Mapp v. San Diego County

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 20, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-00927
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 TIMOTHY MAPP, Case No.: 19-CV-927-CAB-JLB

13 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 14 v. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

15 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, [Doc. No. 14] 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 20 21 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the 22 Pleadings. [Doc. No. 14.] Although Plaintiff has not opposed the motion, the Court deems 23 it suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. 24 Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s unopposed motion for 25 judgment on the pleadings is granted. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff Timothy Mapp, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, filed 28 a complaint against Defendant San Diego County (“the County”). [Doc. No. 1.] The 1 complaint appears to allege a single violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Id. at 6. ] According 2 to the complaint, the “child support agency in San Diego county has instructed employment 3 development department of California to withhold 25%” of Plaintiff’s unemployment and 4 disability insurance payments since March 6, 2019. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges his “court 5 ordered payment amount” for child support is $25.00, however, the employment 6 development department, the child support agency, and the County, all have a policy to 7 “disregard the orders of the court and the laws of the state.” [Id.] Therefore, Plaintiff 8 alleges the County is “taking $711.00 a month over what the court has ordered and refuses 9 to obey the orders of the court.” 10 On July 23, 2019, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s 11 complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). [Doc. No. 14.] 12 II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 13 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact 14 that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . is generally known within the trial 15 court’s territorial jurisdiction; or . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources 16 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). “[U]nder Fed. 17 R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’” Lee v. City of 18 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 19 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts may take judicial notice of “proceedings in 20 other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have 21 a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. 22 Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 23 The County requests the Court take judicial notice of exhibits related to Plaintiff’s 24 pending state court action, several complaints filed by Plaintiff in both state and federal 25 court, and two unpublished opinions from the California Court of Appeals related to 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff’s prior appeals of his child support obligations. [Doc. No. 14-2.] Plaintiff has not 2 opposed the County’s requests. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the 3 County’s exhibits. 4 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 5 A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), any party may move for judgment on 7 the pleadings at any time after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay 8 the trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be evaluated 9 under the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6). See 10 Enron Oil Trading & Trans. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 11 1997). Thus, the standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell 12 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) applies to a motion for judgment on the 13 pleadings. Lowden v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 378 Fed. Appx. 693, 694 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To 14 survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion, a plaintiff must allege ‘enough 15 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 16 544)). When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court assumes the 17 allegations in the complaint are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the 18 plaintiff. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1994). A 19 judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all the allegations in the complaint 20 are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Milne ex rel. Coyne 21 v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). 22 B. Rule 12(b)(1) 23 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 24 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack 25 jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. 26 v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Without 27 subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court is without “power” to hear or adjudicate a claim. 28 See Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2012) 1 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)); Kokkonen, 2 511 U.S. at 377. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an action for 3 lack of subject matter jurisdiction “either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting 4 extrinsic evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 5 2003); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 The County contends Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject 8 matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and/or Younger abstention 9 principles. [Doc. No. 14 at 11–15.] Additionally, the County contends that even if the 10 Court reaches the merits of Plaintiff’s complaint, it should be dismissed for failure to state 11 a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Id. at 16–22.] 12 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 13 Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred from 14 seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United 15 States District Court based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates 16 the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (citing 17 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker 18 v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923)). Review of state court decisions may only 19 be conducted in the United States Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; 20 Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional 21 bar applies even if the complaint raises federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 22 486. More specifically, the bar applies if the challenge to the state court decision is brought 23 as a § 1983 civil rights action. See Branson v. Nott, 62F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). 24 “[A] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto 25 appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. 