Manuel A. Haro Rico v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 13, 2026
DocketSF-315H-24-0538-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Manuel A. Haro Rico v. Department of Defense (Manuel A. Haro Rico v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manuel A. Haro Rico v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MANUEL ALEJANDRO HARO RICO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-315H-24-0538-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: March 13, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Manuel Alejandro Haro Rico , Vacaville, California, pro se.

Randy Ramirez , and Elda Teresa Lazard , Esquire, San Antonio, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary-period termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). With his petition for review, the appellant submits documents that were not part of the record below that show he had prior service for a nonappropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI), without providing further explanation. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed before the administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980). The appellant has not explained why he was unable to provide these documents that predate the initial decision to the administrative judge; thus, we do not consider them. In any event, we do not believe that these documents warrant a different outcome. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (observing that the Board generally will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision). To the extent the appellant provides these documents to suggest that his prior Federal service in a NAFI position should be combined with his agency service to meet the 1-year continuous service requirement or to “tack” pursuant to 3

5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b) (2024), we are not persuaded. 2 To qualify as an “employee” with appeal rights under chapter 75 of title 5, the appellant must show he either is not serving a probationary period or has completed 1 year of current continuous service under an appointment other than a temporary one limited to a year or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); Hurston v. Department of the Army, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9 (2010). An appellant who has not served 1 year under an appointment can show he has completed the probationary or trial period by “tacking” on prior service, including NAFI service, if: (1) the prior service was rendered immediately preceding the probationary appointment; (2) it was performed in the same agency; (3) it was performed in the same line of work; and (4) it was completed with no more than one break in service of less than 30 days. Hurston, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9; 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b) (2024). Positions are in the same line of work if they involve related or comparable work that requires the same or similar skills. Mathis v. U.S. Postal Service, 865 F.2d 232, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (interpreting the similar statutory language in 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(B)); Sandoval v. Department of Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 71, ¶ 8, ¶ 11 n.2, ¶ 14 (2010) (explaining that the interpretation of section 7511(a)(1)(B) in Mathis applies to tacking under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)). Here, the appellant has not alleged or provided any information that his prior service in his NAFI position as a Recreation Assistant, working in Outdoor Recreation at the Equipment Rental Operation, was in the same line of work and involved similar duties, skills, and responsibilities as his position at issue here as a Medical Support Assistant, working in the Directorate of Nursing at the Defense Health Agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 24; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Thus, the appellant’s prior service as a Recreation Assistant does not count towards completing his

2 Effective June 24, 2025—after the appellant’s termination—OPM rescinded subpart H of part 315 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Executive Order No. 14,284. Strengthening Probationary Periods in the Federal Service, 90 Fed. Reg. 26727-01 (June 24, 2025). 4

probationary period. See Hurston, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9; 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b) (2024). Alternatively, an individual can show that, while he may be a probationer, he is an “employee” with chapter 75 appeal rights because, immediately preceding the adverse action at issue, he had completed at least 1 year of current continuous service, either in the competitive or excepted service, without a break in Federal civilian employment of a workday. Hurston, 113 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 9; Fitzgerald v. Department of the Air Force, 108 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 10 (2008). The appellant has not identified any other prior Federal service other than his NAFI Recreation Assistant position. Because he served only 11 months and 25 days in the competitive service preceding his termination, he does not meet the definition of employee set forth in section 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii).

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Charlie Mathis v. United States Postal Service
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Manuel A. Haro Rico v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manuel-a-haro-rico-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2026.