Marcus A. Satterfield v. Roxboro Police Officer T.J. Knaub

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MARCUS A. SATTERFIELD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:23CV144 ) ROXBORO POLICE OFFICER T.J. ) KNAUB, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

When Roxboro Police Officer T.J. his body worn camera footage in Knaub was speaking to Marcus A. support. See Def. T.J. Knaub’s Mot. Satterfield as part of an investigation for Summ. J., Docket Entry 52; Br. in into allegations of assault and Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., trespassing, Satterfield admitted that Docket Entry 54. Satterfield did not he had a rock of crack cocaine that he provide any evidence in opposition to was going to smoke and then opened the motion. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s his hand and showed Knaub several Mot. for Summ. J., Docket Entry 56. off-white rocks. Unsurprisingly, Knaub arrested Satterfield for felony The undisputed evidence shows that possession of cocaine, then found Knaub had probable cause to arrest drug paraphernalia on his person Satterfield and the ensuing search during a search incident to his arrest. incident to arrest was lawful. Satterfield sued Knaub, in his official Accordingly, there is no genuine and individual capacities, alleging dispute of material fact – Knaub did violations of his Fourth Amendment not violate Satterfield’s Fourth rights. Amendment rights, and he is entitled to qualified immunity. For the The Court previously dismissed the reasons explained herein, the Court official capacity claim against Knaub. should grant Knaub’s motion for In turn, Knaub moves for summary summary judgment and dismiss this judgment on the remaining individual action. capacity claim and supports the motion with his declaration, a copy of the investigative report, and a copy of I. UNDISPUTED FACTS to smoke me a rock. . . . I got a rock. On January 28, 2022, while working as a patrol officer with the City of Knaub: Where? Roxboro Police Department, T.J. Knaub was dispatched to a residence Satterfield: I’m fixing to smoke in response to a domestic violence it. call. See Decl. of Officer T.J. Knaub ¶ 3 Knaub: You have it now? (Dec. 4, 2025), Docket Entry 52-1. Satterfield’s mother had called to Satterfield: Yeah. report that he was fighting her husband and was high on drugs. See (Knaub asked to see it) id. ¶ 4. As Knaub approached the home, he saw Satterfield lying in the Satterfield: I got it right here. middle of the road; Satterfield stood up when Knaub approached. See id. Satterfield then opened his left ¶ 6. hand to reveal several off-white rocks. Knaub knew Satterfield from previous encounters where Satterfield had See BWC at 0:01:16–36. acted erratically and violently and seemed to be under the influence of From Knaub’s experience, the off- alcohol or drugs. See id. ¶ 7. Knaub white rocks appeared to be crack also knew that other officers had had cocaine. See Decl. ¶ 15. Based on similar encounters with Satterfield. Satterfield’s statements and the See id. appearance of the rocks, Knaub determined that he had probable Knaub asked “Marcus” to come talk cause to arrest Satterfield for felony and tell him what was going on. See possession of cocaine. See id. ¶ 16. Body Worn Camera Footage (“BWC”) at 0:001:04–05, Ex. B to Decl. Satterfield began to wander away, but (manually filed with the Clerk’s Knaub took hold of the fabric on the Office). The following exchange took left sleeve of Satterfield’s jacket and place: told Satterfield to “come here” and put the drugs down on the patrol car. Satterfield: I don’t know if you See BWC at 0:01:36–40. Satterfield know, I’m Jesus Christ. I’m fixin’ asked, “Why?” and Knaub told him, to smoke me a rock. . . . I’m fixing “You can’t have that.” Id. at 0:01:40– 41. Knaub placed Satterfield in handcuffs. See id. at 0:01:56–2:08. Knaub asked Satterfield to show him his right hand in which he held a pipe, Brillo pad, and lighters. See id. at Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 0:02:18–20. From Knaub’s (1986). In analyzing a summary experience, the glass pipe appeared to judgment motion, courts be the kind used to smoke crack “must construe all facts and cocaine, and he knew that the Brillo reasonable inferences in the light pad is frequently used to filter the most favorable to the nonmoving crack smoke. See Decl. ¶ 20. Knaub party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 then had Satterfield open his left hand F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). which held the small off-white rocks he had shown Knaub earlier. See BWC The moving party bears the burden of at 0:02:27–3:01. establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact by Knaub conducted a pat-down search “identifying those portions of ‘the of Satterfield before placing him in pleadings, depositions, answers to the backseat of the patrol car. See id. interrogatories, and admissions on at 0:03:07–4:19. He then spoke to the file, together with the affidavits, if any’ stepfather and caller, returned to his which it believes demonstrates the car to place the contraband in the absence of a genuine issue of material