Marcello v . Harris, et a l . 07-CV-055-SM 11/2/07 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
James C . Marcello and Olivia A . Marcello, Plaintiffs
v. Rhode Island Civil N o . 07-cv-55 Opinion N o . 2007 DNH 154 Constable Alfred Harris, et a l . , Defendants
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiffs, James and Olivia Marcello, are no
strangers to federal litigation. A brief search of Westlaw’s
First Circuit database reveals well over 35 court decisions in
which one or both have been plaintiffs. Their reputation in the
federal forum is poor and their litigation conduct has been
characterized as “abusive and obstructive.” Marcello v . DeSano,
N o . 05-04-ML, 2006 WL 909930 (D.R.I. April 1 0 , 2006). They have
been found to have “manifested a disregard for orders of the
court,” id., 2006 WL 1582404 at *9 (D.R.I. March 2 3 , 2006), and,
on more than one occasion, plaintiffs have acted “in flagrant
derogation of a direct order of the Court,” id., 2006 WL 561506
at *1 (D.R.I. Jan. 2 0 , 2006). Their filings in prior cases have
been described as “frivolous,” “baseless,” and “incoherent.” Id. In one instance, a federal district judge found it necessary
to enjoin plaintiffs from filing any additional motions until the
court had the opportunity to rule on plaintiffs’ numerous motions
that were already pending. Id., slip o p . at 1-2 (D.R.I. Dec. 7 ,
2005) (“taking into account the numerous baseless filings made by
plaintiffs in this case, it appears that plaintiffs have abused
their right of access to the Court. For that reason, this Court
hereby orders plaintiffs James and Olivia Marcello to refrain
from filing any additional motions until this Court has disposed
of all pending motions.”). Perhaps not surprisingly, plaintiffs
violated that court order as well. See Id., 2006 WL 2006 WL
561506, at *1 (D.R.I. Jan. 2 0 , 2006) (“The filing of this most
recent motion is not only in direct contravention of this Court’s
December 7 , 2005 order, it is yet another in a long series of
baseless, incoherent pleadings filed by plaintiffs.”).
Pleadings filed in this case demonstrate that plaintiffs are
behaving in a manner consistent with a well-established pattern.
Background
This litigation arises out of plaintiff James Marcello’s
failed efforts to challenge his father’s will and the disposition
of his father’s estate. On March 6, 2002, Nicholas F. Marcello
2 (a/k/a Rudolph N . Marcello) executed a new will, naming his
brother, defendant Arthur T . Marcello, as Executor. That new
will apparently provided James with a substantially smaller
portion of M r . Marcello’s estate than James had expected.
Specifically, it divided M r . Marcello’s estate among ten living
relatives and devised to James, M r . Marcello’s only child, a
fifteen percent (15%) share. On September 2 8 , 2002,
approximately six and one-half months after executing the new
will, M r . Marcello died.
Subsequently, the Executor (James’s uncle) presented the
will to the Barrington (Rhode Island) Probate Court. James
contested the will, asserting that his father was not mentally
competent when he executed i t . He also offered a prior “natural
will.” The probate court apparently rejected James’s position
and admitted M r . Marcello’s will to probate on April 2 1 , 2003.
James did not appeal that decision and it became final upon the
expiration of the period allowed for filing an appeal. See
Marcello v . Neves, 912 A.2d 4 2 0 , 420 (R.I. 2006). In December of
2003, the Executor sought, and was granted, an injunction
ordering James and his wife, Olivia, to vacate the property,
refrain from filing any documents encumbering title to that
property, and refrain from interfering with the Executor’s
3 duties. Id. James and Olivia, however, refused to move.
Nevertheless, in February of 2004, in accordance with the power
of sale clause in M r . Marcello’s will, the Executor sold M r .
Marcello’s home (through a real estate agent, defendant David
Coleman) and disbursed the assets of the estate in accordance
with the will.
Plaintiffs, however, continued to deny the validity of the
will, as well as the authority of the Executor to sell M r .
