Marcano v. Apfel

112 F. Supp. 2d 227, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13415, 2000 WL 1299963
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedSeptember 12, 2000
DocketCiv. 00-1037 SEC
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 112 F. Supp. 2d 227 (Marcano v. Apfel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marcano v. Apfel, 112 F. Supp. 2d 227, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13415, 2000 WL 1299963 (prd 2000).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, District Judge.

On January 12, 2000, Petitioner Benjamin Marcano, (hereinafter “Marcano”), filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to be issued against the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Kenneth S. Apfel, (hereinafter “Commissioner”), for attorneys’ fees that have been earned, approved and withheld from the claimants’ lump sum benefits and certified for payment to Marcano by the Commissioner, yet they have not been paid. (Docket # 1). The Commissioner filed an answer and motion to dismiss to Attorney Marca-no’s petition on March 23, 2000. (Docket #4). For the reasons stated below, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, (Docket # 4), is GRANTED. Consequently,. Mar- *228 cano’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, (Docket # 1), is DENIED.

Factual Analysis

Attorney Benjamin Marcano filed his petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner to pay him attorneys’ fees that have been earned, approved and withheld from his clients’ lump sum benefits awarded by the Social Security Administration, (hereinafter “SSA”), and certified for payment by the Commissioner. He also alleges that the payment of the outstanding claims is necessary for his ability to continue practicing the law, since his practice is limited to the area of social security disability and virtually all of his income comes from attorney’s fees paid by the U.S. Government upon successful administrative representation of his social security clients. Docket # 1 at 2.

Aong with his petition for the writ, Attorney Marcano attached copies of several notices of awards sent to various persons, whereby the Commissioner approves payment of attorney’s fees pursuant to sections 405(i), 406(a, b) of Title 42 of the U.S.Code, and 20 CFR 404.1730(b). A copy of the award notices was sent to Marcano, presumably as the attorney of record and the person rightfully entitled to the attorney’s fees payment. Docket # 1, Exhibits. Petitioner contends that:

The Commissioner in each of [the Notices of Award] has, in a final decision, determined that the affected client is entitled to payment of benefits, and in each case, the Commissioner has approved the fee agreement between the claimant and the undersigned, has approved a fee in a set amount, and has notified the affected Social Security claimant and the Petitioner herein of the proposed fee.

Docket #1 ¶ 4. Petitioner further contends that none of the social security claimants disputed the amounts assigned to him for attorney’s fees and therefore, he is entitled to payment of the awarded amounts by virtue of sections 405(i), 406(a, b) of 42 U.S.C. and 20 CFR 404.1780(b).

Respondent does not deny that Petitioner’s claims are true. However, he argues that the writ should not be issued and that the petition should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Commissioner stated that the SSA has made substantial progress on the claims presented by Marcano and that they “continue[ ] to make every effort to resolve the outstanding claims in a timely fashion.” Docket #4 at 3. He further informed the Court that of the thirty-five (35) claims presented by Attorney Marca-no, twenty-six (26) have already been paid. Of the nine (9) claims that remain outstanding, five (5) have worker’s compensation benefits pending. The remaining four (4) have been referred to the Program Service Center in Maryland for further investigation. Id. 1

Applicable Law-Requirements for Issuing a Writ of Mandamus

Section 1361 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides this court with original jurisdiction over “any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case Petitioner invokes this court’s jurisdiction pursuant to § 1361, in order to compel the Commissioner to perform ministerial duties established by 42 U.S.C. § 405(i); 42 U.S.C. § 406(a, b); and 20 CFR 404.1730(b). These statutory provisions create an obligation for the Commissioner of Social Security to certify to the Managing Trustee the name and addresses of persons entitled to payments under the provisions of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(i). If the person entitled to payment under the Social Security Act was represented before the court or the Commissioner by an attorney; the court or the Commissioner may fix as part of the judg *229 ment a reasonable fee to be payed to the attorney that shall not exceed 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits obtained by the judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a, b). If that is the case, the Commissioner shall then certify for payment the amounts due to the attorney, out of the claimant’s past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(4).

The parties do not dispute that Marca-no’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeks to compel the performance of a ministerial duty that is certain and for rights that the petitioner has acquired lawfully pursuant to the statutes cited above. The Commissioner does not dispute either that the payments are due, however he informs the Court that every effort is being taken to pay Petitioner the claims that are still outstanding. A substantial percentage of the claims have in fact been paid. The small number remaining are being investigated.

The Court is mindful that the writ of mandamus is extraordinary in nature and seldom granted. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980) (per cu-riam). Moreover, “[i]n order to insure that the writ will issue only in extraordinary circumstances [the Supreme Court] has required that a party seeking issuance have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, and that he satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted.)

Even if Petitioner’s claims are clear and indisputable 2 , we shall then examine whether this case presents the “extraordinary circumstances” required in equity for the writ to proceed. First, we note that most of Petitioner’s claims have in fact become moot because they have been paid.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
112 F. Supp. 2d 227, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13415, 2000 WL 1299963, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marcano-v-apfel-prd-2000.