Marcus Rashad Williams v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 7, 2024
• Docket: 02-24-00028-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00028-CR ___________________________

MARCUS RASHAD WILLIAMS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1795907

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury found that Marcus Rashad Williams, while under a sudden passion,

murdered Lawrence Garcia Jr. by shooting him with a firearm. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 19.02(b), (d). Williams raises two points on appeal. First, he contends that the trial

court erred by failing to suppress a photo lineup and an in-court identification. We

overrule this point because the identification procedure was not impermissibly

suggestive. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.20. Second, Williams argues that

the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause against a juror. We overrule

this point because Williams did not show that the juror was so biased against him that

the juror could not carry out his oath and instructions according to the law. See id. art.

35.16. Accordingly, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on February 2, 2020, Garcia drove his friend T.C.

home.1 Garcia’s friends A.H., J.C., and R.R. accompanied them. At T.C.’s house, his

aunt, Cristina Watkins, and her boyfriend, Williams, were waiting in the front yard,

along with several other people who lived in the house.

When T.C. got out of the car, Watkins jumped into the back seat and began

pulling A.H.’s hair. Watkins then exited the car. Garcia backed the car out of the

Because most of the people involved in the incident were—or could have 1

been—minors at the time, we identify them by initials only. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10.

2 driveway and hit Watkins. Garcia drove away from the house, with A.H., J.C., and

R.R. still in the car. Watkins shouted, “Shoot him, Baby,” or words to that effect.

Williams walked out into the street, raised a gun, and fired a single shot into the

departing vehicle. J.C. saw Williams do this, and he also heard a gunshot. The shot

struck Garcia in the back of the head. The car coasted to a stop on a bridge nearby,

where A.H. called 911. Watkins saw Williams running back to the house from the

street and carrying a gun.

Medical technicians transported Garcia to the hospital where he died early the

next morning. Responding officers transported A.H., J.C., and R.R. to a City of Fort

Worth police station to be interviewed and to meet with their parents.

At the police station, J.C. initially misremembered Williams’s first name as

“Marco.” J.C. knew Williams from spending time with T.C. at Watkins’s house while

Williams visited Watkins. J.C. and his mother looked up Williams on social media,

found the correct spelling of his first name and a picture of him, and showed the

picture to police. J.C. or his mother also showed A.H. the photograph. A.H. did not

recognize the photograph. Then, the police presented J.C. with a lineup; he identified

Williams. A.H., who had never seen or met Williams before that night, was shown

three photo lineups, but she was not able to identify Williams until viewing the third

lineup.2

A.H. was not asked to, and did not, identify Williams in the courtroom at trial. 2

3 Before trial, Williams filed a motion to suppress J.C.’s and A.H.’s

identifications. The court took up the motion before trial began, out of the presence

of the jury, and J.C. and A.H. testified on voir dire. The trial court denied the motion

but granted Williams a running objection.

At trial, J.C. testified that he had spent time at Watkins’s house and was familiar

with both Watkins and Williams. He knew Williams as Watkins’s boyfriend. When

he initially testified, J.C. stated that Williams was not in the courtroom. However,

after a break, he asked prosecutors for an opportunity to return to the stand so that he

could identify Williams, stating he had not understood the question initially, but that

he did see Williams in the courtroom. Williams did not object to the State’s recalling

J.C. for this purpose or to his subsequent testimony identifying Williams and did not

reurge his running objection.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Pretrial Identification Procedure Was Not Impermissibly Suggestive

Williams argues that because J.C. and his mother had located a photograph of

him based on their prior knowledge that the shooter was Watkins’s boyfriend, the

pretrial lineup procedure was improperly suggestive. We disagree.

In-court identification evidence must meet the due-process standard of

fairness. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196, 93 S. Ct. 375, 380–81 (1972). A pretrial

identification procedure may be so suggestive and conducive to mistaken

identification that subsequent use of that identification at trial would deny the accused

4 due process of law. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971

(1968); Barley v. State, 906 S.W.2d 27, 32–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). An in-court

identification is inadmissible when it has been tainted by an impermissibly suggestive

pretrial photographic identification. Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Whether a pretrial identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive is a

mixed question of law and fact that does not turn on an evaluation of credibility or

demeanor; therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review. Gamboa v. State, 296

S.W.3d 574, 581–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Williams states that this case involves a unique fact scenario because the

witness was shown a photo lineup that the witness helped create. However, our sister

court addressed a very similar situation in Malley v. State, No. 01-19-00127-CR, 2020

WL 4006439, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). In that case, before the police conducted their

photographic lineup, a witness’s father had shown him a photograph of a suspect that

the father had found on social media after the witness described the suspect from his

prior interactions, including spending a considerable amount of time in the suspect’s

home. Id. Relying on the reasoning in Rogers v. State, a case from the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals in which the photo lineups shown to witnesses included the

defendant’s arrest photograph that the witnesses had seen in a newspaper article the

day before, the First Court of Appeals held that the lineup was not impermissibly

5 suggestive and that the identification was properly admitted. Id. (relying on Rogers v.

