Marcus Satterfield v. Timothy Vaughn

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedAugust 2, 2024
Docket24-6298
StatusUnpublished

This text of Marcus Satterfield v. Timothy Vaughn (Marcus Satterfield v. Timothy Vaughn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marcus Satterfield v. Timothy Vaughn, (4th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-6298 Doc: 8 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6298

MARCUS ANTONIO SATTERFIELD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY VAUGHN,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:22-cv-00996-WO-JLW)

Submitted: July 30, 2024 Decided: August 2, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marcus Antonio Satterfield, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6298 Doc: 8 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Antonio Satterfield seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the

magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing without prejudice Satterfield’s civil

action following Satterfield’s filing of a document that the district court construed as a

motion to dismiss the action. We dismiss the appeal.

Defendant did not file an answer or a motion for summary judgment prior to the

filing of Satterfield’s request for dismissal. Accordingly, the district court should have

construed Satterfield’s filing as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of voluntary

dismissal. See Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting request for

voluntary dismissal filed within the limits of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) should be construed as a

notice of dismissal under that rule, regardless of how it is styled), abrogated in part on

other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 394-98 (1990). Because

a voluntary dismissal is effective upon the filing of the notice with the clerk of the district

court, the action terminated when Satterfield filed his notice. See In re Matthews, 395 F.3d

477, 480 (4th Cir. 2005). At that point, the district court was divested of jurisdiction. See

id. The district court therefore was without authority to enter the order Satterfield seeks to

appeal, and that order is void. See Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel, 907 F.2d 861, 864

(8th Cir. 1990). The order being void, the voluntary dismissal remains effective as of the

date the notice of dismissal was filed in the district court. *

* If Satterfield nonetheless desires to pursue his voluntarily dismissed claims, he may initiate a new action by refiling his complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6298 Doc: 8 Filed: 08/02/2024 Pg: 3 of 3

We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately addressed in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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