1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *
7 SUSANNA MANUKYAN, Case No.2:23-CV-1736 JCM (BNW)
8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 9 v.
10 ALBERTSON’S, LLC dba Albertson’s #332, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12
13 Presently before the court is plaintiff Susanna Manukyan’s motion to remand. (ECF No. 14 15). Defendant Albertson’s, LLC filed a response (ECF No. 27), to which Manukyan replied (ECF 15 No. 28). For the reasons stated below, the court grants Manukyan’s motion and remands this case 16 back to state court. 17 I. Background 18 This is a negligence action. Albertson’s removed this case to federal court from the Eighth 19 Judicial District Court of Nevada on diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). The allegations from the 20 complaint are as follows. 21 Manukyan purchased a bottle of lemon juice from an Albertson’s store and used it in her 22 tea. (ECF No. 1-1, at 5-6). Shortly thereafter, she became ill. (Id. at 6). Her son, after 23 experiencing similar symptoms, cut open the bottle of lemon juice and discovered a foreign 24 substance inside. (Id.). Manukyan received medical treatment for her symptoms, which included 25 nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness, stomach pain, diarrhea, and itchy skin. (Id. at 7). 26 Manukyan claims $30,309.40 in medical expenses. (Id. at 35). She also alleges pain and suffering 27 and requests punitive damages. (Id. at 10). 28 1 II. Legal Standard 2 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 3 (2013) (citations omitted). Although plaintiffs are generally entitled to deference in their choice 4 of forum, a defendant may remove a case originally filed in state court to federal court if “the 5 district courts of the United States” would have original jurisdiction over it. Ayco Farms, Inc. v. 6 Ochoa, 862 F.3d 945, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2017); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Relevant to this motion, 7 original jurisdiction includes diversity jurisdiction, which requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of 8 different citizenship than all defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 9 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 10 Once an action is removed to federal court, a plaintiff may challenge removal by filing a 11 motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The removing defendant must overcome the “strong 12 presumption against removal” and has the burden of proving diversity jurisdiction. Hunter v. 13 Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 14 1992) (per curiam)); NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016). Due to 15 this strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of 16 remand to state court. Id. 17 When determining the amount in controversy, the court looks to the complaint and “the 18 sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” St. Paul 19 Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The $75,000 threshold is satisfied 20 if the plaintiff claims a sum greater than the jurisdictional requirement. See id. at 288–89; 21 Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 362, 363 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A] 22 defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in 23 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. 24 Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 25 But where, as here, removal jurisdiction is challenged by the plaintiff, evidence 26 establishing the amount in controversy is required. Id. at 88–89. In such cases, “[b]oth sides must 27 have an opportunity to ‘submit proof,’” but the defendant carries the burden of establishing that 28 the amount-in-controversy requirement “is met by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moe v. 1 GEICO Indem. Co., 73 F.4th 757, 762 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88–89). 2 The defendant also bears the burden of showing that “its estimated amount in controversy relied 3 on reasonable assumptions.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015). 4 The court may consider “facts presented in the removal petition as well as any ‘summary- 5 judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Matheson 6 v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Singer v. State 7 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). The defendant cannot satisfy its 8 burden with conclusory allegations. Id. at 1090 (citation omitted). 9 III. Discussion 10 The parties do not dispute that the diversity of citizenship requirement is satisfied but argue 11 over whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As Manukyan claims $30,309.40 in 12 medical expenses, Albertson’s must still account for an amount in excess of $44,690.60. 13 Albertson’s argues that this court has jurisdiction because, if Manukyan prevails, “it is very likely 14 that a Clark County jury” would award her general damages two-and-a-half times greater than her 15 requested special damages. (ECF No. 27, at 2). Albertson’s also argues that punitive damages are 16 authorized by statute up to $300,000. (Id. at 3). Manukyan counters that Albertson’s has not met 17 its burden in opposing remand and that its arguments are “speculative and conclusory.” (ECF No. 18 28, at 4). The court agrees with Manukyan. 19 The amount in controversy is the “maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably 20 recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019). Thus, punitive 21 damages and general damages may be considered part of the amount in controversy if properly 22 pleaded. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is well established 23 that punitive damages are part of the amount in controversy in a civil action.” (citation omitted)). 24 Albertson’s first argument regarding the likelihood that Manukyan will receive general 25 damages (such as for pain and suffering) in addition to special damages is supported by neither 26 fact nor law. Albertson’s asserts, with no supporting legal authority, that “it is well known that 27 Clark County juries are generous” and that an award in excess of $44,690.60 is “well within 28 probably verdict ranges in Las Vegas.” (ECF No. 27, at 3). But Albertson’s provides the court 1 with no sample jury verdicts.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *
7 SUSANNA MANUKYAN, Case No.2:23-CV-1736 JCM (BNW)
8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER 9 v.
