Marean v. United States Ins. Co.

16 F. Cas. 707, 3 Wash. C. C. 256

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 15, 1814
• Status: Published

Opinion

WASHINGTON. Circuit Justice.

We shall in the outset, dismiss from this case all considerations connected with the loss of this cargo, in respect to quantity or value. As to memorandum articles, the insurer agrees to pay for a total loss only — the insured taking upon himself all partial losses, without exception. If the property arrive at the port of delivery, reduced in quantity, or in value, to'' any amount, the loss cannot be said to be total, in reality; and the insured cannot treat it as total, or demand an indemnity for a partial loss. There is no instance where the insured can demand, as for a total loss, that he might not have declined making- an abandonment, and demanded a partial loss. But, if the property insured be included within the memorandum, he cannot, under any circumstances, call upon the insurer for a partial loss; and consequently he cannot elect to túrn it into a total loss. These principles I consider to be clearly established, by the cases of Mason v. Skurray, Neilson v. Columbia Ins. Co., Cocking v. Fraser, M’Andrews v. Vaughan [1 Marsh. Ins. 219], Dyson v. Rowcroft, and Maggrath v. Church.

The only question which can possibly arise, between the insurer and insured, in relation to memorandum articles, is, whether the loss was total or not; and this can never happen, where the cargo, or a part of it, has been sent on by the insured, and reaches the original port of its destination. Being there specifically, the insurer has complied with his engagement — every thing like a promise of indemnity against loss or damage to the cargo, being excluded from the policy. If the question turn upon the totality of the loss, unconnected with the subject of loss by deterioration of the cargo in value, or reduction in quantity, we know of no difference between memorandum and other articles. If the loss be total in fact, or is such as the insured is permitted to treat as such, he is entitled to abandon, and to recover as for a total loss, in the case of memorandum articles; but always with this exception, that he is not permitted to turn a partial into a total loss. Keeping this distinction in view, the loss of the voyage, by capture, shipwreck, or otherwise, may be treated as a total loss. This is the doctrine of Dyson v. Rowcroft; in which case, the right to abandon was placed, not upon the ground of deterioration of the cargo, but upon the justifiable necessity which resulted from it, of throwing the cargo overboard. This was in effect the same thing, as if it had, in a storm, been swept from the deck. Such too was the case of Manning v. Newnham. In Cocking v. Fraser, no such necessity existed; and the breaking up of the voyage, was attempted to be justified, by the damaged state of the cargo, which, per se, did not authorize the insured to put an end to the voyage, and thus to turn an average loss, for which the insurer was not liable, into a total loss. Maggrath v. Church also establishes the same doctrine.

Now what is the present case? The brig being thrown on shore, within a mile or two from her port of destination, the agent of the insured employs persons to unlade as much of the cargo as could be saved; and by his exertions, nearly a half of it was landed, dried, and sent forward to the market at Lisbon, and sold by the consignees, at about one-fourth of the price of sound corn, leaving a very inconsiderable sum for the owner, after paying the expenses. Is not this precisely the case of Wilson v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co., and Anderson v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co.? with this difference only, that in the first case, the insured declined sending on the corn, when he might have done so, and consequently he was not permitted to turn a partial into a total loss, by his own neglect; and in the latter case, part of the cargo having been rescued from the wreck, before the offer to abandon was made, the insured could not claim as for a total loss, either on account of the injury which the corn had sustained, or of his own act, in not sending it forward to the port of its destination. In this ease, the cargo which was saved was sent forward, and sold at the port of its destination. But it is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, that if the loss be such, as that the insured might at one time have treated it as total, it continues to he so, unless at the time when the offer to abandon is made, it is restored to his possession, clear of the effects of the peril, and in a condition to prosecute the voyage. Now this is certainly not the condition of property, which, at the time of the offer to abandon, is in possession of the re-captor, who has a right to retain it, until he has satisfied his salvage. But in this case, the corn was never out of the possession of the agents of the insured, who exercised every act of ownership over it; subject nevertheless to the laws and customs of the country to which it was sent, with which the insurer and insured are supposed to have been acquainted, at the time they entered into this contract, and to which they impliedly agreed to submit. The cargo which was landed, not only continued in the possession and under the direction of the agents of the insured, but it was relieved from the effects of the peril, as between the insurer and insured; and it was not only in a condition to prosecute the voyage, but it did in fact complete it.

[Subsequently this case was carried by' writ of error to the supreme court, where the judgment was affirmed. 1 Wheat. (14 U. S.) 219.]

Upon the whole, we are clearly of opinion, that this is not such a loss as the defendants have engaged to indemnify against, and that judgment should be given in their favour. Judgment for defendants.