IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1154 Filed May 21, 2025
MARCUS A. HILDEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEVIN L. TYER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. Neary,
Judge.
The mother appeals from a custody decree placing physical care with the
father. AFFIRMED.
Nick E. Wingert, of Mayne, Hindman, Frey, Parry & Wingert, Sioux City, for
appellant.
Deborah J. Morris of Tigges, Bottaro & Lessmann, LLP, Sioux City, for
appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Devin Tyer appeals from a custody decree placing physical care of her two
children with their father, Marcus Hilden. She argues the district court misweighed
the relevant custodial factors and requests appellate attorney fees. After
considering the district court’s implicit and explicit credibility findings, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Devin and Marcus were involved in a relationship from roughly 2014 to early
2022, but they never married. While living together, they both worked full-time and
both parented their two children, born in 2018 and 2020. In resolving sometimes-
conflicting testimony, the district court found “Marcus was as involved, if not more
involved, than Devin with the parenting.”
As of trial, Marcus worked full-time for a Sioux City asphalt company in
eight-hour seasonal shifts. In Marcus’s view, this leaves him plenty of time to
spend with the children without over-relying on a babysitter or family childcare.
Devin worked full-time for a Sioux City hospital system, worked part-time at
a sporting-goods store, and donated plasma regularly for income. Marcus testified
that, throughout their relationship, Devin “had almost two jobs” and worked a lot of
hours. In Marcus’s view, this indicated Devin preferred working to family time.
Devin testified that she needed the money to support the children in part due to
Marcus’s insufficient contribution to their household income. And that she was “not
good at sitting at home without [her] kids” and liked the discount from the sporting-
goods store.
While they were together, both Devin and Marcus were involved with day-
to-day parenting and childcare. But after physical care of the children was placed 3
with her by the temporary-matters order, Devin relied heavily on Marcus’s aunt for
daycare, which led to some friction between the parties. As the district court put
it, there was additional “discord and tension[]” relating to a “right of first refusal”
established in the temporary-matters orders; the order provided that, if Devin was
unavailable and relying on childcare for more than four hours, she had to offer
Marcus additional parenting time to watch the children. The particulars of the
discord would not add much to this opinion, and the parties agreed that the
provision caused problems even if they disagreed on why. In the end, the court
found Devin was “manipulative and controlling” and that she failed to support
Marcus’s rights or his relationship with the children. Similarly, the court found
Marcus acted out toward Devin, which “demonstrated his immaturity, frustration,
and anger with [her].” These disagreements and others, the court found, led to
neither party trusting or communicating well with the other.
In deciding physical care, the district court concluded that both parties
displayed immaturity and seemed to put the children in the middle. But the court
found Devin was “more manipulative than Marcus,” she tended to deny Marcus
access to the children, and she sought to limit or frustrate his relationship with
them. The court “[got] the feeling that [Devin] would rather have Marcus just not
be involved in the children’s lives.” And these findings tipped the scales “ever so
slightly in favor of Marcus on the physical-custody determination.” The court
considered joint physical care at some length but ultimately ruled it out based on
many of the same considerations, with emphasis on the parties’ poor
communication, lack of respect for each other, high degree of conflict, and the 4
serious risk the children would become “pawn[s] in continued post-separation
strife.”
Devin appeals.1
II. Standard of Review
We review custody and care decisions de novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “[W]e examine the entire record and decide
anew the issues properly presented.” In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704
N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). While we are not bound by the district court’s
fact-findings, we do give them weight—especially credibility determinations.
Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 5.
III. Discussion
Although this action is governed by Iowa Code chapter 600B (2024), we
look to the factors in section 598.41 to determine physical care. See Iowa Code
§ 600B.40(2) (providing “section 598.41 shall apply” to chapter 600B proceedings).
Section 598.41 sets forth a series of nonexclusive factors to guide our
consideration. And our case law sets forth similar factors. In re Marriage of Winter,
223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974). “The objective of a physical care
determination is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them
to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” In re Marriage of
Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). Our overriding consideration “is the
best interests of the child.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n).
