1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARCUS PRICE, Case No. 22-cv-03243-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 9
10 JAMES H. CHEN, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 40, 45 Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a detainee at Napa State Hospital (“NSH”), filed this civil rights case under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found that Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 10), when liberally 15 construed, stated cognizable claims for relief against NSH and Dr. James H. Chen, a doctor who 16 worked there. The California Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”), which runs NSH, filed a 17 motion to dismiss, and the claims against NSH/DSH were dismissed for failure to state a 18 cognizable claim for relief. Chen has filed a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed an 19 opposition, and Chen replied. The reply brief was filed before the opposition. The Court accepts 20 and has considered the opposition. For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner was involuntarily committed to NSH in 2019 being found not guilty by reason of 23 insanity. DSH psychiatrists have treated him with Clozapine, an antipsychotic medication. 24 Pursuant to recommendations by psychiatrists, in 2021, DSH officials petitioned for an 25 involuntary medication order under California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 4210. The 26 order was issued by the California Superior Court in January 2021, and it expired one year later. 27 1 Plaintiff claims, “Dr. Chen knowingly forced me on medication and wanted to take my 2 rights to refuse medication.” (ECF No. 10 at 7.) He alleges he experienced “a long list of side 3 affects (sic) that include extreme sweating, extreme constipation, dizziness, drooling and 4 previously could not walk.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that because of the “meds” he fell in May 5 and June 2022, and that he was hospitalized in June 2022 “because of the medication that doctor 6 Chen forced on me.” (Id.) He claims that “all this could have been avoid[ed] by a fair and 7 impartial treatment” and a “reasonable and upheld IMO[1] hearing.” (Id.) 8 Defendant Chen has presented uncontradicted evidence showing he was a Staff Physician 9 at DSH from May 2006 through March 2021, when he resigned. Chen is not a psychiatrist, did 10 not serve on the panels that evaluated Plaintiff’s need for medication, nor was he involved in the 11 petition or order for to involuntarily medicate Plaintiff. Chen’s treatment of Plaintiff was limited 12 to prescribing him Vitamin B and allergy medication (with brand names Flonase and Claritin 13 DISCUSSION 14 I. Standard of Review 15 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 16 is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 17 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of 18 the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 19 fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 20 nonmoving party. Id. 21 The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 22 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 23 issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving 24 party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, 25 by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 26 trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to show a genuine issue of material 27 1 fact, the moving party wins. Id. “[S]self-serving affidavits are cognizable to establish a genuine 2 issue of material fact so long as they state facts based on personal knowledge and are not too 3 conclusory.” Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 5 nonmoving party: if evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with evidence produced by 6 the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving 7 party with respect to that fact. Tolan v. Cotton, 570 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014). A court may not 8 disregard direct evidence on the ground that no reasonable jury would believe it. Leslie v. Grupo 9 ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) (where nonmoving party's direct evidence raises 10 genuine issues of fact but is called into question by other unsworn testimony, district court may 11 not grant summary judgment to moving party on ground that direct evidence is unbelievable). 12 II. Analysis 13 Plaintiff’s complaint can, at best, be construed to claim that Chen violated his 14 constitutional rights by forcing him to take medication that caused adverse side effects, including 15 falling down. 16 Because Plaintiff claims injury while involuntarily committed to a state hospital, his claims 17 arise under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 “Involuntarily committed patients in state mental health 18 hospitals have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be provided safe conditions by the 19 hospital administrators.” Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1027 20 (9th Cir. 2011). When evaluating claims presented by involuntarily confined individuals, courts 21 ask “whether [a hospital] administrator’s conduct diverges from that of a reasonable professional.” 22 Id. A decision, “if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only 23 when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional 24 judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base 25 the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). This “standard 26 is equivalent to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of conscious indifference 27 1 amounting to gross negligence.” Est. of Conners v. O’Connor, 846 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2 1988). 3 The uncontradicted evidence shows Chen was not involved in the decision to forcibly 4 || medicate Plaintiff at NSH, nor that he could have been involved as he was not a psychiatrist. The 5 uncontradicted evidence further shows Chen had resigned from NHS fifteen months before the 6 || falls Plaintiff attributes to such medication. And there is no allegation evidence that Chen’s 7 prescribing Plaintiff the commonplace allergy medications and Vitamin B was medically 8 || unreasonable or caused Plaintiff any harm.? Consequently, there are no triable factual questions as 9 || to whether Chen caused Plaintiff to be involuntary medicated or caused any of the harms Plaintiff 10 || attributes to such medication.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MARCUS PRICE, Case No. 22-cv-03243-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 9
