Marez-Gallegos v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 11, 2024
• Docket: 22-1824
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 11 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SERGIO MAREZ-GALLEGOS, No. 22-1824

Petitioner, Agency No. A072-927-538

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 8, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: CHRISTEN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,*** Judge.

Sergio Marez-Gallegos, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding

the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his claims for withholding of removal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We lack

jurisdiction to consider Marez-Gallegos’s petition insofar as it relates to his

eligibility for withholding of removal, and we dismiss that component of the

petition. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to consider Marez-

Gallegos’s petition insofar as it relates to his eligibility for CAT relief, and we

deny that component of the petition.

1. We lack jurisdiction to consider Marez-Gallegos’s challenge to the

BIA’s denial of his appeal from the IJ’s order denying his application for

withholding of removal. The BIA upheld the IJ’s determination that the

robbery offense of which Marez-Gallegos was convicted in 2019 constitutes a

“particularly serious crime,” thus rendering him ineligible for withholding of

removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Our jurisdiction to review particularly-

serious-crime determinations is limited to circumstances where a petitioner

raises a constitutional or legal question, such as whether the BIA applied the

correct legal standard. Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation

omitted); Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019); see also

Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021) (contrasting

challenges that raise constitutional or legal questions with those that merely

request “a re-weighing of the factors” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

Although he purports to argue that the BIA applied the wrong legal

standard, Marez-Gallegos does not raise such a question in his brief. The sole

2 22-1824 substantive argument he lays out is that the BIA erred in failing to consider

certain extenuating facts about his participation in the 2019 robbery. But this is

not an argument that the BIA somehow failed to apply the appropriate set of

factors, which the BIA first outlined in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244

(BIA 1982). See also Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 2010)

(explaining that the four so-called “Frentescu factors” constitute, with certain

regulatory modifications, “the applicable legal standard for determining whether

a particularly serious crime has been committed”). Under Frentescu the BIA is

to consult, inter alia, “the circumstances and underlying facts of the

conviction.” 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. That is precisely what the BIA did here.

Accordingly, much as Marez-Gallegos might disagree with the BIA’s

assignment of weight to certain “underlying facts,” that disagreement does not

amount to an argument that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard

altogether. Properly characterized, Marez-Gallegos’s argument is a request for

re-weighing that does not suffice to invoke our jurisdiction. See Benedicto, 12

F.4th at 1062.

We therefore dismiss the petition as it pertains to Marez-Gallegos’s

application for withholding of removal.

2. We deny Marez-Gallegos’s petition as it pertains to his application for

deferral of removal under the CAT. To qualify for CAT protection Marez-

Gallegos must demonstrate a “particularized threat of torture” and establish that

he will more likely than not be tortured upon his removal to Mexico. Dhital v.

3 22-1824 Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The BIA

determined the threats on which Marez-Gallegos based his CAT application to

be overly speculative and insufficiently particularized; we review that

determination for substantial evidence. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944

(9th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, we “uphold[] the BIA’s determination

unless the evidence in the record compels a contrary conclusion.” Id.

The record does not so compel. Marez-Gallegos argues that the BIA

erred in disregarding his fear of torture at the hands of persons associated with

the Jalisco New Generation and Sinaloa cartels. With respect to the Jalisco

cartel, he contends that the BIA erred in ignoring his specific citations to record

evidence—including testimony that the brother-in-law of a Jalisco cartel

member negatively perceives Marez-Gallegos to be an informant—that together

established a particularized threat of torture. But this argument, as briefed, is

unsupported by any description of how the BIA committed legal error in finding

Marez-Gallegos’s citations to testimonial and documentary evidence

insufficient. A petitioner must “specifically and distinctly raise an argument

and support it with citations to the record to raise it on appeal.” Rodriguez-

Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Instead, Marez-Gallegos merely summarizes the

BIA’s decision, recapitulates parts of his own testimony and subsequent

arguments before the BIA, and states a conclusion that the BIA’s determination

is in error. This series of assertions—which lacks any explanation of how the

4 22-1824 BIA specifically erred in rejecting Marez-Gallegos’s presentation of a

particularized risk of torture by members of the Jalisco cartel or their

associates—can be no basis for disturbing the BIA’s determination.

Regarding the threat posed by the Sinaloa cartel, Marez-Gallegos’s

argument rests on a misreading of the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. The IJ and

the BIA referenced the presence of Marez-Gallegos’s family members in

Michoacán, Mexico, as support for the conclusion that Marez-Gallegos’s

“general” fear of Mexican cartels—as distinct from his specific fear of the

Jalisco and Sinaloa cartels—constitutes insufficient evidence that Marez-

Gallegos will more likely than not be tortured upon removal. Marez-Gallegos

does not challenge that conclusion in this petition for review. Instead, he

appears to assert that the BIA improperly referenced the living situation of his

family members as a basis for disregarding his specific fear of the Sinaloa

cartel. But the IJ and the BIA relied on other grounds entirely in determining

that Marez-Gallegos’s fear of the Sinaloa cartel does not establish a

particularized threat of torture. The IJ explained, and the BIA agreed, that the

Sinaloa cartel does not pose such a threat because its members have not

attempted to threaten or harm Marez-Gallegos since their last alleged threat (at

Marez-Gallegos’s mother’s California home) in 2015. This explanation, which

Marez-Gallegos does not properly challenge, does not rely on the improper

inference that he purports to identify.

5 22-1824 We accordingly deny Marez-Gallegos’s petition for review as it pertains

to his application for deferral of removal under the CAT.

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

6 22-1824