IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2019-CP-00804-COA
MARCUS HERBERT HARRIS A/K/A MARCUS APPELLANT HARRIS A/K/A MARCUS H. HARRIS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/03/2019 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT P. KREBS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARCUS HERBERT HARRIS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/11/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In 2011, Marcus Harris pleaded guilty to murder and aggravated assault. The Jackson
County Circuit Court sentenced Harris to serve a life sentence for his murder conviction and
a twenty-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC).
¶2. More than three years later, Harris filed a petition to clarify his sentence, which the
trial court treated as a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). The trial court denied
Harris’s motion. In 2018, Harris filed his second PCR motion, which the trial court denied
as time-barred and without merit. ¶3. Harris now appeals from the trial court’s order denying his PCR motion. After our
review, we find that Harris’s PCR motion is time-barred and successive-writ barred. We also
find that Harris’s claims of fundamental-rights violations are without merit. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s order denying Harris’s PCR motion.
FACTS
¶4. On December 26, 2009, Harris was involved in an altercation that resulted in the fatal
shooting of Sema Hall and permanent paralysis of Willie Williams. As a result of the
altercation, Harris was indicted for capital murder, with robbery as the underlying charge,
and aggravated assault. Harris entered a plea of not guilty, and the matter proceeded to trial.
After opening statements,1 Harris withdrew his not-guilty plea, and on March 1, 2011, he
pleaded guilty to murder and aggravated assault. Harris received a life sentence for his
murder conviction and a twenty-year sentence for his aggravated-assault conviction in the
custody of the MDOC. The trial court also ordered Harris to pay a $5,000 fine for each
conviction, as well as all court costs.
¶5. On July 31, 2014, more than three years after pleading guilty, Harris filed a petition
to clarify his sentence. After reviewing Harris’s petition and the State’s response, the trial
court entered an order denying relief, finding that Harris’s sentence was unambiguous.
Harris appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition. On appeal, this Court affirmed
1 The trial transcript reflects that Harris was unsatisfied with his defense counsel’s performance during voir dire, so Harris dismissed his trial counsel and proceeded to trial pro se with the assistance of his public defender.
2 the trial court’s decision. Harris v. State, 230 So. 3d 718, 719 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
This Court held that “Harris’s petition to clarify his sentence falls within the purview of
postconviction relief, as Harris asserts that his sentence is ambiguous.” Id. at 720 (¶5) (citing
Laneri v. State, 167 So. 3d 274, 277 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)). This Court acknowledged
that “Harris did not explicitly file a PCR motion in the circuit court” but explained that
“Harris’s petition takes issue with the ambiguity of his sentence. Therefore, we consider
Harris’s appeal as one from a denial of PCR.” Id. This Court ruled that because Harris
pleaded guilty in March 2011, “his PCR motion is time-barred under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), as he filed his motion more than three years after
the entry of his judgment of conviction.” Id.2
¶6. On May 21, 2018, Harris filed a second PCR motion. That same day, Harris also filed
a motion for discovery and for an expansion of the record. In his PCR motion, Harris set
forth the following claims: (1) no factual basis for his guilty plea existed; (2) his guilty plea
was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) he did not voluntarily and intelligently
enter his guilty plea; (4) his indictment was defective and deprived the trial court of subject
2 In his reply brief, Harris argues that his 2014 motion to clarify his sentence should not be treated as a PCR motion because he did not seek to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. However, in addressing that motion, this Court explained that because Harris argued that his sentence is ambiguous, this Court would treat Harris’s appeal of the denial of his motion to clarify his sentence as an appeal from the denial of a PCR motion. Id. “An argument that a sentence violates law, either because it is clearly erroneous or because it is unredeemably ambiguous or incomplete, would be proper under the post-conviction relief procedures.” Laneri, 167 So. 3d at 277 (¶6) (quoting Burns v. State, 933 So. 2d 329, 331 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)).
3 matter jurisdiction; and (5) the trial court violated Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court
8.04 by participating in plea discussions. In his motion for discovery and expansion of the
record, Harris argued that he needed additional documents to prove his PCR claims,
including the transcript from the trial (in which only voir dire and opening statements were
completed prior to Harris deciding to enter a plea of guilty); the surveillance video from the
December 2009 shooting; the transcript of the plea hearing; and all thirty-eight letters he
wrote to the trial court complaining about his public defenders and the conditions of the jail.
¶7. The trial court entered an order on January 3, 2019, denying Harris’s PCR motion.
The trial court held that Harris’s PCR motion was time-barred and without merit. The trial
court explained that it “reviewed the transcripts of both the guilty plea and the opening
statements made at trial, guilty plea petition, sentencing order, the [PCR motion] and
applicable law[,] and determined that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.” The trial court
stated that Harris’s PCR motion was time-barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated
section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) because Harris failed to file his PCR motion within three
years after his conviction. The trial court further found that Harris failed to show that his
PCR claims involve one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar or an error affecting a
fundamental constitutional right. However, the trial court stated that “[d]espite the absence
of affidavits or other evidentiary support for the [m]otion or a showing of good cause for the
absence of proof, the [c]ourt will address each of Harris’[s] assignments of error in an
abundance of caution.”
4 ¶8. As to Harris’s claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court
explained that “Harris contends his counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to a
defective indictment, failed to investigate the underlying facts of the case, including
Harris’[s] claim of self-defense, and he allowed Harris to plead guilty with no factual basis
to support the plea.” The trial court found that “Harris’[s] attorney performed competently
and Harris has failed in showing, had he completed his trial, that the outcome would have
been different.” The trial court also found that “Harris’[s] attorney negotiated with the State
to reduce the capital murder charge to murder which included the opportunity for release and
significantly reduced time in prison.”
¶9. The trial court also found no merit to Harris’s claim that no factual basis existed for
the trial court to accept his guilty plea, explaining that “[d]uring the plea colloquy, Harris
stated he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. He admitted to
shooting both victims.” The trial court also found that “[t]he State was prepared to prove the
robbery element of the capital murder charge with the store surveillance video that showed
Harris leaving the crime scene with the gun he used to kill one victim and permanently injure
the other.”
¶10. Regarding Harris’s claim that his plea was involuntary, the trial court found that
“Harris was afforded a full explanation by the [c]ourt of the charges against him, the rights
that he was waiving by pleading guilty, and the consequences of his plea. The fact that
Harris pled guilty because he feared a harsher sentence does not render his plea involuntary.”
5 ¶11. As to Harris’s claim that his indictment was defective because it contained only the
statute for robbery, not capital murder, and thus “deprived the [trial] [c]ourt of subject matter
jurisdiction[,]” the trial court found that “[t]his issue is without merit as the indictment
clearly contains the correct capital murder statute.”
¶12. The trial court also found no merit to Harris’s final assignment of error—that the trial
court had improperly participated in plea discussions. The trial court explained that “[o]ther
than Harris’[s] own bare assertion, there is nothing in his pleadings or the record to support
such a contention.”
¶13. On May 6, 2019, Harris filed his notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying
his PCR motion.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. “When reviewing a trial court’s denial or dismissal of a [PCR motion], we will only
disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review
legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.” Chapman v. State, 167 So. 3d 1170,
1172 (¶3) (Miss. 2015).
3 The record reflects that Harris filed a motion requesting permission to file an out-of- time appeal, which the trial court granted. The trial court’s order granting Harris’s motion reflects that Harris attached a copy of the envelope from the trial court containing the order denying Harris’s PCR motion. The envelope reflects that the South Mississippi Correctional Institution personnel received it on April 18, 2019. Harris then filed his notice of appeal on May 6, 2019. The trial court accordingly granted Harris’s motion for permission to proceed out of time, explaining that the delay was based on the fact that Harris did not receive the order denying his PCR motion in a timely fashion and therefore could not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the order.
