Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed March 11, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0586 Lower Tribunal No. 21-14071-CA-01 ________________
Marc Puleo, Appellant,
vs.
Stephan L. Cohen, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lisa Walsh, Judge.
Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Robert E. Minchin III (Tallahassee), and Paul C. Huck Jr., for appellant.
Boyd Richards Parker Colonnelli, P.L., Frank Colonnelli, Jr., and Yvette R., Lavelle, for appellees Stephan L. Cohen and Old Florida Title Company; Solomon, Cooperman, Recondo, Shapiro, Abril, and Craig B. Shapiro; Douglas H. Stein, P.A., and Douglas H. Stein, for appellee Edmund Irvine.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ. MILLER, J.
This appeal arises out of a residential property sale. Appellant, Marc
Puleo, the seller, appeals from final summary judgments rendered in favor
of appellees, Stephan L. Cohen and Old Florida Title Company, the closing
and escrow agents, and Edmund Irvine, the buyer, on his tort lawsuit. The
gravamen of his claims was that the participants in the transaction conspired
to fraudulently induce him to sell his property for less than the listing price by
concealing the buyer’s identity and plans to redevelop and resell the
property. We affirm the orders under review, save as to fraudulent
misrepresentation and conspiracy.1
I
In 2019, Puleo sold his Miami Beach residence to Spanish Rose, LLC
for $13 million dollars. Puleo was led to believe that the purchaser was Maria
Drummond, who intended to reside in the home with her family. Consistent
with this representation, he agreed to sell the house fully furnished.
1 We summarily affirm the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Cohen and Old Florida. See Transp. Eng’g, Inc. v. Cruz, 152 So. 3d 37, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); SO5 501, LLC v. Metro-Dade Title Co., 109 So. 3d 1192, 1195–96 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); David S. Kaufman, P.A. v. Moskowitz, 610 So. 2d 642, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); The Fla. Bar v. Marrero, 157 So. 3d 1020, 1024–25 (Fla. 2015); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
2 In reality, Drummond was a straw buyer. Irvine, a sophisticated real
estate developer and investor and Drummond’s long-term domestic partner,
forged Drummond’s name on the real estate purchase contract. He did not
intend to live in the property but rather planned to demolish the residence
and “flip” the real estate.
Shortly before closing, Irvine formed a single member limited liability
company, Spanish Rose. He yet again forged Drummond’s signature on an
assignment, transferring her purchase rights to Spanish Rose. Because the
contract contained a free assignability clause, Irvine was not required to
procure a countersignature from Puleo.
Less than two weeks before closing, Puleo received copies of the title
commitment and warranty deed reflecting the assignment to Spanish Rose.
Two days before closing, Puleo was provided with a draft closing statement
identifying Irvine, for the first time, as the “authorized member” of Spanish
Rose.
The closing proceeded, as scheduled. Two months after closing,
Spanish Rose relisted the property, first for $16,495,000 and then for nearly
$20 million. The property resold in less than a year for $15,977,700.
After learning of the resale, Puleo brought suit against the parties and
professionals involved in the transaction. As material to these proceedings,
3 his second amended complaint alleged fraud claims against the real estate
brokers, including Julian Johnston (the “Johnston Defendants”). The
defendants were joined in a civil conspiracy count.2
The fraud and conspiracy claims were predicated on the fact that the
parties materially misrepresented both the true identity of the buyer and
intended use of the property. Puleo sought $4,490,000 in damages, alleging
that had he known that Irvine intended to redevelop and immediately resell
the property, he would not have reduced his $18 million listing price.
All defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment for the Johnston Defendants on the fraud and
conspiracy claims, finding unequivocal evidence of misrepresentation, but
an insufficient showing of justifiable reliance, materiality, and damages. As
the court reasoned, because the foundational fraud tort failed, summary
judgment as to conspiracy was proper. Puleo subsequently settled the
remaining count with the Johnston Defendants and filed a voluntary
dismissal.
2 Puleo dismissed several defendants after he filed suit. His claims against his own attorneys, Eric A. Jacobs and Eric A. Jacobs, P.A., were dismissed and affirmed on appeal. See Puleo v. Jacobs, 374 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). He voluntarily dismissed his appeals against Caterina Gomez and Gomez, LLC, after he filed the notice of appeal here.
4 Applying the same rationale, the trial court granted summary judgment
on the remaining conspiracy counts. Puleo unsuccessfully moved for
rehearing. This appeal ensued.
II
A
We review an order granting final summary judgment de novo. Am.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. FDH Infrastructure Servs., LLC, 364 So. 3d 1082, 1083 (Fla.
