Margaret K. Siegel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

D. Arizona

Margaret K. Siegel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

DecidedNovember 5, 2025

Docket2:23-cv-00722

StatusUnknown

This text of Margaret K. Siegel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Margaret K. Siegel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Margaret K. Siegel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Pincite

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Margaret K Siegel, No. CV-23-00722-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Margaret K. Siegel (“Plaintiff”) has filed a motion for attorney fees under 16 Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). In Plaintiff’s first Motion 17 for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 21), Plaintiff, through counsel, requests an award of 18 $8,292.25 in total attorney fees. The Commissioner states that Plaintiff’s counsel is the 19 real party-in-interest, but that he neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request for 20 attorney fees. (Doc. 23 at 2). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s counsel her requested fees. 21 Section 4061 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful 22 representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 23 789, 795–96 (2002). “The statute deals with the administrative and judicial review stages 24 discretely: [Section] 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; 25 [Section] 406(b) controls fees for representation in court.” Id. at 794. Section 406(b) 26 provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who 27 was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as 28 1 Unless where otherwise noted, all Section references are to the Social Security Act. 1 part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 2 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 3 judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Fees are payable out of, and not in addition to, the 4 amount of a claimant’s past-due benefits. Id. 5 Before awarding fees, the Court must consider whether the 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee 6 requested is (1) within the statutory guidelines; (2) consistent with the fee agreement; and 7 (3) reasonable in light of the contingent-fee agreement. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807– 8 08. Additionally, courts will require plaintiff’s counsel to refund to the plaintiff the lesser 9 of the fees awarded under Section 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 10 2412 (“EAJA”). See Parrish v. Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 11 2008) (“When EAJA fees are paid and there is also an award of attorney fees under 12 406(b), a plaintiff’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee. 13 There is thus a dollar-for-dollar offset of any 406(b) fee by an EAJA award.”) (internal 14 quotation and citation omitted); Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215 15 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Where the same attorney represented a claimant at each stage of judicial 16 review, the court need merely offset all EAJA awards against the § 406(b) award.”). 17 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total fee award of $8,292.25 for 25% of Plaintiff’s past 18 due benefits—which the parties agreed to as a contingency fee. (Doc. 22 at 1). Plaintiff 19 sought judicial review for the denial of the denial of Supplemental Security Income for a 20 child. (Id. at 2). This Court reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 21 (“ALJ”) remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. (Id.) 22 Plaintiff’s counsel was also previously awarded $6,020.94 in fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 23 20). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in support of the Motion 24 (Docs. 21 & 22), the Court finds that the time expended, and amounts charged by 25 counsel, are reasonable for this case. 26 First, Plaintiff’s request for fees does not exceed twenty-five percent of the total 27 past-due benefits obtained by Plaintiff. (Doc. 22-2 at 2). Plaintiff was awarded 28 retroactive benefits in the amount of $33,169.00, but twenty-five percent of that benefit 1 award was withheld for attorney fees. (Id.) The amount that Plaintiff pursues for attorney 2 fees—$8,292.25—is exactly 25%2 as statutorily required. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 3 807–08. 4 Second, the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and her counsel stated that 5 Plaintiff’s counsel would receive twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded to 6 Plaintiff because of counsel’s representation. (Doc. 22-3 at 3). This means that 7 Plaintiff’s request is consistent with the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and counsel 8 and that it mirrors the requirements of Section 406(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 9 Finally, Plaintiff’s total fee request is reasonable considering the contingent fee 10 agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted an itemization of services that represents that 11 she spent a total of 24.8 hours laboring on this matter. (Doc. 22-4 at 2–3). The attached 12 Itemization of Services illustrates that Plaintiff’s counsel has been representing Plaintiff 13 since April 12, 2023. (Id. at 2). Her work has included reviewing the unfavorable 14 decision of the ALJ, reviewing Orders set out by the Court, as well as reviewing medical 15 opinions and transcript testimony. (Id.) Other work performed by counsel accords with 16 the work normally performed by attorneys in these cases like drafting legal arguments on 17 why the ALJ’s decision was improper and researching and crafting arguments in 18 Plaintiff’s favor. (Id. at 3). 19 If Plaintiff’s counsel was paid hourly for the work she did in this matter, she 20 would receive a fee equivalent to $334.36 per hour for the 24.8 hours of related work she 21 performed.3 Having considered the reasonableness factors set forth in Gisbrecht, the 22 Court concludes that this amount is a reasonable rate. 535 U.S. at 808; see also Parrish v. 23 Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2008) (“This Court finds counsel’s 24 requested attorney’s fees in the total amount of $37,254.30 for 34.5 hours of work, which 25 calculates to an overall effective rate of $1079.83 per hour, are reasonable in light of the 26 legal standards set forth in Gisbrecht and the facts of this case.”). The Court will

