THIS OPINION HAS
NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
John R.
Marceron and Jeanne M. Marceron, Respondents,
v.
J. Reese Helms
and Brenda Helms, Appellants.
Appeal From Horry County
J. Stanton Cross, Jr., Master-In-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2007-UP-542
Heard June 6, 2007 Filed November 30,
2007
AFFIRMED
Carl Scott Masel, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellants.
Mason Summers and Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., both of Columbia, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Reese
and Brenda Helms appeal the master-in-equitys denial of their motion for
non-suit claiming John and Jeanne Marceron failed to prove that the Helms breached
the contract between the parties or that they suffered any damages as a result.
We affirm.
FACTS
The Helmses were the owners of a home located on a lot they leased inside of Ocean
Lakes Family Campground (Ocean Lakes).[1]
The Helmses decided to subdivide their lease site (MH9) into three separate lease
sites (MH9-A, MH9-B, and MH9-C).[2]
The Helmses hired a surveyor to survey their lease site to ensure that each new
site would meet Ocean Lakes minimum size requirement.
In the summer of 2003, the Marcerons and the Helmses began
discussing the possibility of the Marcerons purchasing the lease rights to
MH9. As a result of these discussions, on June 7, 2004, the Marcerons entered
into a contract with the Helmses to purchase MH9-C for $90,000.00. The
contract required the Helmses to provide a survey of MH9-C and gave the
Marcerons a right of first refusal for MH9-A and MH9-B. The contract provided
that the closing would occur on June 8, 2007, and that MH9 would be subdivided
to create MH9-C on or before October 1, 2004. Also on June 7, 2004, John
Marceron and Reese Helms met with Wayne Peeler, a builder the Helms had
contacted about constructing a home on the site, at the lease site to ensure
the proposed home would fit on the site. At this meeting, Reese Helms gave John
Marceron a survey of MH9 with the proposed subdivided lots marked on it. It is
undisputed that this survey did not accurately depict the size of MH9-C or its
existing boundaries as set by Ocean Lakes. The
inaccuracy in the survey was due to an earlier shifting of the boundary lines
by Ocean Lakes to resolve a dispute with an adjoining neighbor. The moving of
the boundary lines resulted in an overall increase in the square footage of
MH9-C and decrease in the lake frontage of MH9 as a whole. Following the meeting, the Marcerons
purchased the lease rights to MH9-C from the Helmses for the agreed upon price.
By letter dated June 15, 2004, Reese Helms informed the Marcerons he
had received an offer of $180,000.00 for the lease rights to the remaining
portions of MH9 and gave them until June 27, 2004 to exercise their right of
first refusal by matching the offer. By letter dated June 23, 2004, the
Marcerons informed the Helmses they would purchase the lease rights to all of
MH9 for the price of $260,000.00 and the earlier payment of $90,000.00 should
be treated as a prepayment towards this transaction. The letter also expressly
stated: This [agreement] does not change any agreement per our original
contract on June 7, 2004. On July 2, 2003, the Marcerons paid the Helms the
agreed upon amount and received a written lease from Ocean Lakes for MH9.
The Marcerons claim they were not aware of the previous change in
the boundary line until after their purchase of the lease rights. After
unsuccessfully attempting to resolve the boundary line issue with the Helms and
Ocean Lakes, the Marcerons initiated this current action on October 18, 2004.
The Marcerons alleged the following causes of action: breach of contract;
negligent misrepresentation; fraud; and breach with fraudulent intent. The
Marcerons sought damages in the amount of the difference between the values of
the site as represented in the survey and the site as actually conveyed,
punitive damages, and reasonable attorney fees and costs for the action. By
consent, the case was referred to the Horry County Master in Equity, J. Stanton
Cross, Jr. The matter was heard at trial on March 30, 2006. At the conclusion
of the Marcerons case, the Helms moved for a directed verdict on all issues.
