Marcellus McMurray v. Correction Officer Levin; Correction Officer Morales; Correction Officer Morgan; Correction Officer Levy; Matos

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 9, 2026·No. 1:26-cv-03819·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARCELLUS McMURRAY, Plaintiff, -against- 26-CV-3819 (LLS) CORRECTION OFFICER LEVIN; ORDER TO AMEND CORRECTION OFFICER MORALES; CORRECTION OFFICER MORGAN; CORRECTION OFFICER LEVY; MATOS, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated in the Rose M. Singer Enhanced Supervised Housing unit on Rikers Island, brings this action pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federally protected rights. By order dated May 21, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the

complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Named as Defendants in this complaint are Correction Officers Levin, Morales, Morgan, Levy, and Matos. The Court understands from the complaint that Plaintiff is disabled; he provides a document from New York City Health + Hospitals, signed by Dr. Lisa Choleff, authorizing him, pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), to use the following “assistive devices”: (1) a cane, from March 20, 2026, through June 30, 2026, and a “wheelchair for distance only,” from March 20, 2026, through April 30. (ECF 1 at 7.) On April 29, 2026, while Plaintiff and other detainees were being transported to different

destinations, Officer Levin yelled at Plaintiff to “hurry” as Plaintiff “put on disability equipment including elbow and arm cushions, back brace, and ankle braces,” and he “blamed” Plaintiff for a delay that had been caused by a “jail alarm.” (Id.) Plaintiff further states that “during transport to intake he had a bus pass for the wheelchair bus without cages, yet he and four other inmates were chained in a cramped area with no movement or air circulation for 20–25 minutes.” (Id.) He also alleges that Officer Morales called Plaintiff a “crippled” piece of “shit” and expressed animus towards his disability. (Id. at 5.) Also, on an unspecified date, Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to get a “new prescription order” of his “medications and medicines,” and that he “submitted a[n] original bus permit notification for distance only for West Facility, court, hospital, and cane.” (Id.)

Plaintiff lists injuries to his including back, nose, head, arms, right leg muscles, chest, rib cage, and a knot on the left side of his face, but he does not explain how he was injured, or who caused the injuries. Plaintiff seeks $5 million in damages for pain and suffering. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Personal involvement Plaintiff filed this complaint invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state viable claims under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Additionally, a plaintiff asserting claims under Section 1983 must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant may not be held

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Marcellus McMurray v. Correction Officer Levin; Correction Officer Morales; Correction Officer Morgan; Correction Officer Levy; Matos, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Marcellus McMurray v. Correction Officer Levin; Correction Officer Morales; Correction Officer Morgan; Correction Officer Levy; Matos (Marcellus McMurray v. Correction Officer Levin; Correction Officer Morales; Correction Officer Morgan; Correction Officer Levy; Matos) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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