27 2 Twenty-five percent of $33,169.00 is $8,292.25 (0.25 x $33,169.00).

28 3 Dividing the requested amount of attorney fees, $8,292.25, by 29.4 (the amount of work hours committed to representing Plaintiff) yields a total hourly rate of $334.36. || therefore award $8,292.25 in attorney fees under Section 406(b), but Plaintiff’s counsel must refund Plaintiff the $6,020.94 EAJA award received. (Doc. 20). See Russell v. 3|| Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The dual fee awards [under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the EAJA] are proper here as long as [the plaintiff's] attorney gives the 5|| smaller of the two awards to his client to compensate [him] for his litigation costs.’’). 6 Accordingly, 7 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 21) is granted. Plaintiff is awarded $8,292.25 in attorney fees under Section 9|| 406(b). 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the 11 || lesser of the fees awarded under 42 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Margaret K Siegel, No. CV-23-00722-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff Margaret K. Siegel (“Plaintiff”) has filed a motion for attorney fees under 16 Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). In Plaintiff’s first Motion 17 for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 21), Plaintiff, through counsel, requests an award of 18 $8,292.25 in total attorney fees. The Commissioner states that Plaintiff’s counsel is the 19 real party-in-interest, but that he neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request for 20 attorney fees. (Doc. 23 at 2). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s counsel her requested fees. 21 Section 4061 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for successful 22 representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 23 789, 795–96 (2002). “The statute deals with the administrative and judicial review stages 24 discretely: [Section] 406(a) governs fees for representation in administrative proceedings; 25 [Section] 406(b) controls fees for representation in court.” Id. at 794. Section 406(b) 26 provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who 27 was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as 28 1 Unless where otherwise noted, all Section references are to the Social Security Act. 1 part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 2 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such 3 judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Fees are payable out of, and not in addition to, the 4 amount of a claimant’s past-due benefits. Id. 5 Before awarding fees, the Court must consider whether the 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) fee 6 requested is (1) within the statutory guidelines; (2) consistent with the fee agreement; and 7 (3) reasonable in light of the contingent-fee agreement. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807– 8 08. Additionally, courts will require plaintiff’s counsel to refund to the plaintiff the lesser 9 of the fees awarded under Section 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 10 2412 (“EAJA”). See Parrish v. Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 11 2008) (“When EAJA fees are paid and there is also an award of attorney fees under 12 406(b), a plaintiff’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee. 13 There is thus a dollar-for-dollar offset of any 406(b) fee by an EAJA award.”) (internal 14 quotation and citation omitted); Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215 15 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Where the same attorney represented a claimant at each stage of judicial 16 review, the court need merely offset all EAJA awards against the § 406(b) award.”). 17 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total fee award of $8,292.25 for 25% of Plaintiff’s past 18 due benefits—which the parties agreed to as a contingency fee. (Doc. 22 at 1). Plaintiff 19 sought judicial review for the denial of the denial of Supplemental Security Income for a 20 child. (Id. at 2). This Court reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 21 (“ALJ”) remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. (Id.) 22 Plaintiff’s counsel was also previously awarded $6,020.94 in fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 23 20). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in support of the Motion 24 (Docs. 21 & 22), the Court finds that the time expended, and amounts charged by 25 counsel, are reasonable for this case. 26 First, Plaintiff’s request for fees does not exceed twenty-five percent of the total 27 past-due benefits obtained by Plaintiff. (Doc. 22-2 at 2). Plaintiff was awarded 28 retroactive benefits in the amount of $33,169.00, but twenty-five percent of that benefit 1 award was withheld for attorney fees. (Id.) The amount that Plaintiff pursues for attorney 2 fees—$8,292.25—is exactly 25%2 as statutorily required. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 3 807–08. 4 Second, the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and her counsel stated that 5 Plaintiff’s counsel would receive twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded to 6 Plaintiff because of counsel’s representation. (Doc. 22-3 at 3). This means that 7 Plaintiff’s request is consistent with the fee arrangement between Plaintiff and counsel 8 and that it mirrors the requirements of Section 406(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 9 Finally, Plaintiff’s total fee request is reasonable considering the contingent fee 10 agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted an itemization of services that represents that 11 she spent a total of 24.8 hours laboring on this matter. (Doc. 22-4 at 2–3). The attached 12 Itemization of Services illustrates that Plaintiff’s counsel has been representing Plaintiff 13 since April 12, 2023. (Id. at 2). Her work has included reviewing the unfavorable 14 decision of the ALJ, reviewing Orders set out by the Court, as well as reviewing medical 15 opinions and transcript testimony. (Id.) Other work performed by counsel accords with 16 the work normally performed by attorneys in these cases like drafting legal arguments on 17 why the ALJ’s decision was improper and researching and crafting arguments in 18 Plaintiff’s favor. (Id. at 3). 19 If Plaintiff’s counsel was paid hourly for the work she did in this matter, she 20 would receive a fee equivalent to $334.36 per hour for the 24.8 hours of related work she 21 performed.3 Having considered the reasonableness factors set forth in Gisbrecht, the 22 Court concludes that this amount is a reasonable rate. 535 U.S. at 808; see also Parrish v. 23 Astrue, 2008 WL 961611, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2008) (“This Court finds counsel’s 24 requested attorney’s fees in the total amount of $37,254.30 for 34.5 hours of work, which 25 calculates to an overall effective rate of $1079.83 per hour, are reasonable in light of the 26 legal standards set forth in Gisbrecht and the facts of this case.”). The Court will