The Master informed the Helms that they were really seeking an involuntary
nonsuit, treated their motion as such, and denied their motion. By final order
filed June 9, 2006, the Master found in favor of the Marcerons for breach of
contract and awarded damages in the amount of $26,000.00 which represented the
difference in the value of the lot as contracted and the value of the lot as
conveyed. The Helms now appeal the Masters denial of their motion for
involuntary nonsuit claiming the Marcerons failed to prove the Helms breached
the contract between the parties or that they suffered any damages as a result.
STANDARD OF
REVIEW
We
note initially that while the Helms motion at the close of the evidence was
couched as a directed verdict motion, governed by Rule 50, SCRCP, this was a
non-jury action. Rule 50, SCRCP, as noted by the master, is only applicable to
jury trials. The proper motion for the Helms to have made was a motion for
involuntary non-suit under Rule 41(b), SCRCP. After the plaintiff in an
action tried by the court without a jury has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant, . . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Rule 41(b),
SCRCP. Rule 41(b), SCRCP, allows the judge as fact finder to weigh the
evidence, determine the facts and render a judgment
against the plaintiff at the close of his case if justified. Johnson
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 308 S.C. 116, 118, 417 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1992).
In
reviewing the rulings of a trial judge on motions for involuntary nonsuit, this
Court must review the evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Rewis v. Grand Strand Gen. Hosp., 290 S.C. 40, 41-2, 348 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1986). If more than one
reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the motion for nonsuit
must be denied. Id. In deciding a motion for nonsuit, the trial court
must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bullard v. Ehrhardt, 283 S.C. 557, 558, 324
S.E.2d 61, 61 (1984). If there is no relevant competent evidence reasonably
tending to establish the material elements of the plaintiffs case a motion for
nonsuit must be granted. Id.
A
breach of contract seeking money damages is an action at law. South Carolina Fed. Sav. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Dev. Co., 310 S.C. 232, 235,
423 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1992). On appeal of an action at law tried without a
jury, the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed unless
found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the trial courts
findings. The rule is
the same with or without a reference. Townes
Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775
(1976). The trial courts findings are equivalent to a jurys findings in a law
action. Chapman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 263 S.C. 565, 567, 211 S.E.2d
876, 877 (1975). This courts role is to determine whether any evidence
reasonably supports the factual findings of the trial court. Townes
Assocs., Ltd., 266 S.C. at 86, 221 S.E.2d at 776. Additionally, the
appellate court can correct errors of law. Okatie River, L.L.C. v. Southeastern Site Prep, L.L.C., 353 S.C. 327, 334, 577 S.E.2d 468,
472 (Ct. App. 2003).
While
the facts of this particular case are unique, the standard of review applies
and operates here like in any other case. Accordingly, if there was any
evidence or reasonable inference to reasonably support the Macerons case, we
must affirm the Masters denial of the Helmses motion for involuntary
nonsuit. Likewise, if there is any evidence in the record which reasonably supports
the Masters final determination, we must affirm.
LAW/ANALYSIS
In
an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a
contract, its breach, and damages caused by the breach. See Baughman
v. Southern Ry. Co. 127 S.C. 493, 121 S.E. 356, 356 (1924).
The contract for MH9-C provided:
Conveyance Shall Be Made subject to all easements as well as covenants of record (providing
they do not make title unmarketable) and all governmental [statutes],
ordinances, rules and regulations: A survey map of leased lot 9C, section MH
shall be provided by the seller prior to the closing date.
(Bolded in the
original). The Helmses claim this requirement does not apply because it was
included in the contract for the lease rights to MH9-C and not in the agreement
for MH9 in its entirety. However, included in the letter in which the
Marcerons exercised their right of first refusal to the remainder of MH9 is a
provision that states: This does not change any agreement per our original
contract. . . . Furthermore, it is clear that the parties, while contracting
for MH9-C, had considered a transfer of MH9 in its entirety. The contract for
MH9-C included the right of first refusal for the remainder of MH9 and the
survey provided as part of the transaction for MH9-C was a survey of MH9 in its
entirety. Accordingly, there is evidence in the record to support the Masters
finding that the Helmses were required to provide a survey as part of the
contract for MH9.