State, 774 S.W.2d 247, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by

Peek v. State, 106 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).

In Rogers, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because law enforcement was

not the source of any suggestibility of the lineup’s photographs, a rule of exclusion

based on the lineup’s being impermissibly suggestive does not apply. 774 S.W.2d at

260. Instead, the source of the identification might, at most, affect the weight, and

not the admissibility, of the identification. Id.

We apply the same reasoning here. J.C. and his mother located the photograph

that was later included in the lineup based upon J.C.’s personal knowledge of

Williams’s identity and his relationship to Watkins, and not through any acts of law

enforcement. J.C.’s knowledge was based on time spent at Watkins’s home, where he

had seen Williams. No evidence suggests that J.C.’s identification of Williams arose

from improper state action. Because the pretrial identification procedure was not

impermissibly suggestive, we overrule Williams’s first point. See Rogers, 774 S.W.2d at

260; Malley, 2020 WL 4006439, at *3.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Strike Veniremember Number One for Cause

In his second point, Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his challenge

for cause to the veniremember in seat one (V.M. One). Williams properly preserved

6 his complaint for appeal. See Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 83 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016).

We give great deference to the trial court’s discretion during voir dire. Curtis v.

State, 205 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref’d); see Samaripas v.

State, 454 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 879

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that the trial court in jury selection is in the best

position to evaluate a prospective juror’s demeanor and responses). We review the

entire record to determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s

ruling on a challenge for cause. Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826, 831 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011). We reverse only for clear abuse of discretion. Hudson v. State, 620 S.W.3d

726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

A juror who cannot impartially judge the credibility of the witnesses has a bias

or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

35.16(a)(9); Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (op. on reh’g),

superseded by statute in part, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071. However, a

venireperson ought not be struck for cause simply because he would slightly favor

certain classes of witnesses, such as police officers and doctors, when deciding

credibility because “[c]omplete impartiality cannot be realized as long as human beings

are called upon to be jurors.” Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Crim. App.

1998); see Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Before a potential

juror can be excused for cause, the proponent of the challenge must show that the

7 person expressed an extreme or absolute position on the credibility of witnesses and

was not open-minded and persuadable. Feldman, 71 S.W.3d at 747; Jones, 982 S.W.2d

at 389.

Here, one venireperson stated that if an officer took the stand to testify, she

would give the officer more benefit of the doubt when assessing credibility. She said

that to her, the officer’s position would lend more credence initially, depending how

the testimony aligned with the facts, which would temper the credit she gave to the

testimony. The State asked her whether, even if police were initially given respect due

to their position, she would be able to follow the law, to which she answered “yes.”

The State then asked who agreed with these statements, and V.M. One, among

others, raised his hand. When asked about his agreement, V.M. One said,

I think we all –– most of us, at least me, view people in the police and law enforcement as . . . more well trained on the law and more understanding of the law than maybe the person walking across the street from you. But then when you hear them . . . you just have to weigh what they say as well put and then balance it against the other evidence that’s been presented. . . . They make mistakes, too.

Williams objected to V.M. One on the basis that he would assume that police

“are more well-trained on the law than someone else, but then you can hear what they

say and judge. So he’s agreeing he is going to start them higher, give them kind of this

automatic credibility, but it’s possible for them to lose it.” The trial court declined to

strike V.M. One for cause, stating that his remarks were directed toward officers’ legal

training being better than most people’s but not specifically toward their credibility.

8 We agree. V.M. One’s statements as a whole reflect that he was persuadable,

was open to questioning police testimony, and did not hold an absolute view on

police officers’ credibility. See Feldman, 71 S.W.3d at 747 (finding trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it did not strike a juror who said he would “lean towards”

believing an officer over a lay witness but would delay judgment until after hearing

both witnesses).

Further, before a venireperson can be excused for cause on the basis of bias,

the law must be explained to him, and he must be asked whether he can follow that

law regardless of his personal views. Tracy v. State, 597 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2020). The party challenging a venireperson bears the burden to establish that

the challenge is proper, and he does not meet this burden until he has shown that the

venireperson understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his

prejudice well enough to follow the law. Id.

Williams failed to make such a showing. No one questioned V.M. One further

on whether he could follow the law despite thinking that police officers have better

legal training than civilians. He specifically stated he would weigh officer training

against the rest of the evidence.

Because the statements made by V.M. One do not constitute an extreme or

absolute position or otherwise demonstrate improper bias and because Williams failed

to carry his burden to demonstrate bias, we hold that the trial court’s denial of his

9 challenge for cause was not an abuse of discretion. See id.; Feldman, 71 S.W.3d at 747.

We overrule this point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Williams’s points, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 7, 2024