27 2 Twenty-five percent of $33,169.00 is $8,292.25 (0.25 x $33,169.00).

28 3 Dividing the requested amount of attorney fees, $8,292.25, by 29.4 (the amount of work hours committed to representing Plaintiff) yields a total hourly rate of $334.36. || therefore award $8,292.25 in attorney fees under Section 406(b), but Plaintiff’s counsel must refund Plaintiff the $6,020.94 EAJA award received. (Doc. 20). See Russell v. 3|| Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The dual fee awards [under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the EAJA] are proper here as long as [the plaintiff's] attorney gives the 5|| smaller of the two awards to his client to compensate [him] for his litigation costs.’’). 6 Accordingly, 7 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees (Doc. 21) is granted. Plaintiff is awarded $8,292.25 in attorney fees under Section 9|| 406(b). 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the 11 || lesser of the fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act. 12 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff's 13 || attorney, Robin Larkin and can be made by electronic fund transfer (EFT) or by check mailed to the following address: Larkin & Fern, PLLC, 301 E. Bethany Home Road, Ste. |} C186, Phoenix, AZ 85012. 16 Dated this 5th day of November, 2025. 17

13 norable’Dian¢g4. Hurfetewa 0 United States District Fudge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-4-

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

Margaret K. Siegel v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/margaret-k-siegel-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-azd-2025.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack