Mardillo Arnold, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated v. Marriott International, a foreign profit corporation, Jason Tyler, an individual

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00221
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 10 MARDILLO ARNOLD, individually, and CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00221-RAJ 11 on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, ORDER 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, a foreign 15 profit corporation, JASON TYLER, an individual, 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Marriott International, Inc. 20 (“Marriott”) and Jason Tyler’s (collectively, “Defendants”) partial motion to dismiss 21 Plaintiff Mardillo Arnold’s second amended complaint. Dkt. # 41. The Court has reviewed 22 the motion, the submissions in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the balance 23 of the record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES 24 IN PART Defendants’ motion. 25 II. BACKGROUND 26 Mr. Arnold is an employee of Marriott at its Westin Seattle location. Dkt. # 38 ¶ 27 3.3. He brings this putative class action against Marriott and Mr. Tyler, who is a convention 1 services manager at the Westin Seattle. Id. ¶ 3.2. Mr. Arnold alleges that Defendants failed 2 to provide him and other similarly situated individuals with compliant rest breaks, meal 3 breaks, wages for “off-the-clock” work, sick leave, and cell phone reimbursement. Id. ¶¶ 4 6.1–8.3. He further alleges that the alleged violations were willful. Id. ¶¶ 9.1–9.3. 5 The Court previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Mr. 6 Arnold’s first amended complaint in its entirety with leave to amend. Dkt. # 36. Mr. 7 Arnold then filed his second amended complaint. Dkt. # 38. Defendants admit that the 8 second amended complaint plausibly states a claim as to the rest break, meal break, “off- 9 the-clock” work, and sick leave violations. See Dkt. # 41 at 2. They maintain, however, 10 that Mr. Arnold still fails to state a claim for (1) failure to provide cell phone reimbursement 11 under the Seattle Wage Theft Ordinance, SMC 14.20.020; (2) willful withholding of wages 12 under the Washington Wage Rebate Act, RCW 49.52.050 and .070; and (3) liability against 13 Mr. Tyler. Id. Defendants move for partial dismissal of the second amended complaint on 14 these grounds. Id. 15 A. Allegations Regarding Cell Phone Reimbursement 16 Mr. Arnold alleges that he and putative class members used their personal cell 17 phones for work on a regular basis without reimbursement. Dkt. # 38 ¶¶ 4.30–4.31, 8.1– 18 8.3. For example, Mr. Arnold alleges that on January 24, 2024, he “received multiple 19 work-related text messages from his manager on his personal cellphone” but was not 20 reimbursed for his phone usage. Id. ¶ 4.9. Similarly, he alleges that on October 24, 2024, 21 Mr. Tyler sent Mr. Arnold “several work-related text messages on Plaintiff’s personal cell 22 phone” but “neither Defendant Marriott nor Mr. Tyler reimbursed Plaintiff or similarly 23 situated employees for the associated expenses.” Id. ¶ 4.13. Mr. Arnold provides other 24 examples of receiving work-related text messages, although the other allegations do not 25 specify whether he received the messages on his personal cell phone, as opposed to, for 26 example, an employer provided phone. Id. ¶¶ 4.7, 4.12. 27 1 B. Allegations Regarding Willful Withholding of Wages 2 Next, in support of his willful withholding of wages claim, Mr. Arnold alleges that 3 Defendants had knowledge of the alleged wage violations but failed to compensate him 4 and putative class members. Id. ¶¶ 4.3, 4.10. For example, he alleges that during the 5 holiday seasons of 2021, 2022, and 2023, Mr. Tyler directed Mr. Arnold “to assist with 6 conference and event setups at the Westin Seattle while Plaintiff and staff were not clocked 7 in and at lunch.” Id. ¶ 4.4. He further alleges that Mr. Tyler “personally observed” Mr. 8 Arnold and other class members performing pre-shift work on multiple occasions but failed 9 to ensure they were paid for the time worked. Id. ¶ 4.5. Further, Mr. Arnold alleges that 10 on December 16, 2023, another supervisor directed him “to complete setup tasks despite 11 knowing Plaintiff was on his lunch break,” and refused Mr. Arnold’s request for additional 12 help. Id. ¶ 4.7. On March 13, 2024, Mr. Arnold “made management aware” that his 13 supervisor was directing him to perform work prior to his shift, but no changes were made. 14 Id. ¶ 4.10. Finally, on April 5, 2024, a supervisor texted Mr. Arnold regarding work- 15 related matters during a lunch break. Id. ¶ 4.12. Mr. Arnold asked if he would be paid for 16 engaging in work-related texts during his lunch break, the supervisor said yes, but Mr. 17 Arnold was not paid. Id. 18 Moreover, Mr. Arnold alleges that Marriott’s policies and practices resulted in the 19 wage violations. For example, he alleges that Marriott “created and maintained work 20 schedules and a working environment” that discouraged him and other putative class 21 members from taking rest breaks. Id. ¶ 4.2. He further alleges that Marriott “failed to 22 maintain records showing the occurrence, timing, and duration of paid rest breaks” and 23 “failed to establish and maintain a process” for employees to report rest break violations. 24 Id. ¶¶ 4.7, 4.15. 25 C. Allegations Regarding Mr. Tyler 26 Mr. Arnold asserts all claims against both Marriott and Mr. Tyler. Id. ¶¶ 6.1–9.3. 27 Mr. Tyler is a “Convention Services Manager at the Westin Seattle.” Id. ¶ 3.2. He is 1 engaged in managing “all events at the Westin Seattle, including managing the scheduling 2 and payments, and exercising control over how Plaintiff and those similarly situated are 3 paid and the working conditions they are subjected to.” Id. As recounted above, the second 4 amended complaint contains several examples of Mr. Tyler allegedly observing and 5 directing Mr. Arnold and other class members to work during breaks and outside of 6 scheduled shifts without compensation, and sending texts to their personal cell phones 7 without reimbursement. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4.4, 4.5, 4.13. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain 10 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 12 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 13 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 14 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In analyzing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept all factual 15 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable 16 to the nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 17 “Conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences, however, are insufficient to defeat a 18 motion to dismiss.” Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 A. Cell Phone Reimbursement 21 Mr. Arnold alleges that Defendants failed to reimburse him and putative class 22 members for use of their personal cell phones for work-related matters, in violation of the 23 Seattle Wage Theft Ordinance, SMC 14.20.020 (“SWTO”). Dkt. # 38 ¶¶ 4.30–4.31, 8.1– 24 8.3. The SWTO requires employers to “pay all compensation owed to an employee by 25 reason of employment on an established regular pay day at no longer than monthly payment 26 intervals.” SMC 14.20.020. “Compensation” includes, in relevant part, “reimbursement 27 for employer expenses.” Id. The parties agree there are no relevant cases interpreting the 1 SWTO. Dkt. # 41 at 6; Dkt. # 42 at 15. Both parties refer to a Seattle Office of Labor 2 Standards Q&A1 for guidance regarding the SWTO, as well as cases interpreting a similar 3 California statute. Dkt. # 41 at 6–7; Dkt. # 42 at 16–17. 4 Defendants argue Mr. Arnold’s SWTO claim should be dismissed for two reasons. 5 Dkt. # 41 at 6. First, they argue Mr. Arnold fails to plead that he and putative class members 6 were “required” to use their personal cellphones. Id. For example, he does not plead “there 7 is a policy requiring use of personal cell phones, nor does he address whether employees 8 were offered alternative methods of communication.” Id. Second, Defendants argue Mr. 9 Arnold fails to plead that he and putative class members “actually incurred any expense in 10 connection with such calls or texts.” Id. Specifically, he does not plead details regarding 11 his phone plan or that he incurred charges “above and beyond his personal cellphone 12 usage.” Id. In response, Mr. Arnold argues he is not required to plead either issue under 13 the SWTO. Dkt. # 42 at 16. The Court agrees with Mr. Arnold. 14 i. “Required” Use of Personal Cell Phone 15 The Seattle Office of Labor Standards Q&A makes clear that an employer need not 16 necessarily “require” an employee to incur an expense to be liable for reimbursement. The 17 Q&A states reimbursable expenses are “those that are reasonably necessary to perform the 18 employee’s job duties or that foreseeably occurred because of an employer’s instructions.” 19 Q&A at 21 (emphasis added). It goes on to state that employers “must reimburse 20 employees for the cost of items or services that are explicitly or implicitly necessary, or 21 required by the employer, to carry out the employee’s work duties.” Id. (emphasis added). 22 Thus, the Q&A recognizes a distinction between an “implicitly necessary” expense and 23 one “required by the employer.” Either may be subject to reimbursement. The Q&A goes 24 on to explain that “[w]hether an expense is reimbursable will depend on the particular 25 situation.” Id. 26

