Manuel Sanchez Gomez v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Manuel Sanchez Gomez v. Loretta E. Lynch

649 F. App'x 461

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 29, 2016

Docket13-74028

StatusUnpublished

This text of 649 F. App'x 461 (Manuel Sanchez Gomez v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Manuel Sanchez Gomez v. Loretta E. Lynch, 649 F. App'x 461 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Manuel Sanchez-Gomez appeals the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, see Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir.2013); Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir.2012), and review the IJ’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, see Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.2016).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Sanchez-Gomez failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution on account of a protected ground, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c), because the evidence demonstrates that the kidnappers targeted Sanchez-Gomez based on his perceived wealth, which “will not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the [INA],” In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306,1310 (B.I.A.2000).

Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Sanchez-Gomez failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). No evidence here demonstrates that a government official had “awareness of [torturous] activity and thereafter breach[ed] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7). Evidence that a government has been generally ineffective in investigating or preventing crime does not suffice to show acquiescence. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir.2013).

We also deny Sanchez-Gomez’s motion for judicial notice of newspaper articles that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc).

PETITION DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R, 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Manuel Sanchez-Gomez appeals the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, see Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir.2013); Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir.2012), and review the IJ’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, see Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.2016).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Sanchez-Gomez failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution on account of a protected ground, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c), because the evidence demonstrates that the kidnappers targeted Sanchez-Gomez based on his perceived wealth, which “will not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the [INA],” In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306,1310 (B.I.A.2000).

Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Sanchez-Gomez failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). No evidence here demonstrates that a government official had “awareness of [torturous] activity and thereafter breach[ed] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7). Evidence that a government has been generally ineffective in investigating or preventing crime does not suffice to show acquiescence. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir.2013).

We also deny Sanchez-Gomez’s motion for judicial notice of newspaper articles that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc).

PETITION DENIED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R, 36-3.

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649 F. App'x 461, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manuel-sanchez-gomez-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2016.

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