26 As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is 27 ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” 28 Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Noel v. Hall, 415 F.3d 1145, 1 1158 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies not only to final state court 2 orders and judgments, but to interlocutory orders and non-final judgments issued by a state 3 court as well. Doe & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 4 2001). 5 Notwithstanding the foregoing, “for Rooker-Feldman to apply, a plaintiff must seek 6 not only to set aside a state court judgment; he or she must also allege a legal error by the 7 state court as the basis for that relief.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 8 Cir. 2004). “If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 9 illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker–Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” 10 Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. 11 Here, Plaintiff is not arguing that any state court order was legally erroneous. Rather, 12 Plaintiff contends that the County’s actions with respect to the amount of money being 13 withheld from his disability and unemployment benefits for his child support obligations 14 are the legal wrongs that violated his constitutional rights. According to the complaint, 15 Plaintiff is not seeking to set aside any state court judgment or alleging a legal error by the 16 state court itself as his basis for relief. Therefore, Plaintiff is not making a forbidden de 17 facto appeal. 18 The County’s argument that Plaintiff could have appealed the family court’s arrears 19 decision in the pending state court action mischaracterizes Plaintiff’s allegations in this 20 case. It does not appear that Plaintiff is appealing the arrears decision or any other state 21 court order in his complaint. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Noel, “Only when there is 22 already a forbidden de facto appeal in federal court does the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test 23 come into play.” 341 F.3d at 1164. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has asserted an 24 “allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar 25 jurisdiction” in this case. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. 26 B. Younger Abstention 27 Although Plaintiff’s claim is not barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 28 Court concludes that it must abstain from hearing this case under the Younger abstention 1 principles. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 2 “The Supreme Court in Younger ‘espouse[d] a strong federal policy against federal- 3 court interference with pending state judicial proceedings.’” H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. 4 Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden 5 State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)). “Absent extraordinary circumstances, Younger 6 abstention is required if the state proceedings are (1) ongoing, (2) implicate important state 7 interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to litigate federal 8 claims.” Id. (citing San Remo Hotel v. City of S.F., 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998)). 9 Younger abstention applies not only where a federal action would interfere with a state 10 criminal proceeding, but also “to federal cases that would interfere with state civil cases 11 and state administrative proceedings.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce 12 Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 13 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986)). 14 First, both Plaintiff and the County have indicated that state court proceedings have 15 been continuously ongoing with respect to Plaintiff’s child support judgment. [Doc. No. 16 1-2 at 6; Doc. No. 14-2 at 8–12.] Therefore, because Plaintiff’s claim at its core arises out 17 of the County’s efforts to enforce Plaintiff’s child support obligations in an ongoing state 18 court proceeding, the first prong is satisfied. 19 The second prong that important state interests are implicated is satisfied because 20 “[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern.” Koppel, 203 F.3d at 613 (quoting 21 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979)). “This is a particularly appropriate admonition 22 in the field of domestic relations, over which federal courts have no general jurisdiction, 23 and in which the state courts have a special expertise and experience.” Id. (internal citation 24 omitted). Furthermore, “a state has a vital interest in protecting the ‘authority of the judicial 25 system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory.’” Id. (quoting Juidice 26 v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977)). 27 Lastly, the third prong is satisfied because state court provides Plaintiff with an 28 adequate forum to litigate his constitutional claim. In fact, the record reflects that Plaintiff 1 has previously filed several claims related to his child support obligations in state court. 2 [Doc. No. 14-2 at 38–53, 62–70.] Therefore, Plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to 3 litigate his federal claims. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[W]e have 4 consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively 5 competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”) 6 The Court determines that Younger abstention is appropriate in this due process 7 challenge under section 1983 in light of the ongoing state child support proceedings. In 8 cases where damages are sought and Younger applies, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 9 has stated that a stay, rather than dismissal is generally warranted. See Gilbertson v. 10 Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2004). However, in Gilbertson, the Court of Appeals 11 stated, “We do not foreclose the possibility of a unique case where damages are sought and 12 Younger principles apply but dismissal is indicated for some other reason. A damages 13 claim that is plainly frivolous, for example, might not save an action.” Id. at 982 n.18. 14 Here, it is not clear what relief Plaintiff is seeking in his complaint. Even if Plaintiff is 15 seeking damages, the Court finds that this case presents a situation where dismissal is 16 proper. However, in an effort to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to litigate in state court if 17 he so chooses, the Court abstains from reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s claim and 18 dismisses the complaint without leave to amend. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Vv. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the County’s unopposed motion 3 ||for judgment on the pleadings and DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint without leave to 4 ||amend.? The Clerk of Court shall close this case and enter judgment accordingly. 5 It is SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: August 20, 2019

8 9 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 |} 27 ||2 “Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction ‘should be . . . without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his 28 claims ina competent court.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988)).