3d DCA 2023) (citing Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760
So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). The trial court may grant summary judgment
if the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact
and further entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a). Hand-in-hand with this principle is that “the correct test for the
existence of a genuine factual dispute is whether ‘the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” In re
Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
B
“In fraud cases, summary judgment is rarely proper as the issue so
frequently turns on the axis of the circumstances surrounding the complete
transaction, including circumstantial evidence of intent and knowledge.”
5 Cohen v. Kravit Est. Buyers, Inc., 843 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Reciting this adage and invoking the seminal case of Butler v. Yusem, 44
So. 3d 102 (Fla. 2010), Puleo first contends that the defendants led the trial
court into error by requiring him to adduce evidence of justifiable reliance,
rather than mere reliance, to overcome summary judgment on his fraudulent
misrepresentation claim.
In Butler, the Florida Supreme Court shunned this requirement,
clarifying that “[j]ustifiable reliance is not a necessary element of fraudulent
misrepresentation.” Butler, 44 So. 3d at 105.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed March 11, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D24-0586 Lower Tribunal No. 21-14071-CA-01 ________________
Marc Puleo, Appellant,
vs.
Stephan L. Cohen, et al., Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lisa Walsh, Judge.
Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Robert E. Minchin III (Tallahassee), and Paul C. Huck Jr., for appellant.
Boyd Richards Parker Colonnelli, P.L., Frank Colonnelli, Jr., and Yvette R., Lavelle, for appellees Stephan L. Cohen and Old Florida Title Company; Solomon, Cooperman, Recondo, Shapiro, Abril, and Craig B. Shapiro; Douglas H. Stein, P.A., and Douglas H. Stein, for appellee Edmund Irvine.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ. MILLER, J.
This appeal arises out of a residential property sale. Appellant, Marc
Puleo, the seller, appeals from final summary judgments rendered in favor
of appellees, Stephan L. Cohen and Old Florida Title Company, the closing
and escrow agents, and Edmund Irvine, the buyer, on his tort lawsuit. The
gravamen of his claims was that the participants in the transaction conspired
to fraudulently induce him to sell his property for less than the listing price by
concealing the buyer’s identity and plans to redevelop and resell the
property. We affirm the orders under review, save as to fraudulent
misrepresentation and conspiracy.1
I
In 2019, Puleo sold his Miami Beach residence to Spanish Rose, LLC
for $13 million dollars. Puleo was led to believe that the purchaser was Maria
Drummond, who intended to reside in the home with her family. Consistent
with this representation, he agreed to sell the house fully furnished.
1 We summarily affirm the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Cohen and Old Florida. See Transp. Eng’g, Inc. v. Cruz, 152 So. 3d 37, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); SO5 501, LLC v. Metro-Dade Title Co., 109 So. 3d 1192, 1195–96 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); David S. Kaufman, P.A. v. Moskowitz, 610 So. 2d 642, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); The Fla. Bar v. Marrero, 157 So. 3d 1020, 1024–25 (Fla. 2015); Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
2 In reality, Drummond was a straw buyer. Irvine, a sophisticated real
estate developer and investor and Drummond’s long-term domestic partner,
forged Drummond’s name on the real estate purchase contract. He did not
intend to live in the property but rather planned to demolish the residence
and “flip” the real estate.
Shortly before closing, Irvine formed a single member limited liability
company, Spanish Rose. He yet again forged Drummond’s signature on an
assignment, transferring her purchase rights to Spanish Rose. Because the
contract contained a free assignability clause, Irvine was not required to
procure a countersignature from Puleo.
Less than two weeks before closing, Puleo received copies of the title
commitment and warranty deed reflecting the assignment to Spanish Rose.
Two days before closing, Puleo was provided with a draft closing statement
identifying Irvine, for the first time, as the “authorized member” of Spanish
Rose.
The closing proceeded, as scheduled. Two months after closing,
Spanish Rose relisted the property, first for $16,495,000 and then for nearly
$20 million. The property resold in less than a year for $15,977,700.
After learning of the resale, Puleo brought suit against the parties and
professionals involved in the transaction. As material to these proceedings,
3 his second amended complaint alleged fraud claims against the real estate
brokers, including Julian Johnston (the “Johnston Defendants”). The
defendants were joined in a civil conspiracy count.2
The fraud and conspiracy claims were predicated on the fact that the
parties materially misrepresented both the true identity of the buyer and
intended use of the property. Puleo sought $4,490,000 in damages, alleging
that had he known that Irvine intended to redevelop and immediately resell
the property, he would not have reduced his $18 million listing price.
All defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment for the Johnston Defendants on the fraud and
conspiracy claims, finding unequivocal evidence of misrepresentation, but
an insufficient showing of justifiable reliance, materiality, and damages. As
the court reasoned, because the foundational fraud tort failed, summary
judgment as to conspiracy was proper. Puleo subsequently settled the
remaining count with the Johnston Defendants and filed a voluntary
dismissal.