1 Marcus waived his right to file an appellee’s brief. 5
In her appellate brief, Devin disagrees with the district court’s weighing and
consideration of the facts adduced at trial. She urges that Marcus was not credible
based on what she describes as inconsistencies in his testimony. And she puts a
positive spin on her attempts to improve communication between the parties. At
the outset, we acknowledge many of the facts referenced in Devin’s appellate brief
establish Marcus is not a perfect parent. Neither parent in this case is. We single
out just two of Devin’s factual arguments for further discussion.
First, Devin contends she proved Marcus domestically abused her. But the
district court did not find these facts proven. Instead, the court observed that both
parties had alleged physical abuse and neither proved the other abusive at trial.
The district court was in an advantaged position to assess the credibility of
witnesses, and we have no basis to disturb that court’s finding from our seats
removed from the action on appeal.2 To the extent Devin believes evidence she
submitted was overlooked and this issue was inadequately addressed in the ruling
below, she did not file a Rule-1.904(2) motion, and we have no tools by which to
relitigate the question at this juncture. She is owed no relief on this ground.
Second, Devin claims Marcus should not have received physical care
because he did not exercise all of his parenting time under the temporary-matters
order. As the district court noted, there were significant problems attendant the
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1154 Filed May 21, 2025
MARCUS A. HILDEN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEVIN L. TYER, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. Neary,
Judge.
The mother appeals from a custody decree placing physical care with the
father. AFFIRMED.
Nick E. Wingert, of Mayne, Hindman, Frey, Parry & Wingert, Sioux City, for
appellant.
Deborah J. Morris of Tigges, Bottaro & Lessmann, LLP, Sioux City, for
appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Devin Tyer appeals from a custody decree placing physical care of her two
children with their father, Marcus Hilden. She argues the district court misweighed
the relevant custodial factors and requests appellate attorney fees. After
considering the district court’s implicit and explicit credibility findings, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Devin and Marcus were involved in a relationship from roughly 2014 to early
2022, but they never married. While living together, they both worked full-time and
both parented their two children, born in 2018 and 2020. In resolving sometimes-
conflicting testimony, the district court found “Marcus was as involved, if not more
involved, than Devin with the parenting.”
As of trial, Marcus worked full-time for a Sioux City asphalt company in
eight-hour seasonal shifts. In Marcus’s view, this leaves him plenty of time to
spend with the children without over-relying on a babysitter or family childcare.
Devin worked full-time for a Sioux City hospital system, worked part-time at
a sporting-goods store, and donated plasma regularly for income. Marcus testified
that, throughout their relationship, Devin “had almost two jobs” and worked a lot of
hours. In Marcus’s view, this indicated Devin preferred working to family time.
Devin testified that she needed the money to support the children in part due to
Marcus’s insufficient contribution to their household income. And that she was “not
good at sitting at home without [her] kids” and liked the discount from the sporting-
goods store.
While they were together, both Devin and Marcus were involved with day-
to-day parenting and childcare. But after physical care of the children was placed 3
with her by the temporary-matters order, Devin relied heavily on Marcus’s aunt for
daycare, which led to some friction between the parties. As the district court put
it, there was additional “discord and tension[]” relating to a “right of first refusal”
established in the temporary-matters orders; the order provided that, if Devin was
unavailable and relying on childcare for more than four hours, she had to offer
Marcus additional parenting time to watch the children. The particulars of the
discord would not add much to this opinion, and the parties agreed that the
provision caused problems even if they disagreed on why. In the end, the court
found Devin was “manipulative and controlling” and that she failed to support
Marcus’s rights or his relationship with the children. Similarly, the court found
Marcus acted out toward Devin, which “demonstrated his immaturity, frustration,
and anger with [her].” These disagreements and others, the court found, led to
neither party trusting or communicating well with the other.
In deciding physical care, the district court concluded that both parties
displayed immaturity and seemed to put the children in the middle. But the court
found Devin was “more manipulative than Marcus,” she tended to deny Marcus
access to the children, and she sought to limit or frustrate his relationship with
them. The court “[got] the feeling that [Devin] would rather have Marcus just not
be involved in the children’s lives.” And these findings tipped the scales “ever so
slightly in favor of Marcus on the physical-custody determination.” The court
considered joint physical care at some length but ultimately ruled it out based on
many of the same considerations, with emphasis on the parties’ poor
communication, lack of respect for each other, high degree of conflict, and the 4
serious risk the children would become “pawn[s] in continued post-separation
strife.”