10 ALBERTSON’S, LLC dba Albertson’s #332, et al., 11 Defendant(s). 12
13 Presently before the court is plaintiff Susanna Manukyan’s motion to remand. (ECF No. 14 15). Defendant Albertson’s, LLC filed a response (ECF No. 27), to which Manukyan replied (ECF 15 No. 28). For the reasons stated below, the court grants Manukyan’s motion and remands this case 16 back to state court. 17 I. Background 18 This is a negligence action. Albertson’s removed this case to federal court from the Eighth 19 Judicial District Court of Nevada on diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). The allegations from the 20 complaint are as follows. 21 Manukyan purchased a bottle of lemon juice from an Albertson’s store and used it in her 22 tea. (ECF No. 1-1, at 5-6). Shortly thereafter, she became ill. (Id. at 6). Her son, after 23 experiencing similar symptoms, cut open the bottle of lemon juice and discovered a foreign 24 substance inside. (Id.). Manukyan received medical treatment for her symptoms, which included 25 nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness, stomach pain, diarrhea, and itchy skin. (Id. at 7). 26 Manukyan claims $30,309.40 in medical expenses. (Id. at 35). She also alleges pain and suffering 27 and requests punitive damages. (Id. at 10). 28 1 II. Legal Standard 2 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 3 (2013) (citations omitted). Although plaintiffs are generally entitled to deference in their choice 4 of forum, a defendant may remove a case originally filed in state court to federal court if “the 5 district courts of the United States” would have original jurisdiction over it. Ayco Farms, Inc. v. 6 Ochoa, 862 F.3d 945, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2017); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Relevant to this motion, 7 original jurisdiction includes diversity jurisdiction, which requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of 8 different citizenship than all defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 9 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 10 Once an action is removed to federal court, a plaintiff may challenge removal by filing a 11 motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The removing defendant must overcome the “strong 12 presumption against removal” and has the burden of proving diversity jurisdiction. Hunter v. 13 Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 14 1992) (per curiam)); NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016). Due to 15 this strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of 16 remand to state court. Id. 17 When determining the amount in controversy, the court looks to the complaint and “the 18 sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” St. Paul 19 Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). The $75,000 threshold is satisfied 20 if the plaintiff claims a sum greater than the jurisdictional requirement. See id. at 288–89; 21 Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 362, 363 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A] 22 defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in 23 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. 24 Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 25 But where, as here, removal jurisdiction is challenged by the plaintiff, evidence 26 establishing the amount in controversy is required. Id. at 88–89. In such cases, “[b]oth sides must 27 have an opportunity to ‘submit proof,’” but the defendant carries the burden of establishing that 28 the amount-in-controversy requirement “is met by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moe v. 1 GEICO Indem. Co., 73 F.4th 757, 762 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88–89). 2 The defendant also bears the burden of showing that “its estimated amount in controversy relied 3 on reasonable assumptions.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015). 4 The court may consider “facts presented in the removal petition as well as any ‘summary- 5 judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Matheson 6 v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Singer v. State 7 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). The defendant cannot satisfy its 8 burden with conclusory allegations. Id. at 1090 (citation omitted). 