27 1 Seattle Office of Labor Standards, Wage Theft Ordinance: Questions and Answers (Sept. 19, 2025), available at: https://www.seattle.gov/laborstandards/ordinances/wage-theft (“Q&A”). 1 Although not directly about cell phone expenses, the Q&A’s discussion regarding 2 telework is instructive. It states that “[w]hether an employer is required to reimburse 3 expenses associated with ‘optional’ teleworking depends on whether teleworking and the 4 associated costs were reasonably necessary to perform the employee’s job duties.” Id. at 5 21–22. Relevant considerations include “whether the employee was encouraged to work 6 at home, whether the employer has provided sufficient space at its physical location for the 7 employee to perform their work, how clearly the employer communicated that telework 8 was voluntary, and whether other factors that benefit the employer made work at home 9 necessary even though the overall telework policy was voluntary on its face.” Id. Thus, 10 even a facially “optional” expense could be subject to reimbursement. 11 Cases interpreting an analogous California statute further bolster the conclusion that 12 whether expenses are reimbursable is a fact specific inquiry. The cases explain that 13 “[a]scertaining whether an expense is ‘necessary’ ‘depends on the reasonableness of the 14 employee’s choices.’” Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) 15 (quoting Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 42 Cal.4th 554, 568 (2007)). 16 Based on the above, the Court finds that to state a SWTO claim for reimbursement, 17 Mr. Arnold need not plead that Defendants “required” him and putative class members to 18 use their personal cell phones for work-related matters. Rather, the analysis turns on 19 whether personal cell phone use was “reasonably necessary” under the circumstances, even 20 if not explicitly required. Here, Mr. Arnold alleges that his supervisors texted him on his 21 personal cell phone for work-related matters on several occasions. Dkt. # 38 ¶¶ 4.9, 4.13; 22 see also id. ¶¶ 4.7, 4.12. A logical inference from these allegations is that it was reasonably 23 necessary for Mr. Arnold and class members to use their personal cell phones to receive 24 work assignments, instructions, or other necessary communications to perform their duties. 25 While the ultimate question of whether these expenses were “reasonably necessary” is 26 subject to additional discovery, Mr. Arnold alleges sufficient facts at this stage to survive 27 a motion to dismiss. 1 ii. Actual Expenses Incurred 2 Next, the Seattle Office of Labor Standards Q&A clarifies that an employee need 3 not incur actual expenses above and beyond the employee’s personal phone plan to seek 4 reimbursement. In the example of a teleworking employee, the Q&A states reimbursement 5 can include “the portion” of the employee’s “cell phone plan that would be reasonably 6 required to perform work (based on some reasonable calculation).” Q&A at 21. Thus, if 7 it is reasonably necessary for the employee to use a personal phone for work, the employee 8 may seek reimbursement for a portion of the overall phone bill even if the employee did 9 not specifically need to increase the cost of his or her phone plan for the work usage. 10 Cases interpreting the analogous California statute add further support. The 11 California Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an employee must incur an 12 actual expense beyond their personal phone plan to seek reimbursement, and held that 13 employees are entitled to “a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills” regardless of 14 whether they “cell phone plans with unlimited minutes or limited minutes.” Cochran v. 15 Schwan’s Home Servs., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1140 (2014). It explained that “the 16 details of the employee’s cell phone plan do not factor into the liability analysis.” Id. at 17 1144. Subsequent opinions have applied this finding in the federal pleading context and 18 found plaintiffs need not allege details about their phone plans to survive a motion to 19 dismiss. See Dawson v. One Call Med., Inc., No. 20-cv-1188, 2021 WL 5513516, at *7 20 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2021) (holding that plaintiff need not allege facts about his “cell phone 21 plan or whether he incurred additional charges for calls or cellular data as a result of work 22 related usage.”) (emphasis in original); Lobo v. Air-India Ltd., No. 20-cv-8790, 2021 WL 23 254312, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021) (rejecting argument that plaintiff must plead “what 24 costs she incurred as a result of” employer’s policy); Batta v. YRC Inc., No. 20-02529, 25 2022 WL 18397381, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2022) (“while [plaintiff] failed to allege the 26 costs he incurred for using his personal cell phone, he alleged when the calls 27 1 occurred . . . and the nature of the calls, such that the Court can reasonably infer for 2 purposes of this motion to dismiss, their general costs”). 