Devin appeals.1
II. Standard of Review
We review custody and care decisions de novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “[W]e examine the entire record and decide
anew the issues properly presented.” In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704
N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). While we are not bound by the district court’s
fact-findings, we do give them weight—especially credibility determinations.
Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d at 5.
III. Discussion
Although this action is governed by Iowa Code chapter 600B (2024), we
look to the factors in section 598.41 to determine physical care. See Iowa Code
§ 600B.40(2) (providing “section 598.41 shall apply” to chapter 600B proceedings).
Section 598.41 sets forth a series of nonexclusive factors to guide our
consideration. And our case law sets forth similar factors. In re Marriage of Winter,
223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974). “The objective of a physical care
determination is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them
to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” In re Marriage of
Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). Our overriding consideration “is the
best interests of the child.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n).
1 Marcus waived his right to file an appellee’s brief. 5
In her appellate brief, Devin disagrees with the district court’s weighing and
consideration of the facts adduced at trial. She urges that Marcus was not credible
based on what she describes as inconsistencies in his testimony. And she puts a
positive spin on her attempts to improve communication between the parties. At
the outset, we acknowledge many of the facts referenced in Devin’s appellate brief
establish Marcus is not a perfect parent. Neither parent in this case is. We single
out just two of Devin’s factual arguments for further discussion.
First, Devin contends she proved Marcus domestically abused her. But the
district court did not find these facts proven. Instead, the court observed that both
parties had alleged physical abuse and neither proved the other abusive at trial.
The district court was in an advantaged position to assess the credibility of
witnesses, and we have no basis to disturb that court’s finding from our seats
removed from the action on appeal.2 To the extent Devin believes evidence she
submitted was overlooked and this issue was inadequately addressed in the ruling
below, she did not file a Rule-1.904(2) motion, and we have no tools by which to
relitigate the question at this juncture. She is owed no relief on this ground.
Second, Devin claims Marcus should not have received physical care
because he did not exercise all of his parenting time under the temporary-matters
order. As the district court noted, there were significant problems attendant the
right-of-first-refusal provision, and both parties’ behavior was less than ideal.
There is also support in the record for the district court’s conclusion that Devin
2 We have reviewed the video evidence the parties submitted at trial. Like the district court, we find it less than conclusive. We also note Devin testified she slapped Marcus on one occasion. And Marcus’s mother and sister-in-law testified they witnessed Devin punch or hit Marcus in the back of the head. 6
manipulated the situation with the provision, and we do not think she should reap
the benefits of that manipulation by claiming now that Marcus did not exercise all
of his time. That said, we share the frustration expressed by the district court below
and Devin on appeal that the right-of-first-refusal provision’s inartful drafting likely
exacerbated conflict, and we note we would affirm the district court’s ruling even
absent the drama surrounding the provision and its impact on the parties’ parenting
time leading up to trial.
Both parents are suitable caretakers for the children. And in close cases
with conflicting testimony, “we should defer to the trial court’s detailed fact-findings
and credibility assessment.” In re Rhyan, No. 06-1490, 2008 WL 4472300, at *1
(Iowa Aug. 15, 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Overall, we see no basis to
reverse the district court’s ruling placing physical care with Marcus. And we agree
specifically with the court’s comments at trial that this case involves “two parents
that like to play games with each other” and were “acting very childish with each
other.” After giving appropriate weight to the express and implicit credibility
findings related to the parties’ competing evidence at trial, we find placing physical
care with Marcus is in the children’s best interests. We note there is significant
record support for the district court’s conclusion that Devin actively undermined
Marcus’s relationship with the children, such as by not including him as a parent
on medical forms, sending one of the children to Marcus’s house with only “I Love
Mom” shirts or “Just A Boy Who Loves His Mama” shorts for clothing, and
deliberately withholding information. And we observe that, in our de novo review
of Devin’s testimony, even the cold transcript reads as defensive and evasive.
Although perhaps a closer call than some cases, we decline to reverse or modify 7
the physical-care ruling in part out of deference to the district court’s first-hand
observations of these parents at trial.
Because we affirm the district court, Devin is not entitled to appellate
attorney fees. See Iowa Code § 600B.26 (limiting the award of “reasonable
attorney fees” to “the prevailing party”).
AFFIRMED.