evidence bag, and transported fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 Satterfield to the Person County U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule Sheriff’s Office in the Person County 56). Law Enforcement Center. See id. at 0:04:20-12:37. During the transport, “Where, as here, the nonmoving party Knaub did not ask Satterfield any bears the ultimate burden of proof at questions. See id. at 0:12:38-17:25. trial, the moving party may discharge The Magistrate found probable cause its initial burden at summary for Satterfield’s arrest, placed him judgment by ‘showing – that is, under a secured bond, and turned him pointing out to the . . . court – that over to the custody of the Person there is an absence of evidence to County Detention Center. See Decl. support the nonmoving party’s case.’” ¶ 32. Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). “If the moving party carries this A court “shall grant summary initial burden, the burden then shifts judgment if the movant shows that to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go there is no genuine dispute as to any beyond the pleadings and by [his] material fact and the movant is own affidavits, or by the depositions, entitled to judgment as a matter of answers to interrogatories, and law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine admissions on file, designate specific dispute of material fact exists “if the facts showing that there is a genuine evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex secured to them by the Constitution Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). and, in a more sharply limited way, the statutory laws of the United “An affidavit or declaration used to States” by persons acting under color support [summary judgment] must of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l be made on personal knowledge, set Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. out facts that would be admissible in 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit evidence, and show that the affiant or pursuant to § 1983 must show that a declarant is competent to testify on person acting under color of state law the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. violated a constitutional or other 56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487 Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. Here, Satterfield contends that Knaub 1991)). violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search A party cannot rely on statements in a and seizure. brief to support a motion for summary judgment, because they are A. Knaub had reasonable not evidence. City of Greensboro v. suspicion to stop Satterfield. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 To the extent that Satterfield n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017) challenges Knaub’s interaction with (collecting cases); see also Hill v. him in the first place, Knaub acted Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 lawfully. WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 2022). Officers may conduct a “brief investigatory stop” as long as there is There is no genuine dispute of “reasonable suspicion to believe that material fact as to the criminal activity may be afoot.” constitutionality of Knaub’s actions, District of Columbia v. R.W., 608 U.S. and Satterfield, who has the burden at ___, 146 S. Ct. 1069, 1070 (2026) (per trial, has failed to provide any curiam) (internal quotations evidence to the contrary. omitted). “Reasonable suspicion ‘is a Accordingly, the Court should grant less demanding standard than Knaub’s motion for summary probable cause’ yet requires ‘at least a judgment and find that he is entitled minimal level of objective justification to qualified immunity. for making the stop.’” United States v. Critchfield, 81 F.4th 390, 393 (4th III. DISCUSSION Cir. 2023) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.SS. 119, 123 (2000)). Title 42, United States Code, Section An “‘officer must be able to articulate’ 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy objective reasons for his suspicion” available to those deprived of rights that “the particular person stopped is, or is about to be, ‘engaged in a that Satterfield had just committed particular crime.’” Id. (quoting assault and was trespassing. He then Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 385 conducted a brief investigatory stop of n.1 (2020)). Satterfield. Accordingly, because Knaub had articulable, reasonable “[R]easonable suspicion arises when, suspicion that criminal activity was based on the totality of the afoot, this stop was lawful. circumstances, the detaining officer had a particularized and objective B. There was probable cause to basis for suspecting criminal arrest Satterfield. wrongdoing.” R.W., 126 S. Ct. at 1071 (internal quotations and citations Satterfield also challenges his omitted). Officers are permitted “to warrantless arrest, but the law make commonsense judgments and permitted Knaub to arrest him under inferences about human behavior” the circumstances. because “[r]easonable suspicion depends on the factual and practical An officer may arrest someone considerations of everyday life on without a warrant “if the officer has which reasonable and prudent men, probable cause to believe that the not legal technicians, act.” Id. suspect committed a crime in the (internal quotations and citations officer’s presence.” District of omitted) (emphasis in R.W.). Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018). Probable cause does not Here, the totality of circumstances require “‘an actual showing of’” leaves no question that there was criminal activity; it only requires “‘a reasonable suspicion to believe probability or substantial chance of criminal activity was afoot when criminal activity.’” Id. at 57 (quoting Knaub asked Satterfield to come talk Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 to him. (1983)). It “‘deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the Not only did Satterfield’s mother call circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Gates, dispatch to report that Satterfield was 462 U.S. at 243-44 n.13). It “‘is not a at her house fighting with her high bar.’” Id. (quoting Kaley v. husband and would not leave the United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 property – the same location where (2014)). To determine if there is Knaub came upon Satterfield, but probable cause to arrest someone, Knaub knew Satterfield. And he knew courts “‘examine the events leading him to act erratically and violently, up to the arrest, and then decide often when he was under the whether these historical facts, viewed influence of alcohol or drugs. from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to Knaub “drew the commonsense probable cause.’” Id. at 56-57 (quoting inference,” R.W., 146 S. Ct. at 1073, Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.366, 762-63 (1969)); see also Virginia v. 371 (2003)) (cleaned up). Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“When officers have probable cause The circumstances here far surpassed to believe that a person has the standard for probable cause; there committed a crime in their presence, is no need for probability. After all, the Fourth Amendment permits them Satterfield actually admitted the to make an arrest, and to search the crime to Knaub – “I’m fixing to smoke suspect in order to safeguard evidence me a rock; I got a rock” – and Knaub and ensure their own safety.”). actually saw Satterfield commit the crime – Satterfield showed Knaub off- Because Knaub’s arrest of Satterfield white rocks in his hand, which Knaub was lawful, his subsequent search of identified, based on his experience in Satterfield incident to that arrest was law enforcement, as crack cocaine. also lawful. See, e.g., Petrisor v. Therefore, Knaub had probable cause Rodgers, No. 1:23CV552, 2025 WL to arrest Satterfield – even without a 461631, at *12-13 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 11, warrant – for possession of cocaine. 2025) (finding the defendant failed to state a claim for an unreasonable C. The search incident to arrest search where the search of his person was lawful. was incident to his lawful arrest).

To the extent that Satterfield D. Knaub is entitled to qualified challenges Knaub’s search of him immunity. incident to his arrest, Knaub once again acted lawfully. Knaub also argues that qualified immunity protects him from suit in Courts have long recognized that “a his individual capacity. He is correct. search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant “The doctrine of qualified immunity requirement of the Fourth ‘balances two important interests,’ Amendment.” United States v. namely, the need to hold accountable Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). public officials who exercise power “When an arrest is made, it is irresponsibly, and the need to shield reasonable for the arresting officer to officials who perform their duties search the person arrested in order to responsibly from ‘harassment, remove any weapons that the latter distraction, and liability.’” Byers v. might seek to use in order to resist Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir. arrest or effect his escape” and “to 2026) (quoting Peason v. Callahan, search for and seize any evidence on 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To the arrestee’s person in order to determine if qualified immunity prevent its concealment or protects an offer, the court asks two destruction.’” Id. at 226 (quoting questions: “(1) whether a statutory or Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, constitutional violation occurred, and (2) whether the right was clearly Thus, Knaub is entitled to qualified established at the time of the immunity. violation.” Harrold v. Hagen, 174 F.4th 393, 401-02 (4th Cir. 2026). “If IV. CONCLUSION the answer on either question is ‘no,’ the officer being sued is entitled to IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED qualified immunity.” Id. at 402. that the Court GRANT T.J. Knaub’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Here, the analysis is straightforward. dismiss the case with prejudice. There was no constitutional violation.

Vsona Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge August 7, 2026