3 The cases Defendants cite are not persuasive. Defendants cite Wright v. Frontier 4 Management, LLC, No. 19-cv-1767, 2021 WL 2210739 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2021) for the 5 proposition that an employee must allege an actual expense related to use of cell phones 6 for work. Dkt. # 41 at 6. Wright, however, relies on a portion of an earlier opinion from 7 Krauss that the Krauss court later acknowledged was incorrect. See Krauss v. Wal-Mart, 8 Inc., No. 19-cv-838, 2020 WL 1874072, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (“The Court previously 9 found [allegations regarding cell phone reimbursement] failed because Plaintiff did not 10 provide a ‘single instance when such a cost was actually incurred and not reimbursed.’ . . . 11 In light of Cochran, the Court no longer finds Plaintiff needs to allege such an instance.”). 12 Defendants also cite Herrera. There, the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff failed to state a 13 reimbursement claim because she “failed to include specific, non-conclusory facts about 14 how she made the calls or what costs she incurred.” Herrera, 953 F.3d at 1078. The 15 primary failure in Herrera was the lack of non-conclusory allegations about plaintiff’s 16 circumstances. The Court does not read Herrera to require a plaintiff to plead facts about 17 personal phone plans. Such a reading would be directly contrary to Cochran, a case that 18 Herrera cited with approval. See id. 19 In sum, the Court finds Mr. Arnold is not required to plead facts about his phone 20 plan or that he incurred expenses above and beyond his personal phone usage to state a 21 claim for cell phone reimbursement under the SWTO. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. 22 Arnold’s SWTO claim is denied. 23 B. Willful Withholding of Wages 24 Next, Defendants argue Mr. Arnold fails to state a claim for willful withholding of 25 wages under the Washington Wage Rebate Act (“WRA”), RCW 49.52.050 and .070, 26 because he fails to allege Defendants had actual knowledge of the alleged wage violations. 27 Dkt. # 41 at 7–10. The Court disagrees. 1 Under the WRA, an employer may be liable for double damages and attorneys’ fees 2 if it “willfully” withheld an employee’s wages. RCW 49.52.050 and .070. The test for 3 willfulness is not “stringent.” Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 961 P.2d 371, 375 (Wash. 4 1998). It requires that “the employer’s refusal to pay must be volitional.” Id. In other 5 words, “[w]illful means merely that the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what 6 he is doing, and is a free agent” Id. (quoting Brandt v. Impero, 463 P.2d 197, 199 (Wash. 7 Ct. App. 1969)) (quotation marks omitted). “Where an employer fails to pay wages owed, 8 only two instances negate a finding of willfulness: (1) the employer was careless or erred 9 in failing to pay or (2) a bona fide dispute existed between the employer and employee 10 regarding the payment of wages.” Wash. State Nurses Ass’n v. Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 11 287 P.3d 516, 521 (Wash. 2012) (quoting Morgan v. Kingen, 210 P.3d 995, 998 (Wash. 12 2009)) (citation modified). 13 Federal courts have applied these principles in analyzing motions to dismiss under 14 the federal pleading standard. In Silver Fern Chemical, Inc. v. Lyons, No. 23-cv-775, 2024 15 WL 3994345 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2024), the court held counterclaim plaintiffs 16 sufficiently pleaded willfulness by alleging the existence of an implied contract entitling 17 them to wages and “breach of that implied contract in [counterclaim defendants’] failure 18 to pay the entirety of those wages.” Id., at *5. The court explained these allegations “depict 19 volitional actions by [the counterclaim defendants] to withhold wages, not carelessness or 20 a bona fide dispute regarding payment.” Id. Similarly, in Gaspar v. Turn Technologies 21 Inc., No. 23-cv-1274, 2024 WL 1344854 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2024), the court held 22 plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded willfulness by alleging “‘Defendants willfully withheld 23 wages’ by ‘failing to pay the stocks, bonus, and raise.’” Id., at *2 (quotes omitted). These 24 cases demonstrate the principle set out in Schilling that the test for willfulness is not 25 “stringent.” 