Marcello’s former home, and refused to leave. That, in turn, led
to James’s eventual arrest and incarceration (during which time
his competency was questioned). Then, in July of 2004, James
filed suit in state court against the purchasers of his deceased
father’s home (defendants Nuno C . Neves and Natalia Paiva-Neves),
requesting the court to declare him to be the rightful owner of
the property, issue a “writ of possession,” and award him
compensatory damages for injuries allegedly inflicted by the
purchasers. In due course, the trial court granted the
purchasers’ motion for summary judgment and the Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed that decision on appeal. Marcello v .
Neves, supra. At that point, the following issues had been fully
and finally resolved: (1) M r . Marcello died testate and the will
he executed in March of 2002 was valid (i.e., M r . Marcello was
4 competent when he executed i t ) ; (2) the Executor was, among other
things, vested with authority to sell M r . Marcello’s former home;
(3) the price at which the home was sold was not, as James had
claimed, “grossly inadequate”; (4) M r . and Mrs. Neves acquired
clear title to that property and were its rightful owners; and
(5) neither James nor Olivia Marcello had any legal claim to that
property.
In 2005, apparently dissatisfied with the orders issued by
the state courts, plaintiffs, James and his wife Olivia, turned
to the federal courts. They filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island against six
defendants (all of whom are also named in this action): John
DeSano, Bernard P. Healy, John Lacross, Albert Mastriano, Arthur
T . Marcello, and the State of Rhode Island. Marcello v . DeSano,
R.I. Civ. N o . 05-cv-004-ML (“Marcello I ” ) . In their amended
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that M r . Marcello was insane,
incompetent, and delusional when his brother, Arthur Marcello,
and others conspired to force him to execute the revised will,
thereby depriving James of his rightful share of the estate.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants conspired to commit
various crimes (such as misuse of legal process), orchestrated
James’s allegedly unconstitutional arrest, and aided the
5 unconstitutional conversion of M r . Marcello’s estate. By orders
dated September 9, 2005, and April 1 0 , 2006, the court dismissed
all claims against all defendants. See Marcello I , 2006 WL
909930 (D.R.I. April 1 0 , 2006).
Undaunted by their lack of success, in February of 2007,
plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island. In their complaint, plaintiffs
raise virtually identical claims to those advanced in Marcello I ,
but have significantly expanded the number of alleged co-
conspirators from the original 6 to 2 8 . Included among the now
28 defendants are the State of Rhode Island, several state court
judges, a probate judge, the clerk of the Barrington Probate
Court, three law firms, several lawyers, the local police chief,
a constable, plaintiff’s uncle and two cousins, the real estate
agent through whom M r . Marcello’s home was sold, and a mortgage
lending company and its owner. Among other things, plaintiffs
allege that defendants engaged in a RICO enterprise and conspired
to commit numerous crimes, including fraud, embezzlement,
forgery, extortion, and kidnaping.
For reasons discussed below, the court need not describe in
great detail the multiple causes of action asserted in
6 plaintiffs’ complaint. It is sufficient to note that a review of
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the expansive conspiracy and
RICO enterprise outlined in the complaint suggests that their
claims are entirely fanciful. It i s , however, important to
highlight one critical aspect of plaintiffs’ current lawsuit: it
arises out of the same core of operative facts that gave rise to
Marcello I , plaintiffs’ prior (unsuccessful) federal suit.
Plaintiffs have merely expanded the cast of characters/defendants
and substantially augmented the list of co-conspirators who
allegedly aligned themselves against plaintiffs.