6 DISCUSSION
¶15. On appeal, Harris argues that the trial court erred in denying his PCR motion. In
support of his argument, Harris lists the same assignments of error and arguments from his
PCR motion, and he additionally asserts that he was entitled to discovery and expansion of
the record. The State maintains that Harris’s PCR motion is time-barred and successive-writ
barred.
¶16. Harris filed his PCR motion on May 21, 2018, approximately seven years after he
pleaded guilty. Because Harris failed to file his PCR motion within three years after the entry
of the judgment of conviction, the trial court properly found that Harris’s motion is time-
barred. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (In the case of a guilty plea, “[a] motion for relief
under this article shall be made . . . within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of
conviction.”).
¶17. The Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) also prohibits the
filing of a successive motion: “[A] motion filed after entry of a final judgment that asserts
the same issues is procedurally barred as [successive].” McComb v. State, 135 So. 3d 928,
931 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015). As stated,
Harris’s first PCR motion was a request to clarify his sentence based on his belief that the
circuit clerk’s docket summary revealed that the crime he had been indicted for, and the
sentence he received, had been reduced. Harris, 230 So. 3d at 720 (¶3). Harris’s second
PCR motion, which is currently before this Court, sets forth various assignments of error
7 relating to his guilty plea, counsel, and indictment. However, because Harris could have
raised these allegations in his first PCR motion, they are “barred by ordinary principles of res
judicata, which bar ‘all issues that might have been (or could have been) raised and decided
in the initial suit, plus all issues that were actually decided in the first cause of action.’”
Bosarge v. State, 141 So. 3d 24, 26 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Little v. V & G
Welding Supply Inc., 704 So. 2d 1336, 1337-38 (¶8) (Miss. 1997)). This Court has explained
that “[s]ince successive motions are not allowed, ‘a person who requests post[]conviction
relief is obligated to place before the court all claims known to him and/or of which he
should have had knowledge.’” Nichols v. State, 265 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.
2018) (quoting Salter v. State, 184 So. 3d 944, 951 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)), cert.
denied, 265 So. 3d 181 (Miss. 2019). “The failure to do so results in a loss of his claims for
a second or successive petition.” Id. We therefore find that Harris’s PCR motion is also
successive-writ barred.
¶18. Harris argues that his PCR motion is excepted from the time-bar and successive-writ
bar because he raises errors affecting his fundamental rights. This Court recognizes that
“errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars.”
Id. (quoting Rowland v. State, 42 So. 3d 503, 507 (¶12) (Miss. 2010)). “[F]our fundamental-
rights exceptions have been expressly found to survive procedural bars: (1) the right against
double jeopardy; (2) the right to be free from an illegal sentence; (3) the right to due process
at sentencing; and (4) the right not to be subject to ex post facto laws.” Id. (quoting Carter
8 v. State, 203 So. 3d 730, 731 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). This Court has additionally
recognized that “the due-process right not to stand trial or be convicted while incompetent
is a fundamental right not subject to the procedural bars of the Mississippi
postconviction-relief statutes.” Brown v. State, 198 So. 3d 325, 330 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App.
2015) (citing Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (¶8) (Miss. 2014), overruled on other
grounds by Pitchford v. State, 240 So. 3d 1061, 1070 (¶49) (Miss. 2017)). However, “merely
asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars[,] . . .
there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a
fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols, 265 So. 3d at 1241 (¶10) (citation
omitted). Harris, as the PCR movant, “bears the burden of demonstrating that he has met an
exception.” McComb, 135 So. 3d at 932 (¶13).
