the divorce action. Terri filed a proposed judgment requiring
Mark to pay her $301,000, in exchange for which Terri would
vacate and relinquish her rights to the property. Her proposed
judgment also included terms regarding division of marital
property and alimony, similar to those included in the
preliminary agreement. Terri's proposed judgment specifically
reserved Anna's and Kayla's interests in the trust and the
property.
After a hearing, on December 18, 2024, the first judge
signed the plaintiffs' and Mark's proposed order, which entered
as the judgment in the case. Terri then filed the four
postjudgment motions subject to this appeal. First, she timely
served a motion to vacate or modify the judgment, which was
denied by a different Superior Court judge (second judge) on
January 28, 2025. Terri filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the motion to vacate, and the parties
subsequently filed additional pleadings seeking sanctions
against each other. The second judge denied the motion to
reconsider and denied all requests for sanctions on February 13,
2025. Terri's subsequent motions to substitute parties, filed
on February 26, 2025, and for injunctive relief, filed March 19,
2025, were denied by the second judge on February 28 and March
4 28, 2025, respectively. Terri timely filed notices of appeal
from the judgment and from the orders denying all of these
postjudgment motions.
Discussion. In her brief, Terri asserts three main reasons
why the judgment should not have entered and why her
postjudgment motions should have been allowed. The primary
theme of her brief is that the judgment invalidated the plain
language of the trust that named Terri, Anna, and Kayla as
beneficiaries, wrongly depriving them of their interests in the
property. The second major theme is that because Anna and Kayla
reached the age of majority during the pendency of the case,
they were deprived of notice, representation, and informed
consent at various stages of the litigation. Her third theme is
that the preliminary settlement agreement was not enforceable
because she did not fully understand its terms when she signed
it, she signed it under duress, and she lacked representation
during critical periods of the litigation. She also argues that
the judge erred by denying her requests for attorney's fees and
injunctive relief.
As to the first theme, if the preliminary settlement
agreement was properly enforced, the nature and existence of
Terri's rights under the trust is irrelevant because Terri
5 agreed to give up those rights in exchange for payment of
$301,000.7
The second theme, regarding Anna's and Kayla's rights, is
equally unavailing to Terri, because Terri is not an attorney.
Therefore, she may not represent Anna and Kayla in this appeal
or assert rights on their behalf. "Although she of course may
represent herself, she may not represent another." Stevenson v.
TND Homes I LLC, 482 Mass. 1006, 1006 n.1, cert.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-349
MARGARET KELLEY, personal representative,1 & another2
vs.
MARK HURLEY3 & others.4
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Defendant Terri Hurley (Terri)5 appeals from a judgment
entered in the Superior Court and from orders denying four
postjudgment motions. We affirm.
Background. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Margaret Kelley as
personal representative of the estate of Charles Hurley and
Charles Andrew Hurley (Andy), filed a complaint in the Superior
1 Of the estate of Charles Hurley.
2 Charles Andrew Hurley.
3Individually and as trustee of the Charles Hurley Irrevocable Trust.
4 Terri Hurley, Anna Hurley, and Kayla Hurley.
5Because five of the six parties share the same surname, for clarity we refer to the Hurleys by their first names. Court for declaratory judgment concerning the terms of the
Charles Hurley Irrevocable Trust (trust). The complaint named
as defendants Mark Hurley (Mark), who was the trustee of the
trust; Mark's wife, Terri; and their two daughters, Anna Hurley
(Anna) and Kayla Hurley (Kayla), who were both minors at the
time. The plaintiffs alleged that Terri, Anna, and Kayla had
been mistakenly listed as the beneficiaries of the trust and,
therefore, were erroneously given ownership of the trust's
primary asset, the property in Wakefield where Mark, Terri,
Anna, and Kayla resided (property). About the same time, Terri
commenced divorce proceedings against Mark in the Probate and
Family Court.
After years of litigation in both matters, in July 2023 the
parties reached a preliminary settlement agreement in the
declaratory judgment action. The parties agreed that Mark would
pay Terri $301,000, in exchange for which Terri would vacate and
relinquish her rights to the property, and Mark and Andy would
assume title. The preliminary agreement also included terms
regarding the division of the marital estate, alimony, and other
issues relevant to the divorce action. The preliminary
agreement was signed by both plaintiffs and by Mark, Terri, and
2 Anna, who by this time was twenty years old.6 The preliminary
agreement contemplated that the parties would prepare a
"mutually agree[able] comprehensive written settlement
agreement."
When the parties failed to finalize their settlement in
writing, the plaintiffs, aligned with and joined by Mark, filed
an "emergency" joint motion to enforce the preliminary
settlement agreement, which Terri opposed. In an order dated
June 20, 2024, a Superior Court judge (first judge) allowed the
motion to enforce the preliminary agreement, rejecting Terri's
claims that she did not understand the agreement she signed and
that she signed it under duress. A judgment of dismissal was
entered, but then vacated upon Terri's motion. The first judge
ordered the parties to submit a proposed form of judgment by
November 22, 2024.
Still unable to agree on the form of the judgment, on
November 22, 2024, the parties filed separate proposed
judgments. The plaintiffs and Mark proposed a judgment removing
Terri, Anna, and Kayla as beneficiaries of the trust, depriving
them of any interest in the property, and vesting title in Mark
and Andy. Their proposed judgment in the declaratory judgment
6 Kayla, who was sixteen years old at the time, did not sign the agreement. Mark and Terri, as her legal guardians, assented on her behalf.
3 case excluded the terms in the preliminary agreement relating to
the divorce action. Terri filed a proposed judgment requiring
Mark to pay her $301,000, in exchange for which Terri would
vacate and relinquish her rights to the property. Her proposed
judgment also included terms regarding division of marital
property and alimony, similar to those included in the
preliminary agreement. Terri's proposed judgment specifically
reserved Anna's and Kayla's interests in the trust and the
property.
