Marcia Turner-Workman v. Carolyn Colvin

Eighth Circuit

Marcia Turner-Workman v. Carolyn Colvin

626 F. App'x 193

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedDecember 21, 2015

Docket15-1779

StatusUnpublished

This text of 626 F. App'x 193 (Marcia Turner-Workman v. Carolyn Colvin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Marcia Turner-Workman v. Carolyn Colvin, 626 F. App'x 193 (8th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Marcia Trinette Turner-Workman appeals the district court’s 1 judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of supplemental security income after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). For reversal, Turner-Workman contends that the ALJ (1) erred in evaluating her treating physicians’ opinions; (2) did not properly evaluate her subjective allegations; and (3) erred in relying on a vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical that failed to provide for all of her impairments.

Following careful review of the parties’ submissions and the record before us, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s determination. See Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091, 1093 (8th Cir.2012) (standard of review). First, we conclude that the ALJ did not err. in discounting the opinions of Drs. Tamara Wright and Lloyd Miller, because — inter alia — the opinions were inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record, including the physicians’ own treatment notes; the opinions were based on subjective reports or information supplied by others; and the opinions lacked explanation for their findings. See Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848-49 (8th Cir.2007); Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937-38 (8th Cir.2006). Second, in making her credibility determination on Turner-Workman’s subjective allegations, the ALJ considered requisite factors and provided multiple valid reasons to support the credibility determination. See Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir.2010); Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir.2000). Finally, in making the residual-functional-capacity finding, the ALJ properly considered and weighed available medical and other relevant record evidence: the ALJ’s finding was based on independent review of the medical records, Turner-Workman’s daily activities and functioning, her pattern of noncompliance with medication and treatment recommendations, and her inconsistent reporting. See Goose v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 981, 984-85 (8th Cir.2001).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

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PER CURIAM.

Marcia Trinette Turner-Workman appeals the district court’s 1 judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of supplemental security income after a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). For reversal, Turner-Workman contends that the ALJ (1) erred in evaluating her treating physicians’ opinions; (2) did not properly evaluate her subjective allegations; and (3) erred in relying on a vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical that failed to provide for all of her impairments.

Following careful review of the parties’ submissions and the record before us, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s determination. See Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091, 1093 (8th Cir.2012) (standard of review). First, we conclude that the ALJ did not err. in discounting the opinions of Drs. Tamara Wright and Lloyd Miller, because — inter alia — the opinions were inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record, including the physicians’ own treatment notes; the opinions were based on subjective reports or information supplied by others; and the opinions lacked explanation for their findings. See Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848-49 (8th Cir.2007); Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937-38 (8th Cir.2006). Second, in making her credibility determination on Turner-Workman’s subjective allegations, the ALJ considered requisite factors and provided multiple valid reasons to support the credibility determination. See Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir.2010); Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir.2000). Finally, in making the residual-functional-capacity finding, the ALJ properly considered and weighed available medical and other relevant record evidence: the ALJ’s finding was based on independent review of the medical records, Turner-Workman’s daily activities and functioning, her pattern of noncompliance with medication and treatment recommendations, and her inconsistent reporting. See Goose v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 981, 984-85 (8th Cir.2001).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

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