20-2582 Maravilla Campos v. Garland BIA
Kolbe, IJ
A206 879 638
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 25th day of April, two thousand twenty- 5 three. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 9 STEVEN J. MENASHI, 10 EUNICE C. LEE, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 DINA MARIBEL MARAVILLA CAMPOS, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 20-2582 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 25 FOR PETITIONER: Bruno Joseph Bembi, Hempstead, 26 NY.
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy 2 Assistant Attorney General; Linda 3 S. Wernery, Assistant Director; 4 Taryn L. Arbeiter, Trial Attorney, 5 Office of Immigration Litigation, 6 United States Department of 7 Justice, Washington, DC.
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 11 is DENIED. 12 Petitioner Dina Maribel Maravilla Campos, a native and 13 citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a July 7, 2020 14 decision of the BIA affirming a July 9, 2018 decision of an 15 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, 16 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 17 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Dina Maribel Maravilla 18 Campos, No. A 206 879 638 (B.I.A. July 7, 2020), aff’g No. 19 A 206 879 638 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City July 9, 2018). We assume 20 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 21 procedural history. 22 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions 23 “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of 24 Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). When we
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1 review adverse credibility determinations, “the 2 administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 3 reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 4 contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Accordingly, we 5 review the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and 6 must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant 7 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 8 support a conclusion.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113 9 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 10 Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) 11 (reviewing an adverse credibility determination “under the 12 substantial evidence standard”). 13 A trier of fact may base a credibility determination on 14 “the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written 15 and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under 16 oath, and considering the circumstances under which the 17 statements were made), the internal consistency of each such 18 statement, the consistency of such statements with other 19 evidence of record . . ., and any inaccuracies or falsehoods 20 in such statements, without regard to whether an 21 inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
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1 the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We 2 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from 3 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 4 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 5 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 6 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. In this case, 7 substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse 8 credibility determination. 9 Maravilla Campos alleged in her application and testimony 10 that a man attempted to rape her because of her membership in 11 the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (“FMLN”). In 12 contrast, at her credible fear interview, she said she 13 believed the man tried to rape her because she is an orphan 14 and has no protection. At the interview, she answered no 15 when asked if she feared something would happen to her because 16 of her political opinion or any other protected ground. 17 Moreover, she testified that a warning note left at her home 18 warned her against supporting the FMLN, but at the interview 19 she stated only that the note warned her against going to the 20 police. The IJ did not err in relying on her statements at 21 the credible fear interview because the record of that
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1 interview bore sufficient indicia of reliability. It was 2 memorialized in a typed list of questions and answers; the 3 interview was conducted through an interpreter in Maravilla 4 Campos’s native language of Spanish; she did not contend that 5 she did not understand the questions; and the interviewer 6 “explained the purpose of the interview, the importance of 7 providing full and accurate testimony, and the fact that [she] 8 could ask for clarification at any point during the 9 proceedings.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d 10 Cir. 2009). 11 The inconsistencies between her testimony, application, 12 and credible fear interview provide substantial evidence for 13 the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 14 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (noting 15 that the agency “may rely on any inconsistency or omission in 16 making an adverse credibility determination as long as the 17 ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum 18 applicant is not credible”); see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 19 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single 20 inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ 21 was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies
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1 would so preclude even more forcefully.”). The agency was 2 not required to credit her explanation that she was nervous 3 or afraid to speak about the FMLN during her interview, or 4 that the interviewer told her to be as brief as possible, 5 particularly because she answered no to a direct question 6 about whether she had been harmed because of her political 7 opinion. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 8 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible 9 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 10 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be 11 compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks 12 omitted)). 13 Moreover, she did not rehabilitate her claim with 14 reliable corroboration. “An applicant’s failure to 15 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, 16 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an 17 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already 18 been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 19 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Her sister who testified had little 20 knowledge of her alleged political activities and had not 21 witnessed the attack, and an affidavit from another sister
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1 was vague, stating that Maravilla Campos left El Salvador to 2 earn more money to support their siblings, she was afraid of 3 assassination, and her support of the FMLN caused problems 4 of a different nature. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the weight of documentary 6 evidence is within the agency’s discretion); Likai Gao, 968 7 F.3d at 149 (holding that IJ acted within her discretion in 8 discounting evidence from interested witnesses who were 9 unavailable for cross-examination). 10 In sum, the discrepancies between Maravilla Campos’s 11 interview statements and her testimony regarding the 12 motivation for the attempted rape and warning, as well as the 13 lack of reliable corroboration, constitute substantial 14 evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See 15 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968 F.3d 145 n.8; 16 Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. This adverse credibility 17 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 18 removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief are 19 based on the same discredited factual predicate. See Paul 20 v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 3 stays VACATED.
4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 6 Clerk of Court