Here, as in Marcello I , plaintiffs allege that the
defendants engaged in a far-reaching conspiracy designed to
fraudulently induce M r . Marcello to execute the new will, thereby
illegally divesting James of his rightful inheritance, and
wrongfully evicting him and his wife from his deceased father’s
home through the use of numerous forged, counterfeited, and/or
fraudulently obtained legal documents and court orders. Compare
Amended Complaint in Marcello I (alleging that defendants
conspired to “commit crimes against the constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs, M r . James and Olivia Marcello, by depriving them
of their ‘Life, liberty, & Property’ without due process of
law.”) with Complaint in this case (document n o . 1 ) , at pages i
7 through iv (describing the scope and goals of the alleged
conspiracy and racketeering enterprise). See also Plaintiffs’
Memorandum (document n o . 165) in Marcello I (describing, among
other things, many of the same claims advanced in this lawsuit,
including “a fraudulent scheme to obtain the real property,
racketeering activity, ascended from life-time of decedent on
3/6/02 to the present, by concealment phase. Corrupt
organization of will attorneys John A DeSano, Bernard P Healy,
Chief John LaCross, Arthur T Marcello, & Albert Mastriano,
established formal procedure & working relationship with State of
R I , draping these private citizens with power of state, to use
criminal justice system as a mechanism to commit constitutional
crimes against plaintiff & wife, depriving them of “LIFE,
LIBERTY, & PROPERTY", without due process of law, fraudulently
converting estate to defendants, aware, on 2/6/04.”).
Upon the recusal of the federal judges in the District of
Rhode Island, the case was assigned to m e , sitting by
designation. Pending before the court are dispositive motions
filed by various defendants. Plaintiffs have filed several
motions as well.
8 Pertinent Legal Principles
Because so many of defendants’ dispositive motions invoke
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, it is
probably best to discuss those doctrines at the outset. First,
the court notes that because defendants claim that plaintiffs’
prior federal lawsuit has preclusive effect in this case, federal
(rather than state) principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel apply. See, e.g., In re Iannochino, 242 F.3d 3 6 , 41
(1st Cir. 2001) (“Federal res judicata principles govern the res
judicata effect of a judgment entered in a prior federal suit.”).
See also Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v . El Dia, Inc., 490 F.3d
8 6 , 89 (1st Cir. 2007) (same).
I. Res Judicata or Claim Preclusion.
To prevail on an assertion that a claim is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion), a defendant must
demonstrate the presence of three factors: “(1) a final judgment
on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of the cause
of action in both the earlier and later suits; and (3) an
identity of parties or privies in the two suits.” Kale v .
Combined Ins. C o . of Am., 924 F.2d 1161, 1165 (1st Cir. 1991). A
final judgment for res judicata purposes is one that “ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
9 but execute the judgment.” Acevedo-Villalobos v . Hernandez, 22
F.3d 3 8 4 , 388 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber
C o . v . Risjord, 449 U.S. 3 6 8 , 373-74 (1981)).
If a defendant demonstrates an identity of parties in the
present and an earlier suit, the earlier suit was resolved by
entry of final judgment in favor of the defendant, and the causes
of action asserted earlier and those asserted in the present case
are “sufficiently related,” the doctrine of res judicata operates
to bar not only relitigation of claims previously raised, but
also any claims that could have been raised in the earlier
action. See Allen v . McCurry, 449 U.S. 9 0 , 94 (1980). Present
and past causes of action are sufficiently related to trigger the
preclusive effect of res judicata if each arises out of a “set of
facts which can be characterized as a single transaction or a
series of related transactions.” Apparel Art Int’l v . Amertex
Enterprises Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir. 1995). “This boils
down to whether the causes of action arise out of a common
nucleus of operative facts.” Mass. Sch. of Law v . ABA, 142 F.3d
2 6 , 38 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “In mounting this
inquiry, we routinely ask ‘whether the facts are related in time,
space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
10 parties’ expectations.’” Id. (quoting Aunyx Corp. v . Canon
U.S.A., Inc., 978 F.2d 3 , 6 (1st Cir. 1992)).
II. Collateral Estoppel or Issue Preclusion.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is
related to res judicata but, nonetheless, distinct. “Under
collateral estoppel, once a court has actually decided an issue
of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may
preclude relitigation of that factual or legal issue in a suit on
a different cause of action involving a party to the first
action.” Apparel Art Int’l, 48 F.3d at 583. When the parties in
a subsequent civil action are the same as those in a prior one, a
party seeking to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel bears
the burden of establishing four essential elements: (1) the legal
or factual issue sought to be precluded is the same as that
involved in the prior action; (2) the issue was actually
litigated; (3) the issue was resolved by a valid and binding
final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue was
essential to the judgment. Keystone Shipping C o . v . New England
Power Co., 109 F.3d 4 6 , 51 (1st Cir. 1997).