26 The Court finds that Mr. Arnold sufficiently pleads willfulness under the WRA. 27 The second amended complaint depicts volitational acts—that Marriott, through its 1 supervisors, caused Mr. Arnold and class members to miss rest breaks and meal breaks, 2 work outside of scheduled shifts, and use their personal cell phones for work without 3 compensation or reimbursement. See, e.g., Dkt. # 38 ¶¶ 4.4, 4.5, 4.10, 4.12. Mr. Arnold 4 further alleges that on multiple occasions, he raised the issue to his supervisors but no 5 changes were made. Id. ¶¶ 4.10, 4.12. Finally, he alleges that the violations were a result 6 of Marriott’s policies, practices, and work culture. Dkt. # 38 ¶¶ 4.2, 4.7, 4.15. These 7 allegations are sufficient to state a claim for willful withholding of wages. 8 Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. First, Defendants argue 9 that Mr. Arnold’s allegations are conclusory and cite federal cases dismissing WRA claims 10 based on conclusory allegations. Dkt. # 41 at 8. As discussed above, however, Mr. 11 Arnold’s allegations are more than mere recitations of the elements of willful withholding 12 of wages and are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Second, Defendants argue cases 13 like Gaspar are distinguishable because they involved “lump sum payments to individuals 14 in situations in which the employer’s knowledge of nonpayment was obvious.” Dkt. # 43 15 at 6. A consequence of Defendants’ reasoning, however, is that it will be easier for 16 plaintiffs to plead willfulness in cases involving a single plaintiff and discrete payments 17 than in cases involving large-scale and systematic withholding of wages. The Court 18 declines to apply this distinction. Finally, to the extent that Defendants suggest any alleged 19 withholding may have been the result carelessness or error, this is a factual dispute subject 20 to discovery. 21 For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Arnold’s willful withholding 22 of wages claim is denied. 23 C. Claims Against Mr. Tyler 24 Lastly, Defendants argue that all claims against Mr. Tyler should be dismissed 25 because he is not subject to individual liability under the relevant statutes and ordinance. 26 Dkt. # 41 at 11–15. The Court agrees. 27 1 Mr. Arnold brings claims under four statutes and ordinances: (1) the Minimum 2 Wage Act (“MWA”), RCW 49.46; (2) the Industrial Welfare Act (“IWA”), RCW 49.12; 3 the (3) the SWTO; and (4) the WRA. Because each statute or ordinance contains a different 4 formulation for imposing individual liability, the Court must analyze Mr. Tyler’s liability 5 under each one. The common theme in dismissing all claims, however, is that Mr. Tyler 6 is the manager of a single function (convention services) at a single Marriott location. Mr. 7 Arnold fails to plead that Mr. Tyler exercised sufficient control to incur personal liability 8 for the alleged wage violations in this case. 9 i. MWA 10 Only an “employer” may be held liable under the MWA. RCW 49.46.090. 11 “‘Employer’ includes any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, 12 or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer 13 in relation to an employee.” RCW 49.46.010(5). 14 “[I]nterpretations of comparable provisions of the [Fair Labor Standard Act 15 (‘FLSA’)] are persuasive authority when construing the MWA.” Ramirez v. Precision 16 Drywall, Inc., 2011 WL 5147660, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2011). Here, the 17 definitions of “employer” under the MWA and FLSA are “substantially identical.” Id. 18 Thus, the Court will look to cases interpreting the definition of “employer” under the FLSA 19 for guidance. 20 When determining whether an individual is an “employer” under the FLSA, courts 21 look to the “economic reality” of the relationship. Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1091 22 (9th Cir. 2009). “Where an individual exercises ‘control over the nature and structure of 23 the employer relationship,’ or ‘economic control’ over the relationship, that individual is 24 an employer within the meaning of the Act, and is subject to liability.” Id. (quoting 25 Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Lambert, the Ninth Circuit 26 affirmed a jury instruction that individuals may be liable under the FLSA only if they have 27 “significant ownership interest with operational control of significant aspects of the 1 corporation’s day-to-day functions; the power to hire and fire employees; the power to 2 determine salaries; and the responsibility to maintain employment records.” Lambert, 180 3 F.3d at 1012 (citation modified). 4 Significantly, “[s]tatus as a supervisor and execution of certain duties attendant to 5 that status, e.g. scheduling shifts, collection of hours, distribution of paychecks, 6 recommendations regarding raises, and instruction, are not enough, without more, to make 7 the supervisor an ‘employer’ for purposes of the FLSA.” Pineda-Marin v. Classic Painting 8 Inc., No. 08-cv-798, 2010 WL 1257616, at *11 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2010). Multiple cases 9 support the conclusion that “supervisors are considered ‘employers’ under the FLSA only 10 when they exercise something more than common employee supervision.” Id. (collecting 11 cases). 