Marand Construction Corp. v. Rapid Rehabilitation Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Marand Construction Corp. v. Rapid Rehabilitation Corp.

73 A.D.2d 959, 424 N.Y.S.2d 267, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9890

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 28, 1980

StatusPublished

This text of 73 A.D.2d 959 (Marand Construction Corp. v. Rapid Rehabilitation Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marand Construction Corp. v. Rapid Rehabilitation Corp., 73 A.D.2d 959, 424 N.Y.S.2d 267, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9890 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

Pincite

Opinion

— In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, (1) plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered July 18, 1979, which granted the defendant’s motion to open its default in answering a calendar call, restored the matter to the Trial Calendar, and directed that the default judgment stand as security, and (2) defendant cross-appeals from so much of the said order as provided that the judgment shall stand as security. Order modified by adding thereto, immediately after the word "granted”, the words "upon condition that defendant’s counsel personally pay to the plaintiff the sum of $750.” As so modified, order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. Defendant’s counsel’s time to comply with said condition is extended until 20 days after service upon him of a copy of the order to be entered hereon, together with notice of entry thereof. In the event he neglects or fails to comply with the condition, then order reversed and motion denied, with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. In view of the manifest delaying tactics engaged in by defendant’s counsel, it is our view that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to open the default of the defendant without imposition of the condition above stated. The trial of this action should be held forthwith. Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, Titone and Mangano, JJ., concur.

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— In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, (1) plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered July 18, 1979, which granted the defendant’s motion to open its default in answering a calendar call, restored the matter to the Trial Calendar, and directed that the default judgment stand as security, and (2) defendant cross-appeals from so much of the said order as provided that the judgment shall stand as security. Order modified by adding thereto, immediately after the word "granted”, the words "upon condition that defendant’s counsel personally pay to the plaintiff the sum of $750.” As so modified, order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. Defendant’s counsel’s time to comply with said condition is extended until 20 days after service upon him of a copy of the order to be entered hereon, together with notice of entry thereof. In the event he neglects or fails to comply with the condition, then order reversed and motion denied, with $50 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. In view of the manifest delaying tactics engaged in by defendant’s counsel, it is our view that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to open the default of the defendant without imposition of the condition above stated. The trial of this action should be held forthwith. Hopkins, J. P., Damiani, Titone and Mangano, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

73 A.D.2d 959, 424 N.Y.S.2d 267, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9890, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marand-construction-corp-v-rapid-rehabilitation-corp-nyappdiv-1980.