Mardjokic v. Griffin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Mardjokic v. Griffin

186 A.D.2d 431

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 15, 1992

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 186 A.D.2d 431 (Mardjokic v. Griffin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mardjokic v. Griffin, 186 A.D.2d 431 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1992).

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Opinion

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert E. White, J.), entered July 25, 1991, which denied defendant Public Administrator’s motion to vacate a default judgment entered upon the decedent’s failure to timely appear and answer the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion to vacate the default judgment was based solely on the ground that the decedent had never been served with process. As defendant concedes on appeal, that ground was withdrawn in the stipulation entered into after the decedent’s death. The ground defendant now raises instead — the decedent’s personal illness and a death in her family — may not be raised for the first time on appeal (Nelson v Times Sq. Stores Corp., 110 AD2d 691, appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 645), and, in any event, is unpersuasive in the face of evidence that the decedent was served with the process before she fell ill, and was, in fact, experienced in matters of real estate. Concur— Carro, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger and Asch, JJ.

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— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert E. White, J.), entered July 25, 1991, which denied defendant Public Administrator’s motion to vacate a default judgment entered upon the decedent’s failure to timely appear and answer the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion to vacate the default judgment was based solely on the ground that the decedent had never been served with process. As defendant concedes on appeal, that ground was withdrawn in the stipulation entered into after the decedent’s death. The ground defendant now raises instead — the decedent’s personal illness and a death in her family — may not be raised for the first time on appeal (Nelson v Times Sq. Stores Corp., 110 AD2d 691, appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 645), and, in any event, is unpersuasive in the face of evidence that the decedent was served with the process before she fell ill, and was, in fact, experienced in matters of real estate. Concur— Carro, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger and Asch, JJ.

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186 A.D.2d 431, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mardjokic-v-griffin-nyappdiv-1992.

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