Marden v. Braselton

119 F.2d 174, 28 C.C.P.A. 1077, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 256, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 65
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 14, 1941
DocketNo. 4443
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 119 F.2d 174 (Marden v. Braselton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marden v. Braselton, 119 F.2d 174, 28 C.C.P.A. 1077, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 256, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 65 (ccpa 1941).

Opinion

LeNROot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office in an interference proceeding, awarding priority of the subject matter of all the counts in issue, ten in number, to appellee Braselton. The decision of the board reversed the decision of the Examiner of Interferences, which had awarded priority of invention as to all the counts to appellants.

The interference arises between an application of appellants filed November 19, 1931, and an application of appellee filed October 15, 1930. Appellants, being the junior party, had the burden of proving priority of invention by a preponderance of the evidence.

Interference No. 69,449 here involved, as originally declared, contained three counts, and was a three-party interference involving the parties to this appeal and one Gibson. On motion of Gibson four other counts were added to the interference, being counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the issue now before us. It appears from the record that the third party, Gibson, was eliminated from the interference upon failure to respond to an order to show cause why judgment on the record should not be entered, against him. This left in Interference No. 69,449 the parties to this appeal, the issue consisting of present counts 1 to 7, inclusive.

At the time Interference No.' 69,449 was declared, a second interference, No. 69,451, was declared between the parties to this appeal, upon the same applications involved in Interference No. 69,449. This was a two-party interference and, as originally declared, the issue therein consisted of two counts. Upon motion of the party Brasel-ton, appellee here, a third count was added to the interference. Subsequent to the elimination of the party Gibson from Interference No. 69,449, Interference No. 69,451 was consolidated therewith, and the [1079]*1079three counts forming the issue in Interference No. 69,451 became counts 8, 9, and 10 of Interference No. 69,449.

Of the counts constituting the issue of the interference, counts 1, 5, and 9 are thought to be illustrative and read as follows:

1. A negative glow lamp of tlie gaseous conduction type comprising an enclosing-envelope, a plurality of thermionieally active electrodes therein and a grid located between said electrodes.
5. A gaseous conduction lamp comprising an envelope, an ionizable medium therein, a plurality of thermionic electrodes and a grid also located therein, said electrodes being spaced from each other and supported by a press, said grid being located in the space between said electrodes, each of said electrodes including a hollow body having a thermionieally active surface and a heater element, said heater elements being connected in electrical series relationship, said grid also being supported by said press.
9. An ultraviolet lamp comprising an enclosing envelope, an ionizable medium, a plurality of electrodes and a grid located therein, said electrodes being spaced from each other and supported by a press, each of said electrodes including a heater element and a thermionieally active material, a grid located in the space between said electrodes, said grid being in electrical parallel relationship with one of said electrodes.

In his decision the Examiner of Interferences described the subject matter of the interference as follows:

The subject matter of this interference relates to lamps of the negative glow ultra violet type. The lamp comprises an envelope having a suitable ionizable medium therein and a plurality of electrodes having a thermionieally active coating. Heating elements connected in series are provided for the electrodes and at least one grid is located in the space between the electrodes.

In a preliminary statement and in a supplemental preliminary statement appearing in the record appellants alleged conception of the invention in issue about January 1930; actual reduction to practice by the making and operation of a full-sized device in February 1930; that they made and operated several other full-sized devices, the time of the making and operation of such other devices not being alleged; and that they were diligent in adapting and perfecting the invention from about January 1930 until the invention was reduced to practice.

No preliminary statement on behalf of appellee appears in the record. That one was made appears from the decision of the Examiner of Interferences.

In the early stages of Interferences 69,449 and 69,451, before their consolidation as aforesaid, appellants moved to dissolve the interferences oh the ground that the three counts forming the issue of Interference 69,449 and the two counts of Interference 69,451 (now counts 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9) were unpatentable, and also on the ground that' appellee here could not make claims corresponding to those counts for reasons set forth in said motion. The Primary Examiner in decisions in those interferences denied said motions to dissolve, and in addi-[1080]*1080lion, as above stated, permitted (over the objection of appellants) the addition of four counts to the issue of Interference 69,449 (present counts- 4, 5, 6, and 7), and the addition of one count to Interference 69,451 (present count 10).-

The Examiner of Interferences, in a decision in the consolidated interference now before us, held that appellants had established conception of the invention “at least as early as April 30, 1930*’; that they had established actual reduction to practice of the invention as of the same date, and that “Since the earliest date alleged by Braselton is subsequent to the date awarded to Marclen and Nicholson for reduction to practice, the party Marclen and Nicholson must prevail.” He thereupon awarded priority of invention as to all of the counts to appellants.

Upon appeal the Board of Appeals concurred in the examiner’s finding of April 30, 1930, for conception of the invention by appellants, but disagreed with the examiner on the question of whether they had shown a reduction to practice-. The board held that there was no satisfactory proof of reduction to practice by appellants prior to their filing date, November 19, 1931, and further held that they had not established diligence from a time just prior to appel-lee’s entry into the field until such filing date. In addition, the board considered the questions raised by appellants of the right of appellee to make claims corresponding to the counts, and held that the Primary Examiner had correctly held that appellee could make such claims.

Two fundamental questions are before us on this appeal: 1, the right of appellee to make claims corresponding to the counts of the issue; and 2, whether appellants have established a reduction to practice of the invention prior to their filing date, and if not, whether diligence on their part has been established during the critical period. We will consider these questions in that order.

The question of appellee’s right to make claims corresponding to the counts in issue was first raised before the Primaiy Examiner in appellants’ motions to dissolve in the two interferences then existing, in which motions it was urged that Braselton could not make claims corresponding to the counts because he does not show •a “negative glow” lamp and because he does not show an “ultraviolet” lamp. No other grounds were alleged.

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Bluebook (online)
119 F.2d 174, 28 C.C.P.A. 1077, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 256, 1941 CCPA LEXIS 65, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marden-v-braselton-ccpa-1941.