Marcin v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company

50 F. Supp. 3d 23, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84140, 2014 WL 2791238
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 20, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 2013-1308
StatusPublished

This text of 50 F. Supp. 3d 23 (Marcin v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marcin v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, 50 F. Supp. 3d 23, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84140, 2014 WL 2791238 (D.D.C. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Jill Marcin has brought this action seeking review of a denial of disability benefits. Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. Defendants Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (“Reliance”) and the Mitre Corporation (“Mitre”) Long Term Disability Insurance Program have moved to dismiss that portion of the claim that seeks penalties under section 1132(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (2012). Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1 [Dkt. #4] (“Defs.’ Mot.”); Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2 [Dkt. # 4-1] (“Defs.’ Mem.”). Because penalties under ERISA section 1132(c) are not available for the documents plaintiff seeks, and because defendant Reliance would not be subject to those penalties in any event, the Court will grant defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was previously employed as a multi-discipline systems engineer at Mitre. Compl. ¶ 11. During her employment, plaintiff was covered by a group long-term disability insurance plan issued by Reliance. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. She filed a claim for long-term disability benefits in December 2007, citing “pain, discomfort, fatigue, and other related impairments” from renal cancer, portal vein thrombosis, ovarian disease, and “other conditions and impairments.” Id. ¶ 10; see also Marcin v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 895 F.Supp.2d 105, 108 (D.D.C.2012). After exhausting her administrative remedies, plaintiff asked the Court to review Reli *25 ance’s denial of her disability benefits. Martin, 895 F.Supp.2d at 105. The Court remanded the ease to Reliance for reconsideration of its decision on September 28, 2012. Id. at 119.

Reliance continued to deny coverage, issuing its most recent denial on January 7, 2013. Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the decision through Reliance’s administrative procedures and then renewed her claim before the Court. Compl. ¶¶ 18-26. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of her benefits, as well as back benefits, attorney’s fees, and costs. Id. ¶ 27. In addition, and at issue here, plaintiff now seeks statutory penalties against defendants for their failure to produce the “disability durational guidelines” and “claims guidelines” that they allegedly relied upon when they denied her claim. See Pl.’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 3, 15 [Dkt. # 5] (“Pl.’s Opp.”). 1 Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs claim for penalties on the grounds that these penalties are not available for the non-disclosure of the guidelines involved, and that, even if they were, the penalties are not available against Reliance because it is not the “plan administrator” under ERISA. • Defs. Mot. at 1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffi-dent factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. And “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, sup *26 ported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiffs favor, and the Court should grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept a plaintiffs legal conclusions. See id.; see also Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002).

ANALYSIS

ERISA section 1132(c) makes penalties available against a “plan administrator” who fails to provide certain plan documents to a plan participant or beneficiary upon request. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c). Here, plaintiff argues that defendants should be penalized under section 1132(c) for them failure to provide her with the disability durational guidelines and claims guidelines they allegedly relied upon when they denied her request for coverage. Pl.’s Opp. at 3. But the section 1132(c) non-disclosure penalties do not extend to the documents plaintiff seeks. Moreover, defendant Reliance is not subject to section 1132(c) penalties for the separate reason that it is not a “plan administrator” for purposes of ERISA. Therefore, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim for penalties.

I. Section 1132(c) penalties are not available for the non-disclosure of the disability durational guidelines and claims guidelines.

Under section 1132(c) of ERISA, “[a]ny administrator ... who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary” may be “personally liable” for that “failure or refusal.” 29 U.S.C.

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Mark S. Stuhlreyer v. Armco, Inc.
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Marcin v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company
895 F. Supp. 2d 105 (District of Columbia, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
50 F. Supp. 3d 23, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84140, 2014 WL 2791238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marcin-v-reliance-standard-life-insurance-company-dcd-2014.