Manuel Ramos-Ayala v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 20, 2024
• Docket: 20-72194
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 20 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL RAMOS-AYALA, No. 20-72194

Petitioner, Agency No. A206-548-062

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 20, 2024**

Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,*** District Judge.

Manuel Ramos-Ayala, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying cancellation of removal. We deny

the petition.

1. Ramos challenges the agency’s finding that he was ineligible for

cancellation of removal because he failed to establish the required “exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

The Supreme Court recently held that “the application of the exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts is reviewable as a

question of law under [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.

209, 217 (2024). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider Ramos’ petition for

review.

2. To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant

must show that upon his removal “qualifying relatives would suffer hardship that is

substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from

the deportation of [a noncitizen] with close family members here.” In re Monreal-

Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001). Factors to consider include “the

ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . . relatives.” Id. at 63. These factors

are assessed “in their totality, often termed a ‘cumulative’ analysis.” In re Gonzalez

Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 472 (B.I.A. 2002).

Ramos argues that his son, Manuel, would suffer emotional, economic,

educational, and medical hardship if Ramos were removed. But Ramos has not

2 shown that this hardship, assessed cumulatively, would be “substantially beyond that

which ordinarily would be expected to result from” a parent’s removal. See In re

Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 59 (cleaned up). “[I]t has long been settled

that economic detriment alone is insufficient to support even a finding of extreme

hardship.” In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A. 2002). There is

no evidence that Manuel “would be deprived of all schooling or of an opportunity to

obtain any education” if Ramos were removed. Id. And, although Manuel is covered

by Ramos’s health insurance, Manuel previously received state health insurance and

there is no evidence that he suffers from any serious health problem.

3. Ramos contends that the IJ’s failure to make an express determination about

his credibility deprived him of due process by preventing the introduction of

corroborating evidence. However, the IJ did not make an adverse credibility

determination, and Ramos was therefore presumed credible on appeal to the BIA.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). And nothing in the record allows Ramos to

overcome the presumption that the BIA considered the record in its entirety. See

Fernandez v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006). Nor does Ramos explain

how the absence of an express credibility determination prevented him from

providing corroborating evidence or what evidence he would have provided. See

Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (to establish a due

process violation, a petitioner must show fundamental unfairness and prejudice).

3 PETITION DENIED.