Mapp v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Mapp v. State

575 So. 2d 790, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 2145, 1991 WL 31830

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 12, 1991

DocketNo. 90-1957

StatusPublished

This text of 575 So. 2d 790 (Mapp v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mapp v. State, 575 So. 2d 790, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 2145, 1991 WL 31830 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This case involves the question as to whether there is “... such a thing as ‘recross’ ”. Contrary to the trial judge’s assertion that there is not, we hold that there is. Even those cases which stand most strongly for the proposition that the trial court has great discretion in limiting, or even prohibiting, “recross” inherently rec[791]*791ognize that there is such a thing as recross-examination. See United States v. Marler, 614 F.2d 47 (5th Circuit 1980); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Circuit 1978).

The foregoing notwithstanding, the record reflects that the appellant in the instant case, who was the defendant below, was not prejudiced by the Court’s erroneous comment. Furthermore, immediately after stating that he believed that there was "no such thing as ‘recross’ ”, the trial court proceeded to allow the defense attorney to ask one question, which is all that the defense attorney indicated he wished to ask. Furthermore, the record does not reflect any proffer of the questions that appellant’s trial counsel found were being erroneously precluded by the court’s ruling.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This case involves the question as to whether there is “... such a thing as ‘recross’ ”. Contrary to the trial judge’s assertion that there is not, we hold that there is. Even those cases which stand most strongly for the proposition that the trial court has great discretion in limiting, or even prohibiting, “recross” inherently rec[791]*791ognize that there is such a thing as recross-examination. See United States v. Marler, 614 F.2d 47 (5th Circuit 1980); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Circuit 1978).

The foregoing notwithstanding, the record reflects that the appellant in the instant case, who was the defendant below, was not prejudiced by the Court’s erroneous comment. Furthermore, immediately after stating that he believed that there was "no such thing as ‘recross’ ”, the trial court proceeded to allow the defense attorney to ask one question, which is all that the defense attorney indicated he wished to ask. Furthermore, the record does not reflect any proffer of the questions that appellant’s trial counsel found were being erroneously precluded by the court’s ruling.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

575 So. 2d 790, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 2145, 1991 WL 31830, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mapp-v-state-fladistctapp-1991.

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