11 III. Nonmutual Claim Preclusion.
Under federal law, in certain circumstances, defendants who
were not parties to prior federal litigation may invoke the
doctrine of nonmutual claim preclusion to bar litigation of a
claim against them. The court of appeals for this circuit has
described the doctrine as follows:
[A] version of claim preclusion is appropriate in these circumstances if the new defendants have a close and significant relationship with the original defendants, such as when the new defendants were named as conspirators in the first proceeding but were not joined in the action. Another formulation of this idea is that preclusion is appropriate only if the new party can show good reasons why he should have been joined in the first action and the old party cannot show any good reasons to justify a second chance.
In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1988)
(footnote omitted) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
Subsequently, the court noted that the “critical” factor that
must be present in order for new defendants to properly invoke
nonmutual claim preclusion is a “close and significant”
relationship between those new defendants and the defendants in
the earlier proceeding, such as would be the case when they are
alleged to have been co-conspirators or co-perpetrators of joint
harms. Hermes Automation Tech., Inc. v . Hyundai Elec. Indus.,
915 F.2d 739, 751 (1st Cir. 1990) (“We found to be ‘critical’ the
12 fact ‘that both actions purported to address the various ways in
which the original defendant or the original defendant and the
new defendant jointly, caused financial harm to the plaintiff.’”)
(quoting San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d at 11 n . 9 ) .
Discussion
I. Res Judicata and the Marcello I Defendants.
The State of Rhode Island moves to dismiss all claims
asserted against i t , saying: (1) plaintiffs’ claims are untimely;
(2) the damages plaintiffs seek are barred by Will v . Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); (3) plaintiffs’
complaint fails to state a viable claim upon which relief can be
granted; and (4) plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel. Because the court agrees that
plaintiffs’ claims against the State are barred by res judicata,
it need not address the remaining (likely meritorious) arguments
advanced in the State’s motion.
All of the claims plaintiffs advance against the State arise
out of the same core of operative facts that gave rise to the
claims plaintiffs asserted against the State in Marcello I . And,
plaintiffs seek compensation for the same alleged harms - the
allegedly unlawful and unconstitutional taking of M r . Marcello’s
13 home, the eviction of plaintiffs from that home, and the eventual
sale of that home and many of its contents. To the extent
plaintiffs assert that they have raised new claims against the
State in this proceeding, such claims plainly could have (and
should have) been raised in Marcello I . Consequently, the causes
of action plaintiffs advance against the State in this case are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The State’s motion to
dismiss (document n o . 41) i s , therefore, granted.
Likewise, plaintiffs’ claims against the other five
individuals who were actually parties to Marcello I are barred by
res judicata. While most of those defendants have yet to file
dispositive motions, John Lacross has done so (in a motion
jointly filed with new defendants Lorraine Derois and Judge
Marvin Homonoff). Accordingly, as to defendant John Lacross,
that motion to dismiss (document n o . 30) is granted.
II. Nonmutual Claim Preclusion and Alleged Co-Conspirators.
In their motion to dismiss, defendants Lorraine Derois and
Judge Marvin Homonoff correctly point out that, because this case
arises out of the same core of operative facts that gave rise to
the claims in Marcello I , and because they are alleged to have
engaged in the same or similar conspiracies as those identified
14 in Marcello I , plaintiffs could have and should have raised their
claims against Derois and Homonoff in Marcello I . The court
agrees. Because plaintiffs’ complaint in the instant case
alleges that Derois and Homonoff have a close and significant
relationship with the defendants in Marcello I (by virtue of
their status as alleged co-conspirators in the conspiracies and
RICO enterprises identified by plaintiffs), plaintiffs’ current
claims against Derois and Homonoff are barred by the doctrine of
nonmutual claim preclusion. See San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d
at 1 0 . Accordingly, the motion to dismiss jointly filed by
Derois and Homonoff (and LaCross) (document n o . 30) is granted.
David Coleman, proprietor of Coleman Realty, also moves to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims, asserting that: (1) plaintiffs’
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; (2) plaintiffs’ claims are untimely; and (3) plaintiffs’
claims are barred by the doctrine of nonmutual claim preclusion.
