Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co.

154 F. 74, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5146

This text of 154 F. 74 (Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co., 154 F. 74, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5146 (circtsdny 1907).

Opinion

TOWNSEND, Circuit Judge.

On motion for preliminary injunction. The original opinion in the suit by this complainant against the De Forest Wireless Telegraph Company, the predecessor of this defendant, is reported in 138 Fed. 667. Judge Wheeler’s opinion in National Electric Signaling Company against the original De Forest Company (C. C.) is reported in 145. Fed. 354.

[75]*75Iii the original suit brought by this complainant • against the De Forest Wireless Telegraph Company on claims 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, and 84 of complainant’s reissued Marconi patent, No. 11,913, granted to Marconi in 1901, this court held that the first claim was invalid, that the other claims were valid, and that defendants had infringed the third and fifth claims of said patent, but had not infringed claims 8, 10, and 84 thereof, and dismissed the bill as to claims 1, 8, 10, and 84. In this decision both parties acquiesced. In the present case the motion for a preliminary injunction is founded only on claim 3 of said patent. The principal defendant in this case, the American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Company, is the successor of the former defendant, and actually defended the original company in the former suit against it.

In the present case the defendants are using a modified apparatus, differing in many respects from the one against which the former suit was directed. The contention of complainant is that the alterations made by defendants have not materially changed the system so far as concerns the infringement of claim 3.

Said claim is as follows:

“The combination, in an apparatus for communicating electrical signals, of a spark-producer at the transmitting-station, an earth connection to one end of the spark-producer, and an insulated conductor connected to the other end, an imperfect electrical contact at the receiving-station, an earth connection to one end of the contact, an insulated conductor connected to the other end, and a circuij: through the contact, substantially as and for the purpose described.”

Defendants deny infringement, on the ground, inter alia, that the new system is totally different from that covered by said claim in construction, operation, and result. These alleged differences, so far as is material to the disposition of the questions herein, are as follows: (1) In defendants’ new system “the receiving conductor is not insulated, but is electrically connected at its upper end to an earth plate by a wire or cable.” (2) The defendants do not use “an imperfect electrical contact at the receiving station” to detect the electrical oscillations. (3) The defendants’ earth connection is not connected to one end of the spark-producer, nor is the insulated conductor connected to the other end of the spark-producer. (4) The defendants’ detector is not connected at one end to an Insulated conductor and at the other end to an earth connection. Whether the defendants use an “imperfect electrical contact” at the receiving station apparently depends upon the meaning to be attached to said term, and upon the causes which set the detector in motion. Upon these questions the opposing affidavits are directly in conflict.

Thus, defendants’ expert, Prof. Ives, says as follows:

“Tlie meaning of the term is very clear. To fulfill the electrical condition implied, first, we must have two separate pieces of the metal brought into contact; and, second, this contact must be a loose one — that is, the pressure between them must be so slight that they can be easily jarred apart. * * * The position taken by Profs. Cross and Fleming that tlie electrolytic detector used by the defendants operates by an increase of resistance dne to heating of the electrolyte is, In my opinion, entirely untenable in view of recent investigations.”

[76]*76Complainant’s expert, Prof. Cross, says:

“Hence, in my opinion, even if there were not present an actual imperfect contact in defendants’ responder, I fail to see that there could be any substantial change brought about in the action of the device by a substitution which merely involved varying an electromotive force in the circuit instead of varying a resistance. * * • I do not think that all the arguments advanced in favor of the hypothesis held by defendants’ experts are beyond criticism, and they themselves speak with different degrees of certainty. The burden of the evidence seems in favor of their hypothesis. * * * And that little is known, even as yet, regarding the ultimate facts in the ease is shown by the following quotation from the paper referred to, that of Gundry, published in the Philosophical Magazine for March, 1906:
“ ‘On the theoretical side there is, so far as I know, no satisfactory explanation. The idea of the depolarization set forth by Rothmund and Lessing, by which one phase of the alternating current passes easily from electrolyte to electrode owing to oxidation, the other with difficulty, based on a comparison with the aluminum rectifier, appears to help but little to a clear understanding of the question. A satisfactory explanation must account for the very, marked dependence on the degree of polarization of the electrode. We know, however, very little indeed of the conditions which prevail in an oxygen, or hydrogen-charged platinum electrode, and the hope of obtaining a satisfactory explanation of the above phenomenon seems remote until this gap in oúr knowledge is filled.’ ”

He further says:

“The way in which the variation of resistance at the imperfect contact takes place in the different responders referred to, as explained in the former case and by defendants’ expert in the present ease, is not precisely the same.”

■In addition to these admissions, it further appears from Prof. Cross’ affidavit that he bases his assertion of infringement upon his opinion as to the scope of the patent in suit. He says that in his opinion Marconi does not limit himself to any particular kind of contact.

In the original opinion in this case this court held that defendants’ improved form of detector device, which by reason of its liquid or semiliquid characteristics operated automatically without the use of a trembler, did not infringe those claims which were limited to a dry powder, but it “does infringe the claims covering an imperfect electrical contact because it produces the same result, the transmission of the oscillations by a variation of resistance, and by means which operate in substantially the same way, namely, by changing the amount of resistance in the coherer or detector device.”

In view of the admissions quoted above, and of the grounds on which Prof. Cross bases his conclusions, I am not satisfied that the new detector infringes the claim in suit. Furthermore, Prof. Ives, one of the experts for defendants, in support of his claim that defendants’ device is a perfect electrical contact, quotes from the opinion of Judge Wheeler in National Electric Signaling Co. v. De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co., supra, as follows:

“An immersion of platinum of a diameter of .00004 of an inch to the depth of .00002 of an inch is mentioned in the specification, ‘for example,’ but there is added: ‘The immersion of the terminals should be such as to insure what is known in the art as a perfect contact between the terminals and liquid.’ This perfect contact appears to be the operative and material thing, and the defendants’ device in question appears to, and must to be of any use, have that.”

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Related

Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co.
138 F. 657 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York, 1905)

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Bluebook (online)
154 F. 74, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marconi-wireless-telegraph-co-of-america-v-american-de-forest-wireless-circtsdny-1907.