12 The Court finds that Mr. Tyler is merely a supervisor rather than an “employer” 13 subject to liability under the MWA. His duties, including “managing the scheduling and 14 payments” of employees, Dkt. # 38 ¶ 3.2, are part of his role as supervisor of a single 15 function at a single Marriott location. Nothing in the second amended complaint suggests 16 that Mr. Tyler has the level of economic and operational control to give rise to liability 17 under the MWA. 18 ii. IWA 19 Under the IWA, liability also attaches to “employers,” defined as “any person, firm, 20 corporation, partnership, business trust, legal representative, or other business entity which 21 engages in any business, industry, profession, or activity in this state and employs one or 22 more employees.” RCW 49.12.005(3)(b). An individual may be liable under the IWA if 23 the individual “engages in business and employs employees.” Ramirez, 2011 WL 24 5147660, at *5. In Ramirez, the court found that the individual defendants, who were the 25 sole owners of the corporate defendant, could not be liable under the IWA because it was 26 the “corporate entity,” not the individual defendants, that engaged in business and 27 employed employees. Id. Here, again, Mr. Tyler is a supervisor of a single function at a 1 single Marriott location. He does not engage in business or employ anyone, and thus 2 cannot be liable under the IWA. 3 iii. SWTO 4 The SWTO similarly applies to “employers,” defined as “any individual, 5 partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any entity, person or group of 6 persons, or a successor thereof, that employs another person and includes any such entity 7 or person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 8 employee.” SMC 14.20.010. The Seattle Office of Labor Standards Q&A states an 9 “individual may also be a joint employer.” Q&A at 6. Similar to the FLSA and MWA, 10 whether an individual is an employer under the SWTO requires application of an 11 “economic realities test.” Id. The “five primary factors” are: (1) the nature and degree of 12 control of the workers; (2) the degree of supervision (direct or indirect) of the work; (3) the 13 power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of the workers; (4) the right 14 (directly or indirectly) to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions of the workers; 15 and (5) preparation of payroll and payment of wages.” Id. 16 Applying these factors, the Court finds that Mr. Tyler is also not an “employer” 17 under the SWTO. His control and supervision of employees is limited to his role as a 18 supervisor; he is not alleged to determine pay rates or methods of pay; he is not alleged to 19 have the power to hire, fire, or modify employment conditions; and he is not alleged to 20 prepare payroll or payment of wages. Again, nothing in the second amended complaint 21 suggests Mr. Tyler has the level of economic and operational control that could fairly 22 subject him to individual liability in this case. 23 iv. WRA 24 Finally, the WRA imposes liability on an “employer or officer, vice principal or 25 agent of any employer.” RCW 49.52.050. The Washington Supreme Court has held that 26 “low-level managers and supervisors” are exempt from liability under the WRA. Allen v. 27 1 Dameron, 389 P.3d 487, 493–94 (Wash. 2017) (discussing Ellerman v. Centerpoint 2 Prepress, Inc., 22 P.3d 795 (2001)). Thus, Mr. Tyler also cannot be liable under the WRA. 3 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against Mr. Tyler is granted. 4 v. Leave to Amend 5 The Court already put Mr. Arnold on notice that the allegations in his first amended 6 complaint against Mr. Tyler were deficient, and gave Mr. Arnold an opportunity to amend. 7 Dkt. # 36 at 13–14. Based on the analysis above, the Court finds the deficiencies in the 8 second amended complaint against Mr. Tyler cannot be cured through further amendment. 9 Accordingly, leave to amend is denied. 10 V. CONCLUSION 11 For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 12 Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, Dkt. # 41, as follows: 13 (1) All claims in the second amended complaint against Defendant Jason Tyler are 14 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 15 (2) The remainder of Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 16 17 Dated this 2nd day of March, 2026. A 18

19 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 20 United States District Judge 21

26 27