2 Puleo dismissed several defendants after he filed suit. His claims against his own attorneys, Eric A. Jacobs and Eric A. Jacobs, P.A., were dismissed and affirmed on appeal. See Puleo v. Jacobs, 374 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). He voluntarily dismissed his appeals against Caterina Gomez and Gomez, LLC, after he filed the notice of appeal here.
4 Applying the same rationale, the trial court granted summary judgment
on the remaining conspiracy counts. Puleo unsuccessfully moved for
rehearing. This appeal ensued.
II
A
We review an order granting final summary judgment de novo. Am.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. FDH Infrastructure Servs., LLC, 364 So. 3d 1082, 1083 (Fla.
3d DCA 2023) (citing Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760
So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). The trial court may grant summary judgment
if the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact
and further entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a). Hand-in-hand with this principle is that “the correct test for the
existence of a genuine factual dispute is whether ‘the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” In re
Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
B
“In fraud cases, summary judgment is rarely proper as the issue so
frequently turns on the axis of the circumstances surrounding the complete
transaction, including circumstantial evidence of intent and knowledge.”
5 Cohen v. Kravit Est. Buyers, Inc., 843 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Reciting this adage and invoking the seminal case of Butler v. Yusem, 44
So. 3d 102 (Fla. 2010), Puleo first contends that the defendants led the trial
court into error by requiring him to adduce evidence of justifiable reliance,
rather than mere reliance, to overcome summary judgment on his fraudulent
misrepresentation claim.
In Butler, the Florida Supreme Court shunned this requirement,
clarifying that “[j]ustifiable reliance is not a necessary element of fraudulent
misrepresentation.” Butler, 44 So. 3d at 105. This element is not required
because “a recipient may rely on the truth of a representation, even though
its falsity could have been ascertained had he made an investigation, unless
he knows the representation to be false or its falsity is obvious to him.” Id.
(quoting Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995, 998 (Fla. 1980)). As the Florida
Supreme Court further explained, “the policy behind our holding . . . is to
prohibit one who purposely uses false information to induce another into a
transaction from profiting from such wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting Gilchrist
Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 336–37 (Fla. 1997)).
Under Butler, fraudulent misrepresentation is instead comprised of four
elements: “(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the
representor’s knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that
6 the representation induce another to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by
the party acting in reliance on the representation.” Id. (quoting Johnson v.
Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985)).
Here, Puleo claimed that Irvine, aided by the Johnston Defendants,
actively and intentionally engaged in an ongoing deception to procure the
property at a discounted price. He further claimed he rejected considerably
higher offers because he believed that Drummond was purchasing the
property with the intent to reside there with her family.
By law, Puleo was entitled to rely on the misrepresentations and had
no duty to inquire further. See Besett, 389 So. 2d at 998 (“[A] recipient may
rely on the truth of a representation, even though its falsity could have been
ascertained had he made an investigation, unless he knows the
representation to be false or its falsity is obvious to him.”). By the time he
was on constructive notice that Spanish Rose had acquired the purchase
agreement, unilateral cancellation under the contract would have exposed
him to a specific performance lawsuit and attorney’s fees. Moreover, this
limited record yields no indication he was ever placed on notice that the
intended use was redevelopment and resale. Under these circumstances, a
reasonable jury could find that Puleo relied on the representations to his
detriment. See Butler, 44 So. 3d at 105.
7 The after-acquired mortgage appraisals do not vary this conclusion. At
best, they injected a factual dispute into the record as to the proper measure
of any damages. Because the foundational tort is viable and there was
record evidence to support the remaining elements of conspiracy, we
summarily reverse the conspiracy count. In so doing, we note that Puleo’s
settlement with the Johnson Defendants does not bar the conspiracy action
against the other alleged co-conspirators. See Charles v. Fla. Foreclosure
Placement Ctr., LLC, 988 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Each
coconspirator need not act to further a conspiracy; each ‘need only know of
the scheme and assist in it in some way to be held responsible for all of the
acts of his coconspirators.’” (quoting Donofrio v. Matassini, 503 So. 2d 1278,
1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987))); see also Sec. Pro., Inc. By and Through Paikin
v. Segall, 685 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“As a general rule,
parties that are not included in a stipulation for settlement cannot be bound
by its provisions.”); O’Neill v. Scher, 997 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA
2008) (noting that a release must “accurately reflect the release of interests
and/or claims” agreed upon in a settlement agreement); Mazzoni Farms, Inc.
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 761 So. 2d 306, 315 (Fla. 2000)
(“[E]nforcement is premised upon the assumption that the released claims
8 are those that were contemplated by the agreement.”). Accordingly, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.