Like virtually all of the defendants in this case, Coleman is
alleged to have been a co-conspirator in the various conspiracies
described by plaintiffs in Marcello I and augmented in this case
- conspiracies aimed at depriving James of his “proper” share of
his father’s estate and unlawfully dispossessing him of his
father’s former home. Those claims are, then, barred by the
15 doctrine of nonmutual claim preclusion. Accordingly, Coleman’s
motion to dismiss (document n o . 119) is granted.
III. Failure to State a Claim.
Defendants Ava Martinelli and Diamond Funding Corporation
(“DFC”) move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against them,
asserting that, while they are named as defendants in the caption
of plaintiffs’ complaint, “[a]fter that, they are not mentioned
in the complaint again. There are no factual allegations against
them. There are no facts in the complaint to support any cause
of action in the complaint.” Memorandum in support of motion to
dismiss (document n o . 113) at 1 . Although the time for filing an
objection passed several months ago, plaintiffs have not
responded, nor have they moved to amend their complaint.
Having searched through plaintiffs’ 55 page complaint, the
court is unable to find any references to either DFC or Ava
Martinelli. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth by DFC and
Ava Martinelli, their motion to dismiss (document n o . 113) is
granted.
16 IV. Summary Judgment.
Defendants Nuno Neves and his wife Natalia Paiva-Neves (the
couple who purchased M r . Marcello’s home from his estate),
Jeffrey Caffrey (the lawyer who represented them), and the law
firm of Resnick & Caffrey move for summary judgment as to all of
plaintiffs’ claims against them. Plaintiffs’ claims against
those defendants all arise out of plaintiffs’ mistaken view that
the Executor of M r . Marcello’s estate was not authorized to sell
the home, M r . and Mrs. Neves did not acquire clear title to that
home, and, even if they did, they purchased the home at a price
plaintiffs believe was substantially below its market value.
Critically, however, all of those claims were (or should have
been) previously litigated and were fully and finally resolved
against the plaintiffs to the extent raised. See Marcello v .
Neves, 912 A.2d at 420-21 (describing the history of the
litigation in the probate court and superior court involving
plaintiffs’ claims relating to M r . and Mrs. Neves and M r .
Marcello’s former home).
As they did with several other defendants, plaintiffs have
simply recast their original claims against M r . and Mrs. Neves
(as well as claims that could have, and should have, been
previously raised against their lawyer and his firm) in terms of
17 conspiracy and racketeering. That, however, is insufficient to
avoid dismissal of those claims on grounds of res judicata and
collateral estoppel (as to M r . and Mrs. Neves) and nonmutual
claim preclusion (as to Attorney Caffrey and his law firm).
Their motion for summary judgment (document n o . 147) i s ,
therefore, granted.
V. Dismissal of the Remaining Defendants.
While the remaining defendants have yet to file dispositive
motions, because plaintiffs’ claims are so transparently baseless
the court sees no reason for the remaining defendants to incur
additional legal fees in connection with this case, nor should
they be forced to bear the stress and anxiety associated with
being named a defendant in federal litigation. Additionally,
judicial resources are limited and can be put to more efficient
use than reconsidering factual and legal issues that were fully
and finally resolved years ago.
Plaintiffs were previously afforded the opportunity to fully
litigate all the claims advanced and issues presented in this
case. Questions involving the validity of M r . Marcello’s will,
the disposition of his estate, the removal of plaintiffs from M r .
Marcello’s former home, and the sale of that home to Nuno and
18 Natalia Neves, were fully and finally resolved long ago, by
courts of competent jurisdiction, including the Barrington
Probate Court, the Rhode Island Superior Court, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, and the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island. While plaintiffs plainly disagree with
the judicial resolution of their claims, they are not entitled to
indefinitely relitigate the same issues.
The court i s , of course, aware that “sua sponte dismissals
are risky business,” Gonzalez-Gonzalez v . United States, 257 F.3d
3 1 , 37 (1st Cir. 2001), and should be reserved for rare cases in
which the allegations set forth in the complaint, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, are “patently meritless
and beyond all hope of redemption,” id. See also Bezanson v .