10 JAMES H. CHEN, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 40, 45 Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a detainee at Napa State Hospital (“NSH”), filed this civil rights case under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court found that Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 10), when liberally 15 construed, stated cognizable claims for relief against NSH and Dr. James H. Chen, a doctor who 16 worked there. The California Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”), which runs NSH, filed a 17 motion to dismiss, and the claims against NSH/DSH were dismissed for failure to state a 18 cognizable claim for relief. Chen has filed a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed an 19 opposition, and Chen replied. The reply brief was filed before the opposition. The Court accepts 20 and has considered the opposition. For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner was involuntarily committed to NSH in 2019 being found not guilty by reason of 23 insanity. DSH psychiatrists have treated him with Clozapine, an antipsychotic medication. 24 Pursuant to recommendations by psychiatrists, in 2021, DSH officials petitioned for an 25 involuntary medication order under California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 4210. The 26 order was issued by the California Superior Court in January 2021, and it expired one year later. 27 1 Plaintiff claims, “Dr. Chen knowingly forced me on medication and wanted to take my 2 rights to refuse medication.” (ECF No. 10 at 7.) He alleges he experienced “a long list of side 3 affects (sic) that include extreme sweating, extreme constipation, dizziness, drooling and 4 previously could not walk.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that because of the “meds” he fell in May 5 and June 2022, and that he was hospitalized in June 2022 “because of the medication that doctor 6 Chen forced on me.” (Id.) He claims that “all this could have been avoid[ed] by a fair and 7 impartial treatment” and a “reasonable and upheld IMO[1] hearing.” (Id.) 8 Defendant Chen has presented uncontradicted evidence showing he was a Staff Physician 9 at DSH from May 2006 through March 2021, when he resigned. Chen is not a psychiatrist, did 10 not serve on the panels that evaluated Plaintiff’s need for medication, nor was he involved in the 11 petition or order for to involuntarily medicate Plaintiff. Chen’s treatment of Plaintiff was limited 12 to prescribing him Vitamin B and allergy medication (with brand names Flonase and Claritin 13 DISCUSSION 14 I. Standard of Review 15 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 16 is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 17 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of 18 the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 19 fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 20 nonmoving party. Id. 21 The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 22 portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 23 issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving 24 party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, 25 by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 26 trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to show a genuine issue of material 27 1 fact, the moving party wins. Id. “[S]self-serving affidavits are cognizable to establish a genuine 2 issue of material fact so long as they state facts based on personal knowledge and are not too 3 conclusory.” Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 902 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 5 nonmoving party: if evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with evidence produced by 6 the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving 7 party with respect to that fact. Tolan v. Cotton, 570 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014). A court may not 8 disregard direct evidence on the ground that no reasonable jury would believe it. Leslie v. Grupo 9 ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) (where nonmoving party's direct evidence raises 10 genuine issues of fact but is called into question by other unsworn testimony, district court may 11 not grant summary judgment to moving party on ground that direct evidence is unbelievable). 12 II. Analysis 13 Plaintiff’s complaint can, at best, be construed to claim that Chen violated his 14 constitutional rights by forcing him to take medication that caused adverse side effects, including 15 falling down. 16 Because Plaintiff claims injury while involuntarily committed to a state hospital, his claims 17 arise under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 “Involuntarily committed patients in state mental health 18 hospitals have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be provided safe conditions by the 19 hospital administrators.” Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1027 20 (9th Cir. 2011). When evaluating claims presented by involuntarily confined individuals, courts 21 ask “whether [a hospital] administrator’s conduct diverges from that of a reasonable professional.” 22 Id. A decision, “if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only 23 when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional 24 judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base 25 the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). This “standard 26 is equivalent to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of conscious indifference 27 1 amounting to gross negligence.” Est. of Conners v. O’Connor, 846 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2 1988). 3 The uncontradicted evidence shows Chen was not involved in the decision to forcibly 4 || medicate Plaintiff at NSH, nor that he could have been involved as he was not a psychiatrist. The 5 uncontradicted evidence further shows Chen had resigned from NHS fifteen months before the 6 || falls Plaintiff attributes to such medication. And there is no allegation evidence that Chen’s 7 prescribing Plaintiff the commonplace allergy medications and Vitamin B was medically 8 || unreasonable or caused Plaintiff any harm.? Consequently, there are no triable factual questions as 9 || to whether Chen caused Plaintiff to be involuntary medicated or caused any of the harms Plaintiff 10 || attributes to such medication. There are furthermore no triable issues as to whether treated 11 Plaintiff unreasonably, let alone with gross negligence towards Plaintiffs safety so as to violate 12 || Plaintiffs constitutional nghts. Accordingly, Chen is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs 13 claims under Section 1983. CONCLUSION 3 15 Defendants’ summary judgment motion is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment a 16 || and close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. || Datea: July 30, 2024 a}
JEFFREY §. WAITE 21 United/States istrict Judge 22 , 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 Indeed, Plaintiff does not mention these medications in his amended complaint.