Implicit in the requirement to provide a survey is the requirement
that the survey which is provided be an accurate survey. Common sense and good faith are the
leading touchstones of construction of the provisions of a contract; where one
construction makes the provisions unusual or extraordinary and another
construction which is equally consistent with the language employed, would make
it reasonable, fair and just, the latter construction must prevail. C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. South Carolina Health &
Human Servs. Fin. Comn 296
S.C. 373, 377, 373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1988) (citing Farr v. Duke Power Co., 265 S.C. 356, 360, 218 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1975)). It is undisputed that the survey
provided by the Helmses was inaccurate.
During
the trial, Reese Helms testified that at the meeting, he informed John Maceron
of the inaccuracy of the survey due to an earlier shifting of the boundary
lines by Ocean Lakes to resolve a dispute with an adjoining neighbor. Brenda
Helms testified that she discussed the shift in the boundary line with John
Marceron on the day of the meeting. Wayne Peeler testified that Reese Helms
informed John Marceron at the meeting that the boundary line had been moved.
He also testified that the measurements the three men used to lay out the home
site reflected the change in the boundary line. However, John Marceron
testified that he was unaware of the inaccuracy of the survey or the change in
the boundary line.
Despite
the conflicting testimony, the Master found the Marcerons were unaware of the
inaccuracies in the survey. Although John Marcerons testimony conflicts with other evidence in the record, our
standard of review dictates that we affirm if any evidence exists in the record
to reasonably support the findings of the Master and does not allow us to weigh
the evidence. Accordingly, we find evidence to support the Masters finding
that Marcerons were unaware of the inaccuracies in the survey. See Sherman v. W & B Enters., Inc. 357 S.C. 243, 250, 592 S.E.2d 307,
310 (Ct. App. 2003).
The Helmses
argue that because the dimensions and boundaries of lots in Ocean Lakes are subject to change conferring lease rights to sites of set dimensions is
impossible. We are not persuaded by this argument. By the terms of the
contract, the Helmses agreed to provide a survey of the lot to be conveyed. The
inaccuracies in the survey were material to the contract because the survey
provided the only means by which the Marcerons could determine the land of
which they were purchasing the lease rights. The moved boundary line served as
the boundary between the MH9 and the adjoining lease site. Accordingly, the
physical change to the boundary line which was not reflected in the survey
equally affected lot MH9 in its entirety and the proposed lot MH9-C.
The
Helms claim that because the value of the lease site now exceeds the amount the
Marcerons paid, the Marcerons cannot show any resulting damages. This argument
is unpersuasive. In a breach of contract action, damages serve to place the
nonbreaching party in the position he would have enjoyed had the contract been
performed. South Carolina Federal Sav. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby
Development Co., Inc. 303 S.C. 74, 77, 399 S.E.2d 8,10 - 11 (Ct.
App.1990). The Marceron sought damages based on the correct measure: the
difference in the value of the lot as contracted for and the value of the lot
as conveyed.
In South Carolina, a property owner is competent to offer testimony as to the value of his property. Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 372 S.C. 643, 647,
643 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 289
S.C. 377, 379, 346 S.E.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1986)). The rule that a property
owner is competent to present an opinion as to the propertys value is well
recognized. Lewis v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 278 S.C. 170,
173, 293 S.E.2d 434, 436 (1982).
John
Marceron testified that the value of the lease site was based heavily on the
amount of lake frontage the lot had. He testified that the lot as represented
in the survey had a total of 153 feet of lake frontage, but the lot as conveyed
only had 138 feet of lake frontage. He testified that the difference between
the two measurements equaled ten percent of the total lake frontage as
represented in the survey. He also testified that the increase in the total
amount of square footage did not increase the value of the lease site. He
stated the additional land was valueless to him because it was made up of a
roadway and an unsightly berm. He also testified that the total purchase price
for MH9 was $260,000.00 and explained that he was seeking ten percent of the
total purchase in damages as result of the reduction in lake frontage. Accordingly,
there is evidence in the record support the Masters findings as to damages.
CONCLUSION
For the
reasons stated above, the order of the Master is
AFFIRMED.
STILWELL, SHORT, and WILLIAMS JJ., concur.