Bayside Enter., Inc., 922 F.2d 895, 904 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
that “a court on notice that it has previously decided an issue
may dismiss the action sua sponte, consistent with the res
judicata policy of avoiding judicial waste”) (citations omitted).
This is such a case and affording plaintiffs an opportunity to
amend their complaint would amount to little more than an
exercise in futility, and a dramatically wasteful exercise at
that.
19 As to the remaining defendants who were also defendants in
Marcello I (i.e., John DeSano, Bernard Healy, Arthur T . Marcello,
and Albert Mastriano), it is plain that the claims plaintiffs
assert against them in this case are barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs’ claims
against those defendants are, therefore, dismissed.
Finally, the remaining defendants who were not previously
named in any of plaintiffs’ various suits are entitled to the
protections afforded by the doctrine of nonmutual claim
preclusion. As noted above, although plaintiffs have recast
their original claims as broader conspiracies and RICO
enterprises, they are, in reality and for all practical purposes,
the identical claims raised in Marcello I , and certainly arise
out of the same core of operative facts that gave rise to
Marcello I . And, of course, because they are named as co-
conspirators with the original defendants in Marcello I , the
remaining defendants have the required “close and significant”
relationship with the original defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims
against those remaining defendants are, therefore, dismissed on
grounds that they are barred by nonmutual claim preclusion.
20 Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in the
parties’ respective legal memoranda, the following motions are
granted:
1. The motion to dismiss filed by defendants Lorraine Derois, Judge Marvin Homonoff, and John Lacross (document n o . 3 0 ) ;
2. The motion to dismiss filed by the State of Rhode Island (document n o . 4 1 ) ;
3. The motion to dismiss filed by David Strachman and McIntyre, Tate, Lynch & Holt (document n o . 1 0 8 , as replaced by document no. 120);
4. The motion to dismiss filed by Eva Martinelli, proprietor of Diamond Funding Corporation (document n o . 1 1 3 ) ;
5. The motion to dismiss filed by David Coleman (document n o . 1 1 9 ) ; and
6. The motion for summary judgment filed by Nuno Neves and Natalia Paiva-Neves, Jeffrey Caffrey, and Resnick & Caffrey (document n o . 147).
The following motions filed by plaintiffs are denied as
being without legal or factual merit, frivolous, and/or barred by
the final judgments issued in Marcello I or Marcello v . Neves,
912 A.2d 420 (R.I. 2006):
21 1. Motion for default judgment (document n o . 47);
2. Motion to disqualify counsel (document n o . 48);
3. Motion for the court to determine its own jurisdiction (document n o . 7 8 , as replaced by document n o . 7 9 ) ;
4. Motion for summary judgment against the State of Rhode Island (document n o . 9 6 ) ;
5. Motion for hearing on motion for summary judgment (document n o . 9 8 ) ;
6. Motion for decree pro confesso (document n o . 109);
7. Motion for decree pro confesso (document n o . 125);
8. Motion for summary judgment (document n o . 1 4 3 ) ; and
9. Motion for hearing on motion for summary judgment (document n o . 1 4 4 ) .
Finally, as noted above, although the remaining defendants
have not yet filed dispositive motions, the court concludes that
this is one of those rare cases in which it is appropriate to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against those defendants, sua sponte.
Defendants and the judicial system itself are entitled to no
less.
22 While it is clear that plaintiffs do not, and likely will
never accept the various decisions made by the Barrington Probate
Court, the Rhode Island Superior Court, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, and the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, as correct, still, it is time for plaintiffs to at
least recognize that this dispute has been finally resolved.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with
this order and in favor of all defendants and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
___________ ' Steven J./McAuliffe 'hief Judge
November 2 , 2007
cc: James C . Marcello, pro se Olivia A . Marcello, pro se Betty Barney, pro se Michael A . DeSisto, Esq. Robert W . Smith, Esq. Thomas C . Plunkett, Esq. James Moretti, Esq. Frederick E . Connelly, Jr., Esq. Mark P. Dolan, Esq. Mark A . Charleson, Esq. Thomas A . Palombo, Esq.