¶19. In addition to the five fundamental-rights exceptions listed above, we recognize that
under “extraordinary circumstances,” ineffective assistance of counsel can also constitute an
exception to the procedural bars of the UPCCRA. Brown v. State, 187 So. 3d 667, 670-71
(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Chapman v. State, 167 So. 3d 1170, 1173-74 (¶¶10-13)
(Miss. 2015)). To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris must prove
that (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Overcoming
the procedural bars “requires more than a party’s own affidavit or mere assertions made
within his brief.” McCoy v. State, 111 So. 3d 673, 679 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “A
9 defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be pled with specificity, and the
claim must be supported by affidavits other than his own.” Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845,
851 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotation mark omitted). When the PCR movant
offers only his own affidavit in support of his claim, and the affidavit “is contradicted by
unimpeachable documents in the record, an evidentiary hearing is not required.” Lackaye
v. State, 166 So. 3d 560, 564 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Gable v. State, 748 So. 2d
703, 706 (¶12) (Miss. 1999)).
¶20. Harris argues that because he has shown that his counsel’s performance was so
deficient and so prejudicial that Harris’s constitutional rights were violated, he has therefore
overcome his burden of demonstrating that he has met an exception to the procedural bars.
Harris also asserts that all of the issues he raised in his PCR motion fall under the umbrella
of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Harris specifically asserts that his trial
attorneys were ineffective for (1) allowing Harris to plead guilty despite the lack of a factual
basis for the plea; (2) allowing the trial court to participate in the plea discussion; (3) failing
to object to the defective indictment; and (4) failing to investigate key evidence in the case
showing that Harris acted in self-defense.
¶21. As acknowledged, the record reflects that the instant PCR motion is time-barred and
successive-writ barred. However, “[w]here a petitioner asserts a fundamental right, the
courts must address the merits of the PCR petition regardless of procedural bars.” Salter,
184 So. 3d at 950 (¶21). We now turn to examine whether Harris provided sufficient
10 evidence to overcome the procedural bars.
¶22. Harris first argues that because he was denied effective assistance of counsel, he
involuntarily entered his guilty plea. In support of his claim that his guilty plea was not
voluntarily or intelligently made, Harris states that from the time of his arraignment until the
time he entered a guilty plea (approximately eleven months), he wrote thirty-eight letters to
the trial court complaining about his public defenders; his personal safety, health, and
welfare; and the “deplorable conditions” at the Jackson County detention center. Harris
maintains that these letters show that Harris’s “plea of guilty was based on ignorance and
incomprehension” as well as “coercion and terror.”
¶23. However, Harris’s plea petition and the transcript of his guilty plea hearing do not
support his assertion that his plea was involuntary. Rather, Harris’s plea petition reflects that
he “knowingly, intelligently, understandingly, freely[,] and voluntarily” entered his plea of
guilty to the charges of murder and aggravated assault. During his plea hearing, Harris
informed the trial court, under oath, that he had reviewed his plea petition with his attorney
and that he understood it. Harris also swore that he had not been threatened or promised
anything in exchange for his guilty plea. When the trial court asked whether he was satisfied
with the services of his attorney, Harris responded, “I’m accepting this plea. I feel like I have
no alternative.” The trial court then asked, “Do you think these attorneys have properly
advised you in your best interests?” Harris answered, “As far as the plea, yeah. Yes sir.”
After questioning Harris and his attorneys, the trial court accordingly found that Harris’s
11 guilty plea was “freely, voluntarily[,] and intelligently” made and accepted the plea. Based
on our review, we also find that Harris’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made.
¶24. Harris next claims that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty
despite no factual basis existing for the entry of his guilty plea. In support of his claim,
Harris asserts that “at no time during the guilty plea hearing . . . did Harris admit to any
elements of robbery.” Harris admits, however, that he told the trial court, “I think I shot Hall
and Williams.” Harris also acknowledges that the surveillance video from the incident shows
him shooting Hall and Williams, but he argues that the video does not contain audio of the
conversation that occurred between himself, Hall, and Williams and that the video does not
show Harris committing a robbery. Harris asserts that the surveillance video could instead
be used to show that Harris acted in self-defense by shooting Hall and Williams. Harris
claims that “manslaughter is the only crime” with which he could be charged.
