Margaret Ann Johnston v. the State of Texas
Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 12, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-00832-CR
MARGARET ANN JOHNSTON, Appellant V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 21-10851-86F
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Breedlove Appellant Margaret Ann Johnston was convicted of murder after a jury trial
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appeals, complaining that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 14, 2021, Cindy Rowan-Stutts was on the phone with her half-
sister, Connie Helms, when she heard Connie yelling and a gunshot go off while Connie was at appellant’s house. As soon as Connie began screaming, Cindy started
to drive to Appellant’s house. Appellant is Connie’s mother and was 80 years old at the time. Appellant picked up Connie’s phone and told Cindy to call 911. Cindy called 911 while driving to appellant’s house. When Cindy arrived, she found appellant leaning over Connie attempting to perform CPR. Connie had been shot in the arm. Appellant had the gun she had shot Connie with in her front pocket, and Cindy was scared that appellant would also shoot her after appellant said to her, “You little bitch. You believe everything this little bitch had to say. Cindy returned to her car at the end of the drive to wait for police to arrive. When police arrived, they attempted, unsuccessfully, to resuscitate Connie.
Because of appellant’s health conditions, Connie occasionally drove up from Galveston to care for appellant. On the date of the murder, Connie was in town to take appellant to the doctor. During the sisters’ phone conversation, Connie told Cindy about an incident between herself and appellant earlier in the day. Appellant needed to get a COVID-19 test in order to proceed with a surgery scheduled that week. Connie told Cindy that appellant had gotten mad and began punching Connie. However, appellant told police that in fact Connie had gotten mad at appellant and began scratching her while they were in a carwash. Cindy later heard appellant in the background of their phone call saying it was Connie’s fault she would be unable to have her surgery because she could not get a COVID test.
At some point during their call, Connie’s tone changed, and she screamed Cindy’s name several times, immediately followed by a gunshot. Cindy then heard
Connie ask for help. Cindy testified that appellant asked Connie, “How does it feel to be dying, you little bitch?” Cindy heard Connie ask for help again, and then she heard a gurgle, and she knew Connie was dead. Appellant then asked, “How does it feel to be dead, you little bitch?” Appellant picked up the phone and said, “Cindy, Cindy, I need you to call 911. I shot Connie. I only shot her in the arm, but she’s acting like she’s dead.”
Deputy Robert Dominguez was dispatched to appellant’s house in Kaufman County. Officers retrieved a .38 revolver with one spent cartridge from appellant’s pocket; Connie was unarmed. Appellant told police on the scene that Connie “went to get her gun out of her car.” Appellant said that Connie had been threatening her since July and that she was “meaner than hell.” Appellant accused Connie of trying to kill her and scratching her arms in the car earlier that day. Officer Mitchel Hempel saw the scratches on appellant’s arms but did not believe appellant’s version of events. Dominguez testified that appellant appeared calm, matter of fact, and almost unemotional. Investigator Justin Guy learned that she kept the gun in her bedroom. Guy also observed information regarding nursing homes inside appellant’s house.
During her interview with Hempel at the scene, appellant confessed several times to shooting her daughter deliberately. Appellant tried, unsuccessfully, to get Connie to leave the property before going into the house to get her firearm with the intention of shooting Connie. Appellant said she shot Connie because she was afraid Connie was going to shoot her. Appellant “felt as if Connie was gonna go get her
gun out of her car,” and officers found a gun in Connie’s vehicle. However, appellant also admitted that Connie did not have any weapons on her at the time she was shot. Appellant did not deny saying “Are you dead yet, you little bitch,” to Connie, but she did deny shooting Connie out of anger.
Appellant told police she was angry with Connie about the COVID test and because Connie was planning to put her in a nursing home. Appellant said that Connie had threatened her in the past but not on the day of the shooting. Appellant further theorized that Connie was trying to get her diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and early dementia because she was trying to take appellant’s property away from her.
An autopsy of Connie’s body was performed. A bullet was removed from Connie’s right ventricle. Dr. Jessica Dwyer, a forensic pathologist, testified that the bullet had entered the back of Connie’s right upper arm, traveled into the right upper chest, striking the right lung, and ultimately penetrating Connie’s heart.
Appellant was tried before a jury on August 1, 2022. The charges of murder and manslaughter were presented to the jury. The jury found appellant guilty of murder as charged in the indictment. The court sentenced her to life imprisonment. Appellant moved for a new trial on August 22, 2022, which was denied by operation of law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.038(b). This appeal followed. In one issue, appellant complains that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction, we apply well-established standards. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational factfinder could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The jury, as the fact-finder, may make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial in determining appellant’s guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When there is conflicting evidence, we presume the jury resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution so long as it is supported by the evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We also defer to the trier of fact’s determinations of witness credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Our role as an intermediate appellate court is restricted to guarding against the “rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally.” Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
III. DISCUSSION
A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1). Alternatively, she also commits the offense when she intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Id. at § 19.02(b)(2).
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