Marcano v. Retirement Board of Trustees of the City of Harvey Police Pension Board

2024 IL App (1st) 230579-U
Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided March 29, 2024·No. 1-23-0579·Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 230579-U

SECOND DIVISION

March 29, 2024

No. 1-23-0579

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DELFINA MARCANO, ) Appeal from ) the Circuit Court Plaintiff-Appellant, ) of Cook County )

v. ) 2019CH8533 )

RETIREMENT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY ) Honorable OF HARVEY POLICE PENSION BOARD, ) Michael T. Mullen, ) Judge Presiding Defendant-Appellee. )

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Termination of former police officer’s disability pension was supported by manifest weight of evidence indicating officer was no longer disabled from police service. Also, officer failed to preserve due process claim for appeal.

¶2 J.J. Marcano was an exemplary sheriff’s deputy in Florida for more than a decade while he was collecting a police officer’s disability pension from Harvey, Illinois. The Board of Trustees of the Harvey Police Pension Fund (pension board or board) terminated the disability pension after hearing evidence about Marcano’s recovery and ability to resume his duties as a Harvey police officer. The circuit court of Cook County reviewed and affirmed the board’s decision. Marcano contracted COVID-19 and died during this litigation in early 2022. His estate seeks this court’s

review, arguing that Marcano’s disabling conditions were permanent. The estate also argues that the pension board violated his due process rights in 2016, three years before terminating the pension in 2019, by suspending the monthly payments, subject to reinstatement, based upon only an initial independent medical examination (IME) and Marcano’s testimony, rather than a full hearing. The pension board responds that the manifest weight of the medical evidence and Marcano’s employment history established that he was no longer disabled from police service. As for the due process claim, Marcano was given the initial IME and notice and opportunity to address the board prior to the payment suspension and he did not object to or otherwise challenge the entry of what was only an interim decision, so his argument should not be entertained by this court of review.

¶3 In an administrative review, we review the agency’s decision, not the circuit court’s decision. Roman v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2014 IL App (1st) 123308, ¶ 66. Our review “shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court.” 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2020). “No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court.” 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2020). Also, the “findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.” 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2020). Accordingly, we neither reweigh evidence nor make an independent determination of the facts. Cook County Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231, 244 (2009); Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).

¶4 An administrative agency’s determinations can be subject to three distinct standards of

review. The applicable standard of review depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001). The pension board’s findings of fact are given considerable deference, but are subject to reversal if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 471-72 (2005). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo, while mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 211 (2008); City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998).

¶5 A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when it appears from the record that an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Szewczyk v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Village of Richmond, 2011 IL App (2d) 100321, ¶ 20; Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. To make such a finding, a court must conclude that all reasonable and unbiased persons, acting within the limits set by law and drawing all inferences in support of the finding, would agree that the finding is erroneous and that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Evert v. Board of Trustees of Firefighters’ Pension Fund of City of Lake Forest, 180 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660 (1989). It is not enough that there are conflicts in the testimony or that an opposite conclusion might be reasonable; since the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses is to be determined by the agency and there need be only some competent evidence in the record to support its findings. Id.

¶6 An administrative decision is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Szewczyk, 2011 IL App (2d) 100321, ¶ 20; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State

Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 216 Ill. 2d 569, 577-78 (2005).

¶7 The operative section of the Pension Code, section 3-116, provides:

“Examination and emergency service. A police officer whose duty is suspended because of disability may be summoned to appear before the board, and to submit to an examination to determine fitness for duty. The officer shall abide by the board’s decision.

If a police officer retired for disability, except one who voluntarily retires after 20 years’

service, is found upon medical examination to have recovered from disability, the board shall certify to the chief of police that the member is no longer disabled and is able to resume the duties of his or her position. In case of emergency, a disabled police officer may be assigned to and shall perform such duty without right to compensation as the chief of police or chief officer of the municipality may direct.” (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/3-

116 (West 2016)1.

¶8 Marcano, who was born in 1971, went to high school in Harvey and became a Harvey patrol officer in January 1997, when he was 25 years old. He was injured a year later while conducting a solo Terry stop of an armed robbery suspect. The suspect’s companion fired three shots, two of which struck Marcano. The first bullet entered Marcano’s right shoulder. He would eventually make a full recovery from the shoulder wound. The next bullet missed him. The last bullet went through his left nostril and fragmented in his right temporal bone. A bullet fragment that protruded from his right ear was removed, but other pieces had to remain undisturbed to preserve his facial nerves and speech. It is undisputed that Marcano had permanent hearing loss.

1 This version of the statute is not the current version. While this appeal was pending, the statute was amended with the addition of a concluding sentence: “This Section does not apply to a police officer who has attained the age of 60.” Pub. Act 103-33, § 5, eff. June 9, 2023.

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