¶25. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 8.04(A)(3) formerly provided that
“[b]efore the trial court may accept a plea of guilty, the court must determine that the plea
is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea.” URCCC
8.04(A)(3).4 We recognize that a factual basis can be established through various means,
including “a statement of the prosecutor, the testimony of live witnesses, and prior
4 Effective July 1, 2017, the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure replaced the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice with regard to criminal procedure. At the time of Harris’s guilty pleas, however, the former rules remained in effect.
12 proceedings, as well as an actual admission by the defendant.” Timmons v. State, 176 So. 3d
168, 172 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). As stated, after opening statements in his trial, Harris
withdrew his plea of not guilty. That same day, he entered a plea of guilty. During opening
statements, the State set forth that it was prepared to prove the elements of Harris’s capital
murder charge, including the elements of the underlying charge of robbery, as well as the
elements of aggravated assault. The State explained to the jury that the store surveillance
video showed Harris shooting Hall and Williams, and then leaving the crime scene with
Williams’s gun, which Harris used to kill Hall and permanently injure Williams.
¶26. However, in exchange for pleading guilty, Harris’s charges of capital murder, where
the underlying offense was robbery, and aggravated assault were reduced to murder and
aggravated assault. The plea petition and plea hearing transcript reflect that Harris pleaded
guilty to and was sentenced for murder and aggravated assault, and not robbery. As to the
charges of murder and aggravated assault, Harris admitted at the plea hearing that he shot
Hall and Williams. Harris admitted to the trial court that he was pleading guilty because of
his guilt and for no other reason. Harris stated he “picked up a gun and used it” on Williams
and Hall, and he acknowledged that as a result of his actions, Hall is dead, and Williams is
in a wheelchair. After our review, we find that a sufficient factual basis existed for the trial
court to accept Harris’s guilty plea.
¶27. Harris also claims that his counsel’s assistance was ineffective for failing to object to
the defective indictment. Harris argues that Count I of the indictment did not adequately
13 define capital murder; specifically, the indictment allegedly failed to identify the section and
subsection of the capital murder statute under which Harris was charged. Harris states that
his indictment only contained a definition of section Mississippi Code Annotated 97-3-73
(Rev. 2006), which defines robbery. Harris asserts that the trial court possessed subject
matter jurisdiction to determine whether Harris’s indictment was defective.
¶28. The heading of Harris’s multi-count indictment reflects that Harris was charged with
the following: (1) Count I: capital murder, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section
97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2006), and (2) Count II: aggravated assault, in violation of Mississippi
Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2)(b) (Supp. 2009). As to count I, the indictment charged
that Harris, while
in Jackson County, Mississippi, on or about December 26, 2009, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without the authority of law, and with or without any design to effect the. death, kill and murder Sema Hall, a human being, while in the commission of the felony crime of [r]obbery, as defined by [s]ection 97-3-73[.]
¶29. This Court has held that “the purpose of an indictment is to put the defendant on
notice of the charge against him.” Baker v. State, 95 So. 3d 692, 694 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App.
2012). “[A]n indictment gives sufficient notice so long as its words substantially describe
the crime within the statute.” Id. (citing Winters v. State, 52 So. 3d 1172, 1174-75 (¶7)
(Miss. 2010)). In Baker, this Court held that “the indictment was not defective because its
heading clearly stated the crime and code section.” In the case before us, we find that
because Harris’s indictment “clearly stated the crime and code section,” the indictment
14 provided him with sufficient notice that he was being charged with capital murder and
aggravated assault.
