Manuel v. Hoffner

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedJuly 31, 2020
Docket2:17-cv-11655
StatusUnknown

This text of Manuel v. Hoffner (Manuel v. Hoffner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manuel v. Hoffner, (E.D. Mich. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION THOMAS GEORGE MANUEL, Petitioner, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-11655 HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD BONITA J. HOFFNER, Respondent. _______________________________/ ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELEASE/APPEAL ON BOND [#18] Before the Court is habeas petitioner Thomas George Manuel’s motion for release on bail pending a decision on his habeas petition. For the reasons stated below, the motion is DENIED. To receive bond pending a decision on the merits of a habeas corpus petition, a petitioner must show a substantial claim of law based on the facts and exceptional circumstances justifying special treatment in the interest of justice. Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993)(quoting Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d

77, 79 (6th Cir. 1990)); See also Nash v. Eberlin, 437 F. 3d 519, 526, n. 10 (6th Cir. 2006). There will be few occasions where a habeas petitioner meets this standard. Dotson, 900 F. 2d at 79. Federal courts may grant bail when granting the writ. See Sizemore v. District Court, 735 F. 2d 204, 208 (6th Cir. 1984). Petitioner does not address in his motion that he has a substantial claim of

1 law as to any of his claims raised in his petition. Following a jury trial in Genesee County Circuit Court, the jury convicted Petitioner of armed robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84, felon in possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f, and possession of firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to prison for twenty-five to fifty years for the armed robbery and to lesser terms for the remaining convictions. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions, see People v. Manuel, No. 316756, 2014 WL 3705101 (Mich. Ct. App. July 24, 2014), and on March 31, 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. See People v. Manuel, 497 Mich. 982; 861 N.W.2d 29 (2015). In 2016, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). See People v. Manuel, No.

12-031348-FC (Genesee Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016) (Docket No. 1-1, PageID. 189-192). The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal the trial court’s decision, see People v. Manuel, No. 334728 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017) (Docket No. 1-1, PageID. 112), and Petitioner’s subsequent appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was rejected as untimely on April 21, 2017. Id.,

PageID. 115. Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition before the court raises the following grounds for relief are: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his 2 conviction for armed robbery; (2) the prosecutor failed to show due diligence in locating defense witnesses and also used perjured testimony to obtain a criminal conviction; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s

misconduct; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the complainant’s mental health records and for failing to secure an expert witness to impeach the complainant’s testimony; (5) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of the alleged victim’s character trait for violence; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a biased juror for cause; (7) he was denied

his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; (8) the assistant prosecutor suborned perjury, obstructed justice, and failed to correct a witness’s perjury; (9) the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence; and (10) he was denied his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The State argues in an answer to the petition that these claims are meritless, procedurally defaulted, or not cognizable

on habeas review. Petitioner’s habeas claims were adjudicated by a state court on the merits. Congress mandated the standards of review in federal habeas proceedings in 1996 in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Recognizing the foundational principle that “[s]tate courts are adequate forums for the

vindication of federal rights,” “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 16 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the 3 AEDPA deference, the state court’s determinations of law and fact must be “so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2017) (per curiam)

(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). Because Petitioner failed to address how he would prevail on the merits of his claims, he is not entitled to release on bail pending review of his habeas petition. Exceptional circumstances warranting release during review “have been limited to situations where (1) the prisoner was gravely ill, (2) the prisoner

committed a minor crime and is serving a short sentence, or (3) possibly where there was an extraordinary delay in processing the habeas petition.” Scheidler v. Berghuis, 07–cv–01346, 2008 WL 161899 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Milstead v. Sherry, 07–cv–15332, 2009 WL 728540 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citation omitted). Federal courts very rarely find “exceptional circumstances” and

very rarely release petitioners before ruling on the merits of their claims. Blocksom v. Klee, 2015 WL 300261, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2015). Recent cases involving federal prisoners and COVID-19 have cautioned in basing compassionate release solely on the possibility of contracting COVID-19. In considering an application for compassionate release, the Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit recently noted "… the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release." United States v. Raia, 20-1033, 4 2020 WL 1647922, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 2, 2020). "[T]he existence of a widespread health risk is not, without more, a sufficient reason for every individual subject to a properly imposed federal sentence of imprisonment to avoid or substantially

delay reporting for that sentence," and stating that it is "imperative" that the courts "continue to carefully and impartially apply the proper legal standards that govern each individual's particular request for relief." United States v. Roeder, 20-1682, 2020 WL 1545872, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2020). Courts have noted that, although the COVID-19 situation is an extraordinary one for the population at large in this country, including prisoners, and without diminishing in the least the fact that [Defendant] [may be] part of an especially at-risk COVID-19 population, [Defendant] has not shown that prison [or jail] authorities are unable or unwilling to address this serious problem within [facilities], or that [Defendant] is unable to take the general, protective measures applicable to all as of yet unafflicted persons, i.e., wash hands frequently, avoid touching the face and so forth. . . . Moreover, ... authorities may be able to isolate highly at-risk prisoners, such as [Defendant], more easily than isolation or ‘social distancing' is achieved in the general population, e.g., housing in administrative segregation, partial lockdowns or transfers. . . . Prisons [and jails] are certainly able to order their afflicted employees to stay at home, and can probably, more easily find testing opportunities for their essential employees than is yet possible for the general population. .

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Harrington v. Richter
131 S. Ct. 770 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Robert Lee, Jr. v. John Jabe
989 F.2d 869 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
Darell Nash, Sr. v. Michelle Eberlin
437 F.3d 519 (Sixth Circuit, 2006)
Burt v. Titlow
134 S. Ct. 10 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Dunn v. Madison
583 U.S. 10 (Supreme Court, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Manuel v. Hoffner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manuel-v-hoffner-mied-2020.