After a hearing, on December 18, 2024, the first judge
signed the plaintiffs' and Mark's proposed order, which entered
as the judgment in the case. Terri then filed the four
postjudgment motions subject to this appeal. First, she timely
served a motion to vacate or modify the judgment, which was
denied by a different Superior Court judge (second judge) on
January 28, 2025. Terri filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order denying the motion to vacate, and the parties
subsequently filed additional pleadings seeking sanctions
against each other. The second judge denied the motion to
reconsider and denied all requests for sanctions on February 13,
2025. Terri's subsequent motions to substitute parties, filed
on February 26, 2025, and for injunctive relief, filed March 19,
2025, were denied by the second judge on February 28 and March
4 28, 2025, respectively. Terri timely filed notices of appeal
from the judgment and from the orders denying all of these
postjudgment motions.
Discussion. In her brief, Terri asserts three main reasons
why the judgment should not have entered and why her
postjudgment motions should have been allowed. The primary
theme of her brief is that the judgment invalidated the plain
language of the trust that named Terri, Anna, and Kayla as
beneficiaries, wrongly depriving them of their interests in the
property. The second major theme is that because Anna and Kayla
reached the age of majority during the pendency of the case,
they were deprived of notice, representation, and informed
consent at various stages of the litigation. Her third theme is
that the preliminary settlement agreement was not enforceable
because she did not fully understand its terms when she signed
it, she signed it under duress, and she lacked representation
during critical periods of the litigation. She also argues that
the judge erred by denying her requests for attorney's fees and
injunctive relief.
As to the first theme, if the preliminary settlement
agreement was properly enforced, the nature and existence of
Terri's rights under the trust is irrelevant because Terri
5 agreed to give up those rights in exchange for payment of
$301,000.7
The second theme, regarding Anna's and Kayla's rights, is
equally unavailing to Terri, because Terri is not an attorney.
Therefore, she may not represent Anna and Kayla in this appeal
or assert rights on their behalf. "Although she of course may
represent herself, she may not represent another." Stevenson v.
TND Homes I LLC, 482 Mass. 1006, 1006 n.1, cert. denied, 589
U.S. 1084 (2019). See Varney Enters., Inc. v. WMF, Inc., 402
Mass. 79, 82 (1988) ("person appearing pro se does not represent
another").8
As to Terri's own rights, the third theme of her brief, the
record does not support her claim that she did not understand
the preliminary settlement agreement or that she signed it under
7 Mark's obligation to pay Terri that sum is conspicuously absent from the proposed judgment that he and the plaintiffs submitted, and that the judge signed as an order of the court. Likewise, any argument that this term was erroneously omitted from the judgment is conspicuously absent from Terri's brief. We can only assume that the omission was inadvertent, that the parties have made an arrangement concerning this payment, or that Mark's obligation to pay $301,000 to Terri in exchange for the marital home will be incorporated as a term of the parties' divorce judgment.
8 As Terri repeatedly points out, both Anna and Kayla are now adults. They were both named as defendants in the declaratory judgment complaint. When the preliminary settlement agreement was prepared, as Anna had reached the age of majority, Mark's attorney sent Anna a copy of the agreement for her review and signature.
6 duress, claims that the first judge specifically rejected in the
June 20, 2024, order enforcing the preliminary agreement. To
the contrary, the terms of the proposed judgment that Terri
submitted on November 22, 2024, were essentially the same terms
that were included in the preliminary agreement -- the only
difference being Terri's attempt to reserve Anna's and Kayla's
rights. Terri's proposed judgment demonstrated that she fully
understood and accepted the terms of the preliminary agreement
insofar as they affected her own interests. The preliminary
agreement set out all the material terms of the settlement and
manifested the parties' intent to be bound by those terms, even
without the more formal document contemplated in the preliminary
agreement. See Fecteau Benefits Group, Inc. v. Knox, 72 Mass.
App. Ct. 204, 212-213 (2008); I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton
Mfg. Co., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 455 (2004); Goren v. Royal
Invs. Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 140-141 (1987). Finally, as
Terri had no right to a court-appointed attorney in this case,
see Genninger v. Genninger, 418 Mass. 732, 735 (1994), the fact
that she was left to represent herself during periods of the
litigation does not provide grounds to attack the judgment. The
myriad motions that Terri filed on her own behalf, and both
judges' serious attention to those motions, demonstrate that she
was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See
7 Wilbur v. Tunnell, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 25 n.10 (2020)
(although self-represented litigant must be given "meaningful
opportunity to present her case . . ., and some leniency is
appropriate, the statutes and rules of procedure bind a pro se
litigant as they bind other litigants" [quotations and citations
omitted]).
Nor did the second judge abuse his discretion in denying
Terri's requests for sanctions and for injunctive relief. The
record does not substantiate Terri's contentions that the
plaintiffs' claims were frivolous or advanced in bad faith. Nor
did the judge err in denying Terri's request for postjudgment
injunctive relief. The judge reasonably determined that Terri's
harm could be compensated monetarily. See Caffyn v. Caffyn, 70
Mass. App. Ct. 37, 42 (2007) ("Suffice it to say that the trial
judge acted within her discretion in concluding that injunctive
relief was not warranted, if only because the wife's claim of
potential monetary loss was insufficient to establish
irreparable harm").
Conclusion. The judgment is affirmed. The orders of
January 28, February 13, February 28, and March 28, 2025,
denying the motion to vacate or modify judgment, the motion for
8 reconsideration and sanctions, the motion to substitute parties,
and the motion for injunctive relief, are affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Massing, Neyman & Smyth, JJ.9),
Clerk
Entered: April 14, 2026.
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.