¶30. Harris next maintains that his counsel’s assistance was ineffective for allowing the
trial court to participate in the plea discussion. However, this Court has held that once a
defendant notifies the trial court “of his intent to plead guilty, it [is] the duty of the trial court
to address him personally and to inquire and determine whether he understood the nature and
consequences of the guilty pleas. It must also advise him of the maximum and minimum
penalties provided by law.” Mitchell v. State, 795 So. 2d 620, 622 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing URCCC 8.04).5 The trial court must also address the defendant personally “to inquire
and determine” that he understands “that by pleading guilty []he waives his/her constitutional
rights of trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right
against self-incrimination.” Dixon v. State, 52 So. 3d 1254, 1256-57 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App.
2011) (quoting URCCC 8.04(c)). Our review of the plea hearing transcript reflects that the
trial court properly advised and made these inquiries of Harris.
¶31. Harris also maintains that his counsel’s assistance was ineffective because he failed
to adequately investigate the evidence in this case. Harris asserts that the surveillance video
of the crime would have shown that he acted in self-defense. Harris also claims that if his
counsel had subpoenaed the video footage, he would not have pleaded guilty and he would
5 As stated, the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice were in effect at the time Harris entered his guilty plea.
15 have insisted on going to trial. However, our review of the record shows that Harris failed
to provide any evidence, other than his own assertion, that supports this claim. This Court
has held that where the defendant “failed to offer any other evidence, aside from his own
assertions, of his counsel’s deficient performance[,]” the defendant “provided insufficient
evidence to support a finding of ineffective assistance.” Vitela v. State, 183 So. 3d 104, 108
(¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). Furthermore, as stated, the trial transcript reflects that the State
was prepared to use the surveillance video at trial to make its case for capital murder and
¶32. Finally, Harris asserts that he is entitled to discovery and expansion of the record. On
the same day he filed his PCR motion, Harris also filed a motion for discovery and expansion
of the record. In his motion, Harris sought to obtain the transcript of the trial transcript, plea
hearing transcript, “and other documents related to the case,” including the thirty-eight letters
he wrote to the trial court and the surveillance video footage of the crime. Harris argues that
the documents he requested “would have established that Harris[’s] guilty plea was not
intelligently and voluntarily made,” that no factual basis existed for his guilty plea, and that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶33. The record reflects that the trial court denied Harris’s PCR motion without ruling on
Harris’s motion for discovery and expansion of the record. We find that “[b]y failing to
pursue a hearing or ruling on the motion from the trial court, [Harris] effectively abandoned
the motion and waived this issue for appeal.” Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 296 (¶17)
16 (Miss. 2008). Furthermore, the record before us contains the transcript from Harris’s trial6
and plea hearing, as well as Harris’s plea petition. The record also contains numerous letters
written by Harris and mailed to the public defender’s office, the Mississippi Bar Association,
and the trial court. These letters appear to be attachments to Harris’s PCR motion. After
reviewing these documents, we find that they do not support Harris’s PCR claims.
¶34. As stated, “[u]nder ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ ineffective assistance of counsel
can constitute an exception to the [procedural bars].” Morales v. State, 291 So. 3d 363, 369
24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), cert. denied, 289 So. 3d 310 (Miss. 2020). After our review of the
record, we find that Harris failed to present any “extraordinary circumstances” that would
constitute an exception to the procedural bars. See id. Although Harris did attach numerous
exhibits to his PCR motion—including police reports from the crime; his indictment; the trial
court docket; letters that he sent to the trial court, public defender’s office, and Mississippi
Bar Association; and the order denying Harris’s motion to quash his indictment—we find
that none of these documents provides evidentiary support for his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Moore, 248 So. 3d at 851 (¶15) (“A defendant’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel must be pled with specificity, and the claim must be
supported by affidavits other than his own.”). Procedural bar notwithstanding, we also find
no merit to Harris’s PCR motion, as his claims are contradicted by our review of the record.
6 As explained, after opening statements, Harris decided to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a plea of guilty.
17 Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶35. AFFIRMED.
WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, C.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. LAWRENCE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.