Marchand v. Armstrong

354 So. 2d 581, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 3908
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 13, 1977
DocketNo. 8664
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 354 So. 2d 581 (Marchand v. Armstrong) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marchand v. Armstrong, 354 So. 2d 581, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 3908 (La. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

STOULIG, Judge.

Plaintiff, Gloria Delesdernier Gerald, has appealed a judgment dismissing on exceptions of “no cause and/or right of action” her suit asserting an heritable -interest in three tracts of land in Plaquemines Parish. She attacks two links in the title of George T. Armstrong, the present record owner, claiming (1) the land first came- into the Delesdernier family through simulated sales by her grandfather to two uncles and an aunt; and (2) a later transfer by these same collaterals to Armstrong is a nullity because the signatures of two of the vendors were forged with Armstrong’s knowledge.

Gloria Gerald is the grandchild of Julia Loga Delesdernier and George W. Delesder-nier and is their forced heir through representation of her father Chester 0. Delesder-nier, one of the children of George W. and Julia who predeceased both his parents. In addition she is a collateral heir of George 0. Delesdernier (her uncle) who died intestate without forced heirs. Her proportionate interest in each succession is not germane to our review.1 1

We preface our discussion of the issue with a restatement of the general rule that allegations of the petition are accepted as true for the purpose of weighing the validity of an exception of no cause of action.. Documents incorporated in the petition by reference may be considered; however, evidence is inadmissible to controvert any assertions. C.C.P. art. 931; Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So.2d 328 (1972); American Creosote Company v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510 (1970); Leidenheimer v. Schutten, 194 So. 32 (La.1940).

Plaintiff attacks as nullities the following acts registered in the conveyance office of Plaquemines Parish:

Sale by Albert W. Newlin, administrator of the Succession of Robert M. White, to Mark Delesdernier before Harold J. Rayl, late Notary, dated August 24, 1931 and registered in C.O.B. 72, Folio 114.
Sale by Albert W. Newlin, administrator of the Succession of Robert M. White, to Mark, George 0. and Shirley I. Delesder-nier before Harold J. Rayl, late Notary, dated October 29, 1931 and registered in C.O.B. 72, Folio 106.
Sale by Albert W. Newlin, administrator of the Succession of Robert M. White, to Mark, George O. and Shirley I. Delesder-nier before Harold J. Rayl, late Notary, dated November 14, 1931 and registered in C.O.B. 72, Folio 110.
Sale of property by Mark Delesdernier, Shirley Delesdernier Koehl, and George O. Delesdernier to George T. Armstrong, before Frank J. Lobrano, Clerk of Court and ex-officio Notary Public, on October 14,1933 and registered in C.O.B. 74, Folio 511.

The petition avers the first three sales are simulated transfers by George W. De-lesdernier to three of his children in that it was George W. who bid for the properties at public auction and paid the purchase price with funds belonging to the community of acquets and gains existing between him and Julia Loga. Gloria avers the designation of George W. as the agent for the three vendees in the respective acts is a sham.

As a general rule, a forced heir is barred from attacking transfers by his an[584]*584cestors in authentic form by parol evidence. See Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938) and Eberle v. Eberle, 161 La. 313, 108 So. 549 (1926), for cases discussing this rule, and the exceptions thereto.

Plaintiff alleges two irregularities in the acts attacked as simulated sales that she contends destroys their statuses .as authentic acts, namely: (1) the mandates for George W. Delesdernier to act for his various children are not in writing and are not made part of the acts; and (2) the proces verbal of the auction sale recites George W. Delesdernier is the purchaser without stating he was bidding in an agency capacity.

C.C. arts. 2996 and 2997 stipulate a power of attorney to buy or sell real property must be express; however, if the recited agency in a deed is not evidenced by a written mandate, the transaction is not an absolute nullity that may be voided by a third party attack. Rather, it is voidable by one of the parties to the act. Once the Delesdernier vendees sold to Armstrong they ratified the agency of their father and foreclosed any future attack on the validity of the mandate. Bolding v. Eason Oil Company, 178 So.2d 246 (La.1965).

Nor is the alleged conflict between the proces verbal and the authentic act a basis for nullifying the sale. Plaintiff suggests an unrecorded proces verbal is the contract of sale between the estate of White and George W. Delesdernier, rather than the authentic acts later passed to convey the titles on which George W. bid successfully. She relies on C.C. art. 2623, which states:

“The adjudication made and recorded by the sheriff, auctioneer or representative of the succession, is a complete title to the purchaser, and needs not be followed by an act passed before a notary.” (Emphasis added.)

The article does not apply to this case because the proces verbals upon which plaintiff rests her claim that George W. Deles-dernier was the actual purchaser were not recorded.

With respect to the White sales, George T. Armstrong is an innocent third party protected by the law of public registry. See McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909); R.S. 9:2721. But even if the unrecorded proces verbals were admissible and the reference therein to George W. Delesdernier were viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the conflict between the authentic acts and the proces verbals would be resolved in favor of the recitations contained in those notarial acts. Carroll v. Scheen, 34 La.Ann. 423 (1882); Heirs of Nesom v. Weis, 34 La.Ann. 1004 (1882); McCall v. Irion, 41 La.Ann. 1126, 6 So. 845 (1889); and Hughes v. Edson, 129 La. 866, 57 So. 154 (1911).

We conclude, as did the trial court, that plaintiff’s petition attacking the three White sales as simulations states no cause of action.2

However, with respect to the assertions that the 1933 Armstrong acquisition is a nullity because two of the vendors’ signatures were forged, plaintiff has stated a cause of action. Defendants argue to support their exceptions that Gloria is es-topped from attacking this act because the uncle through whose succession she asserts this claim subsequently ratified the 1933 transfer in other written transactions. And further that in accepting his succession unconditionally, Gloria could not repudiate any agreements made by the uncle through whom she claims title. (See C.C. art. 1013.)

To support their position, defendants introduced numerous exhibits that are not incorporated by reference in plaintiff’s pleadings. Defendants suggest we treat the exception leveled at the 1933 sale as one of no right of action. It is not. It is properly an exception of no cause of action. The exception of no right of action questions the capacity cf the plaintiff to sue, [585]*585while no cause of action tests whether the pleadings and exhibits, if proved, afford a remedy at law. Outdoor Electric Advertising v. Saurage, 207 La. 344, 21 So.2d 375 (1945). Therefore, the exhibits introduced by defendant cannot be considered in passing on the exception of no cause of action. Soniat v. White, 146 La.

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Bluebook (online)
354 So. 2d 581, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 3908, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marchand-v-armstrong-lactapp-1977.