COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
MANUEL ARANDA, § No. 08-10-00336-CR Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court § THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Andrews County, Texas § Appellee. (TC# 5445) §
OPINION
In two issues, Manuel Aranda, Appellant, challenges the trial court’s revocation of his
community supervision alleging that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enter
requested findings of fact and conclusions of law in violation of his due process rights and by
finding the evidence sufficient to support the revocation. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty in Andrews County to the offense
of criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’ confinement in a state
jail facility, placed him on two years’ community supervision, and ordered Appellant to pay a
$1,000 fine and $344 in court costs. The terms and conditions of community supervision
required in part that Appellant commit no offense against the laws of this State, perform 120
hours of community service, and pay to his probation officer, for payment to the District Clerk,
court costs in the sum of $344. The State sought to revoke Appellant’s community supervision in Andrews County after
Appellant subsequently committed the offense of resisting arrest in Ector County, failed to
perform any community service, and failed to pay his probation fees and restitution. At the
contested revocation hearing, Appellant’s probation officer testified that Appellant was arrested
for resisting arrest, had not performed any community service, and had not made any required
payments. When the judgment of conviction for resisting arrest was admitted into evidence,
Appellant specified that he had no objection.
The trial court entered a judgment revoking community supervision in which it expressly
found that Appellant: (1) committed the offense of resisting arrest, search, or transport in Ector
County on or about June 12, 2010, in violation of Condition 1; (2) was 14-hours delinquent in
providing community service, a violation of Condition 14; and (3) was $237 delinquent in
paying court costs, a violation of Condition 16(b). The trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve
months’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
DISCUSSION
In Issue One, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
due-process rights by failing to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. We
disagree.
In a revocation proceeding, due process requires: (1) a hearing; (2) written notice of the
claimed violations; (3) disclosure of the evidence against the defendant; (4) an opportunity to be
heard and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (5) a neutral hearing body; and (6) “a
written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking
probation.” Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (the United States
Constitution protects persons who have been released on community supervision from re-
2 incarceration without due process of law), citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). When a defendant timely requests the entry of specific
findings of fact upon which revocation is based, the trial court errs in failing to enter such
findings of fact. Whisenant v. State, 557 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977); Joseph v.
State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 639 (Tex.App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A trial court’s failure
to make the requested findings may require reversal if the omission of such findings impedes
appellate review of the revocation. Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 639, citing Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d
793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972). However, the trial court is not required to issue separate
findings if the judgment or revocation order discloses the grounds for revocation found by the
court. See Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 640 (holding that trial court’s hand-written notations on a
revocation order were adequate to provide notice of the grounds by which defendant had violated
his community supervision).
In this case, the trial court’s judgment revoking probation contains an express recitation
that it found Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the
offense of resisting arrest, search, or transportation, by being delinquent on his payment of court
costs, and by being delinquent in providing community service. The trial court’s recitations are
adequate to inform Appellant and this Court of the grounds on which it found Appellant had
violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision. See Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 640.
As a result, Appellant was not hampered in his ability to prosecute this appeal and was not
denied due process of law.
In both Issues One and Two, Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by failing
to make required payments because the State failed to prove that Appellant had the ability to pay
3 the outstanding sums in violation of Article 42.12, section 21(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(c) (West 2006).
This provision is inapplicable under these facts for two reasons. First, Article 42.12,
section 21(c) applies only when the State seeks to revoke community supervision solely because
a defendant failed to pay compensation as set forth therein. Here, the State also sought to revoke
Appellant for committing a violation of law, thus removing the revocation proceedings from the
purview of Section 21(c). Second, had Section 21(c) governed the revocation proceedings, it
provides that an inability to pay as ordered by the trial court is an affirmative defense, which the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.12, § 21(c). Appellant mistakenly argues here that the State bore the burden of proving
that Appellant had the ability to pay the sums required under the terms and conditions of his
community supervision. Therefore, Appellant’s contentions are without merit.
In Issue Two, Appellant also complains that the evidence is insufficient to support the
trial court’s determination that he violated the terms and conditions of his community
supervision and attempts to focus our attention on his alleged failure to make required payments
pursuant thereto.
In a probation revocation hearing, the State must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his probation. Cobb v.State, 851 S.W.2d 871,
873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The trial court is the sole trier of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses. See Jackson v.State, 915 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex.App. -- San Antonio 1996, no pet.).
Consequently, appellate review of a probation revocation order is limited to a determination of
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COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
MANUEL ARANDA, § No. 08-10-00336-CR Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court § THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Andrews County, Texas § Appellee. (TC# 5445) §
OPINION
In two issues, Manuel Aranda, Appellant, challenges the trial court’s revocation of his
community supervision alleging that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enter
requested findings of fact and conclusions of law in violation of his due process rights and by
finding the evidence sufficient to support the revocation. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty in Andrews County to the offense
of criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’ confinement in a state
jail facility, placed him on two years’ community supervision, and ordered Appellant to pay a
$1,000 fine and $344 in court costs. The terms and conditions of community supervision
required in part that Appellant commit no offense against the laws of this State, perform 120
hours of community service, and pay to his probation officer, for payment to the District Clerk,
court costs in the sum of $344. The State sought to revoke Appellant’s community supervision in Andrews County after
Appellant subsequently committed the offense of resisting arrest in Ector County, failed to
perform any community service, and failed to pay his probation fees and restitution. At the
contested revocation hearing, Appellant’s probation officer testified that Appellant was arrested
for resisting arrest, had not performed any community service, and had not made any required
payments. When the judgment of conviction for resisting arrest was admitted into evidence,
Appellant specified that he had no objection.