9 III. Discussion 10 The parties do not dispute that the diversity of citizenship requirement is satisfied but argue 11 over whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As Manukyan claims $30,309.40 in 12 medical expenses, Albertson’s must still account for an amount in excess of $44,690.60. 13 Albertson’s argues that this court has jurisdiction because, if Manukyan prevails, “it is very likely 14 that a Clark County jury” would award her general damages two-and-a-half times greater than her 15 requested special damages. (ECF No. 27, at 2). Albertson’s also argues that punitive damages are 16 authorized by statute up to $300,000. (Id. at 3). Manukyan counters that Albertson’s has not met 17 its burden in opposing remand and that its arguments are “speculative and conclusory.” (ECF No. 18 28, at 4). The court agrees with Manukyan. 19 The amount in controversy is the “maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably 20 recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019). Thus, punitive 21 damages and general damages may be considered part of the amount in controversy if properly 22 pleaded. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It is well established 23 that punitive damages are part of the amount in controversy in a civil action.” (citation omitted)). 24 Albertson’s first argument regarding the likelihood that Manukyan will receive general 25 damages (such as for pain and suffering) in addition to special damages is supported by neither 26 fact nor law. Albertson’s asserts, with no supporting legal authority, that “it is well known that 27 Clark County juries are generous” and that an award in excess of $44,690.60 is “well within 28 probably verdict ranges in Las Vegas.” (ECF No. 27, at 3). But Albertson’s provides the court 1 with no sample jury verdicts. It also fails to provide the court with evidence—or even an 2 explanation—for why the facts of this case support an award of special damages in excess of 3 $44,690.60. Its averments are wholly speculative. 4 To include punitive damages in the amount in controversy, “the party asserting jurisdiction 5 must establish that punitive damages would be permitted under the applicable state law based on 6 the conduct alleged.” In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig., 7 No. MDL 2672 CRB (JSC), 2019 WL 1501577, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019). Then, the party 8 seeking jurisdiction must demonstrate the amount of punitive damages in controversy, which may 9 be established by “evidence of jury verdicts in cases involving analogous facts.” Surber v. 10 Reliance Nat. Indem. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 11 Albertson’s argues that, as Nevada authorizes punitive damages up to $300,000 when 12 compensatory damages are less than $100,000, “a jury verdict incorporating special, general, and 13 punitive damages [in this case] would total approximately $175,000.” (ECF No. 27, at 3). 14 Albertson’s does not explain how it arrived at this number, or how the specific facts of this case 15 entitle Manukyan to punitive damages. Albertson’s averments are, again, wholly speculative and 16 unsupported by fact or law. In sum, Albertson’s has provided the court with no evidence to support 17 a finding of diversity jurisdiction. E.g., Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567 (explaining that a defendant’s 18 conclusory allegations are insufficient to overcome the presumption against removal or to meet 19 the defendant’s burden of supporting its removal petition with specific facts); Soriano v. USAA 20 Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-661-RCJ-RAM, 2010 WL 2609045, at *3 (D. Nev. June 24, 2010) 21 (“The mere possibility that Plaintiff may recover punitive damages in excess of $75,000 is not 22 enough to satisfy Defendant's burden.”). 23 IV. Conclusion 24 Accordingly, 25 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff Susanna 26 Manukyan’s motion to remand (ECF No. 15) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) be, and the 28 same hereby is, denied WITHOUT prejudice. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF 2 No. 35) be, and the same hereby is, denied WITHOUT prejudice. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be REMANDED to the Eighth Judicial 4 District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Case No. A-23-876524-C. 5 The clerk of the court is INSTRUCTED to close this case. 6 DATED May 24, 2024. 7 _________________________________________ 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28