Maraj v. Massachusetts

953 F. Supp. 2d 325, 2013 WL 3742489, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99755
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided July 17, 2013·No. Civil Action No. 10-12251-JLT·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH L. TAURO, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Darryl Leslie died of a heart-related event while a prisoner at the Suffolk County House of Correction. Plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of Leslie, filed this action against several corrections officers who were involved in the transport of Leslie around the time of his death. Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants used excessive force and were deliberately indifferent to Leslie’s medical needs, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all counts. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [# 82] is ALLOWED as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claim, and Plaintiffs battery claim is dismissed without prejudice.

II. Background1

On December 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint [# 1] in this court. After several motions to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [# 65]. Plaintiffs theory of liability appears to be that Defendants caused Leslie’s death through their (1) application and use of the Emergency Restraint Belt (“ERB”), and (2) delay in administering medical treatment.

After Leslie died in custody, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed an autopsy on Leslie and issued a report.2 The Examiner found that there was no evidence of blunt force trauma.3 The Examiner determined the “cause of death” to be “probable onset of cardiac dysrhythmia as a result of myxomatous degeneration of mitral valve in the setting of reported acute agitation requiring restraint.”4 In other words, the Examiner found that Leslie had a diseased heart valve (myxomatous degeneration of the mitral valve), which was a pre-existing heart condition and which caused Leslie to experience an irregular heartbeat (dysrhythmia) and ultimately led to Leslie’s cardiac arrest.5 The Examiner also found that Leslie’s heart was enlarged and the heart wall was thickened.6 The Examiner could not determine the “manner of death.”7

On May 8, 2012, this court issued a Scheduling Order [# 64] requiring the parties to inform the court of their retention of experts by June 8, 2012. The court allowed the parties’ joint motion for an extension of the expert deadline until July 31, 2012. On June 29, 2012, Defendants timely notified the court of their retention of a medical expert, Dr. Thomas Piemonte. Plaintiff, however, missed the July 31 deadline. On August 1, 2012, Plaintiff moved to extend the expert deadline until September 15, 2012. Plaintiff missed the [327] September 15 deadline as well. Two days later, on September 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Notice [# 73], stating: “Plaintiff in the above mentioned civil matter will not be retaining the services of an expert.”

Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 2, 2013. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition by the deadline. Instead, Plaintiff moved to extend the opposition deadline until February 8, 2013. Plaintiff failed to meet the February 8 deadline as well. Instead, on February 13, 2013, Plaintiff again moved to extend the opposition deadline until February 18, 2013.

On February 18, 2013, after having informed the court that it would not be retaining an expert five months prior, Plaintiff filed an untimely motion for leave to hire a rebuttal expert to rebut Defendants’ expert, Dr. Piemonte.8 On March 5, 2013, the court allowed Plaintiffs motion and issued the following order:

As requested in Plaintiffs motion, Plaintiffs expert report is limited in scope to rebutting Defendants’ expert, Thomas Piemonte M.D. Accordingly, Plaintiffs expert evidence cannot be used as part of its case-in-chief, but is limited to its rebuttal case.9

On May 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed the expert report of Dr. Dan Michael Sodano (“Soda-no Report”) attached to its opposition to summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file a motion to reconsider or otherwise object to the court’s March 5 Order. As a result, the Sodano Report, and any testimony derived therefrom, is properly limited to Plaintiffs rebuttal case.

III. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”10 The court must view the evidence in the record “in the light most favorable to, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party.”11

The movant may discharge its burden “by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 12 If the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, -the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.”13 “In so doing, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations in, say, an unverified complaint or lawyer’s brief, but must produce evidence which would be admissible at trial to make out the requisite issue of material fact.”14

B. Plaintiff’s § 1988 Claim: Failure to Prove Causation

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has [328] failed to offer any expert evidence that is admissible in Plaintiffs case-in-chief to prove that Defendants’ conduct caused Leslie’s death. Defendants argue that, absent this evidence, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim must fail. This court agrees.

The purpose of summary judgment is to “assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”15 As a result, “summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it “would require a directed verdict for the moving party.’ ”16

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 953 F. Supp. 2d 325, 2013 WL 3742489, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99755 (D. Mass. 2013).

953 F. Supp. 2d 325 (Maraj v. Massachusetts) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Town of Lexington v. Pharmacia Corp.
133 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Massachusetts, 2015)