The trial court entered a judgment revoking community supervision in which it expressly
found that Appellant: (1) committed the offense of resisting arrest, search, or transport in Ector
County on or about June 12, 2010, in violation of Condition 1; (2) was 14-hours delinquent in
providing community service, a violation of Condition 14; and (3) was $237 delinquent in
paying court costs, a violation of Condition 16(b). The trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve
months’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
DISCUSSION
In Issue One, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
due-process rights by failing to file requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. We
disagree.
In a revocation proceeding, due process requires: (1) a hearing; (2) written notice of the
claimed violations; (3) disclosure of the evidence against the defendant; (4) an opportunity to be
heard and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (5) a neutral hearing body; and (6) “a
written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking
probation.” Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (the United States
Constitution protects persons who have been released on community supervision from re-
2 incarceration without due process of law), citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93
S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). When a defendant timely requests the entry of specific
findings of fact upon which revocation is based, the trial court errs in failing to enter such
findings of fact. Whisenant v. State, 557 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977); Joseph v.
State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 639 (Tex.App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A trial court’s failure
to make the requested findings may require reversal if the omission of such findings impedes
appellate review of the revocation. Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 639, citing Ford v. State, 488 S.W.2d
793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972). However, the trial court is not required to issue separate
findings if the judgment or revocation order discloses the grounds for revocation found by the
court. See Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 640 (holding that trial court’s hand-written notations on a
revocation order were adequate to provide notice of the grounds by which defendant had violated
his community supervision).
In this case, the trial court’s judgment revoking probation contains an express recitation
that it found Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by committing the
offense of resisting arrest, search, or transportation, by being delinquent on his payment of court
costs, and by being delinquent in providing community service. The trial court’s recitations are
adequate to inform Appellant and this Court of the grounds on which it found Appellant had
violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision. See Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 640.
As a result, Appellant was not hampered in his ability to prosecute this appeal and was not
denied due process of law.
In both Issues One and Two, Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by failing
to make required payments because the State failed to prove that Appellant had the ability to pay
3 the outstanding sums in violation of Article 42.12, section 21(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(c) (West 2006).
This provision is inapplicable under these facts for two reasons. First, Article 42.12,
section 21(c) applies only when the State seeks to revoke community supervision solely because
a defendant failed to pay compensation as set forth therein. Here, the State also sought to revoke
Appellant for committing a violation of law, thus removing the revocation proceedings from the
purview of Section 21(c). Second, had Section 21(c) governed the revocation proceedings, it
provides that an inability to pay as ordered by the trial court is an affirmative defense, which the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 42.12, § 21(c). Appellant mistakenly argues here that the State bore the burden of proving
that Appellant had the ability to pay the sums required under the terms and conditions of his
community supervision. Therefore, Appellant’s contentions are without merit.
In Issue Two, Appellant also complains that the evidence is insufficient to support the
trial court’s determination that he violated the terms and conditions of his community
supervision and attempts to focus our attention on his alleged failure to make required payments
pursuant thereto.
In a probation revocation hearing, the State must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his probation. Cobb v.State, 851 S.W.2d 871,
873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The trial court is the sole trier of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses. See Jackson v.State, 915 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex.App. -- San Antonio 1996, no pet.).
Consequently, appellate review of a probation revocation order is limited to a determination of
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763
(Tex.Crim.App. 2006).
4 In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we view the evidence
presented at the hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding. Jones v. State,
589 S.W.2d 419, 420-21 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). When the State has sustained its burden of
proving the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence and no procedural obstacle is raised,
the decision to revoke probation lies within the discretion of the trial court. Flournoy v. State,
589 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Gordon v. State, 4 S.W.3d 32, 35 (Tex.App. -- El
Paso 1999, no pet.). Under such circumstances, the trial court’s discretion is substantially
absolute. Flournoy, 589 S.W.2d at 708; Gordon, 4 S.W.3d at 35. Thus, the only question
presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation.
Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Gordon, 4 S.W.3d at 35.
To prevail, an appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the
revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.]
1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex.App. -- Waco 2005, pet. stricken). If a single
ground for revocation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is otherwise valid,
then an abuse of discretion is not shown. Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App.
1980); Gordon, 4 S.W.3d at 35.
Resisting arrest is a criminal offense under Texas law. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
38.03(a) (West 2011). The State alleged that Appellant had committed the offense of resisting
arrest, presented the probation officer’s testimony that Appellant had been arrested for resisting
arrest, and introduced into evidence, without objection, the final judgment adjudicating
Appellant guilty of resisting arrest. This evidence is sufficient to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that Appellant committed an offense of state law in violation of the terms and
conditions of his supervision. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
5 revoked Appellant’s community supervision. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64; Gordon, 4 S.W.3d
at 35. Issues One and Two are overruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice November 30, 2011
Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, J., and Antcliff, J.
(Do Not Publish)