Marcell Williams v. Ely State Prison, et al.

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 MARCELL WILLIAMS, Case No. 3:24-cv-00022-ART-CLB 6 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 7 v. RECOMMENDATION (ECF No. 64)

8 ELY STATE PRISON, et al.,

9 Defendants.

10 Plaintiff Marcell Williams brings this civil rights action under section 1983 11 against Defendants Tasheena Cooke, James Dzurenda, David Drummond, 12 William Gittere, and Kenneth Williams (“Defendants”) for deliberate medical 13 indifference to his mental health needs under the Eighth Amendment and 14 violation of his medical-privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF 15 No. 7.) 16 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 17 51.) Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin issued a Report and Recommendation 18 (“R&R”) recommending that Defendants’ motion be granted on the basis that Mr. 19 Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison 20 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and failed to show in the alternative that 21 administrative exhaustion was unavailable to him. (ECF No. 64.) 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the magistrate judge’s R&R. 23 I. LEGAL STANDARD 24 a. Review of Reports and Recommendations 25 Under the Federal Magistrates Act, a court “may accept, reject, or modify, 26 in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by [a] magistrate 27 judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party timely objects to a magistrate judge's 28 1 report and recommendation, then the court is required to “make a de 2 novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which 3 objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A court is not required to conduct “any 4 review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. 5 Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). Mr. Williams has not filed an objection to the 6 magistrate judge’s R&R and his time to do so has now expired. (ECF No. 51.) 7 b. Administrative Exhaustion 8 The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 9 conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 10 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 11 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 12 “[T]he PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” 13 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). [A] prisoner must complete the 14 administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 15 including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court[.]” Id. at 16 88. But, because the PLRA requires exhaustion of those administrative remedies 17 “as are available,” the PLRA does not require exhaustion when circumstances 18 render administrative remedies “effectively unavailable.” See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 19 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010). In other words, an inmate must exhaust 20 only those grievance procedures “that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief 21 for the action complained of.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (quoting 22 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). 23 Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a non-jurisdictional 24 affirmative defense that defendants must raise and prove. See Albino v. Baca, 747 25 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212-17 (2007). A 26 “defendant must first prove that there was an available administrative remedy 27 and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy. … Then, the burden 28 shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that there is something particular in his 1 case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 2 effectively unavailable to him by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, 3 unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile. … The ultimate 4 burden of proof, however, remains with the defendants.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 5 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). “If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most 6 favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to 7 summary judgment under Rule 56. If material facts are disputed, summary 8 judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should 9 determine the facts [in a preliminary proceeding].” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 The magistrate judge found that Defendants met their burden to show that 12 Mr. Williams did not exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA 13 because he did not continue to appeal his grievances through the Second Level 14 as required by A.R. 740, which he concedes. (ECF No. 64 at 10-11.) 15 Next, she found that Mr. Williams did not sufficiently show that the 16 grievance procedure was unavailable to him to justify an exception to exhaustion. 17 (Id. at 14.) Mr. Williams argued that there is a culture of chilling grievances at 18 Ely State Prison and that his mental health issues placed him at “an extreme 19 disadvantage” in pursuing the grievance process, thus excusing his failure to 20 exhaust. (ECF No. 60 at 9.) The R&R found that because Mr. Williams was still 21 able to pursue the grievance process through the First Level despite his mental 22 health and the potentially tedious and frustrating procedural requirements of 23 A.R. 740, he was unable to show that the grievance process was unavailable to 24 him. The Court agrees. 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 It is therefore ordered that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 64) 27 is ADOPTED in full. 28 It is further ordered that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 1 || No. 51) is GRANTED. 2 It is further kindly ordered that the Clerk enter judgment and close this 3 || case. 4 5 Dated this 11t* day of March, 2026. 6

8 ANNE R. TRAUM 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28