Marco v. Marco

242 N.W.2d 867, 196 Neb. 313, 1976 Neb. LEXIS 787
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJune 9, 1976
Docket40385, 40386 and 40387
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 242 N.W.2d 867 (Marco v. Marco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marco v. Marco, 242 N.W.2d 867, 196 Neb. 313, 1976 Neb. LEXIS 787 (Neb. 1976).

Opinion

Clinton, J.

Three separate actions are before us on this appeal. These actions were consolidated for trial in the District Court and for argument here. The petition in No. 40385 was filed on February 28, 1974, and the plaintiff in that action, Dorothy M. Marco, individually and as executrix of the estate of Lawrence S. Marco, deceased, asked to have the defendants, Jerry A. Marco and Jim S. Marco, restrained and enjoined from coming upon a business premises referred to as A-l Auto Parts, from interfering with her management of the business, from imposing any restraint upon the liberty of the plaintiff, and from coming upon a certain premises which is her home. In that action the defendants counterclaimed, asking to have a constructive trust declared in certain real property of which Dorothy Marco is holder of the legal title as surviving joint tenant of Lawrence S. Marco, her husband and father of the defendants Jerry A. Marco and Jim S. Marco, who are the plaintiff’s stepsons. Four tracts of land are involved in the above *315 counterclaim and we will hereafter refer to them collectively as A-l Auto Parts real estate or property.

In No. 40386, filed on April 8, 1975, Jim Marco was plaintiff and Dorothy Marco was defendant. Jim Marco there asks to have a constructive trust declared as to certain property, the address of which is 7401 Sarpy Avenue and which we will hereafter refer to as “Jim’s house.” In No. 40387, also filed on April 8, 1975, Jerry Marco is plaintiff and Dorothy Marco is defendant. Jerry Marco there asks to have a constructive trust declared in certain real property, the addresses of which are 7202 and 7204 South 25th Street and which we will hereafter refer to as “Jerry’s house and building.” Previous to trial the court permitted Jerry and Jim to amend their petitions in Nos. 40386 and 40387 to include the property described in their counterclaim in No. 40385, to wit, the A-l Auto Parts property.

The evidence in cases No. 40386 and No. 40387 and on the counterclaim in No. 40385 was heard first and, at the close of the presentation of evidence by Jerry and Jim in those cases, Dorothy moved for a dismissal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish a constructive trust. The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed the petitions and counterclaim of Jerry and Jim. It is the propriety of this action of the trial court which is before us on appeal. The only assignment of error relates to that proposition.

Following the granting of the motion to dismiss, Dorothy presented the evidence on her petition in No. 40385. The trial court granted the injunction for which she prayed. Jim and Jerry have not appealed from that ruling.

In our review of the cases before us we are guided by the following principles of adjective law: “In an equity suit, when the defendant moves for a dismissal of the plaintiff’s action at the close of plaintiff’s evidence he thereby admits plaintiff’s evidence to be true, together with every inference which fairly and reason *316 ably may be drawn therefrom, and where the plaintiff’s evidence meets the burden of proof required and plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the motion to dismiss should be overruled. ... In an equity suit, a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence affords a proper means of determining the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to make a prima facie case. . . . Where it appears that such dismissal of a plaintiff’s cause of action was erroneous, the parties are entitled to be placed in the same position they were in before the error occurred, which requires the cause to be remanded for a new trial.” Paul v McGahan, 152 Neb. 578, 42 N. W. 2d 172. In the above case we said that the case comes to this court for trial de novo subject to the foregoing rules. We must, therefore, determine, as a question of law, whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment for Jerry and Jim.

The applicable principles of substantive law are found in the same case: “Constructive trusts arise from actual or constructive fraud or imposition, committed by one party on another. Thus if one person procures the legal title to property from another by fraud or misrepresentation, or by an abuse of some influential or confidential relation which he holds toward the owner of the legal title, obtains such title from him upon more advantageous terms than he could otherwise have obtained it, the law constructs a trust in favor of the party upon whom the fraud or imposition has been practiced. If a party obtains the legal title to property by virtue of a confidential relation, under such circumstances that he ought not, according to the rules of equity and good conscience as administered in chancery, hold and enjoy the benefits, out of such circumstances or relations, a court of equity will raise a trust by construction and fasten it upon the conscience of the offending party and convert him into a trustee of the legal title.” Paul v. McGahan, supra.

We must accordingly first summarize the pertinent *317 allegations of the pleadings by which Jim and Jerry state their causes of action and then review their evidence and examine the possible reasonable inferences therefrom. We treat their pleadings collectively since the general allegations relied upon to establish constructive trust are essentially the same in each case. We mention especially at the end of this summary of the pleadings the allegations peculiar to the individual cases.

The petitions allege: At various times between 1967 and 1971 Dorothy and Lawrence acquired title to the A-l Auto Parts real estate; for about 20 years before the death of Lawrence, Jim and Jerry worked for their father in the business of A-l Auto Parts; they were not paid regular salaries; their uncompensated labors were the source by which the real estate upon which the A-l Auto Parts business is conducted was obtained; the plaintiffs at all times reposed great trust and confidence in their father and believed their father would deal justly with them; their father told them repeatedly “that it was his intention that the real estate . . . should pass to . . . [Jim and Jerry on his death] in consideration of . . . services performed [by Jim and Jerry] in connection with . . . A-l Auto Parts”; except for the contributions made by Jim’s and Jerry’s services, all contributions to the acquisition of the property were paid by Lawrence, and Dorothy contributed nothing; Dorothy was a grantee of the property solely as a matter of convenience; Lawrence desired the property be conveyed by Dorothy to Jim and Jerry after his death and he had the same desire with reference to the business itself; a relationship of trust and confidence existed between Lawrence and Dorothy; Lawrence believed Dorothy would comply with his wishes and he would not have permitted Dorothy to be a grantee if he had known she would not; Dorothy acquired her title to the property by abuse of a confidential relationship; she holds the property as constructive trustee; and she refuses to convey *318 the same to Jim and Jerry although they have demanded that she do so.

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Bluebook (online)
242 N.W.2d 867, 196 Neb. 313, 1976 Neb. LEXIS 787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marco-v-marco-neb-1976.