Manthey v. Vincent

108 N.W. 667, 145 Mich. 327, 1906 Mich. LEXIS 767
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 23, 1906
DocketDocket No. 144
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 108 N.W. 667 (Manthey v. Vincent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manthey v. Vincent, 108 N.W. 667, 145 Mich. 327, 1906 Mich. LEXIS 767 (Mich. 1906).

Opinion

Carpenter, C. J.

December 11,1902, the warden and board of control of the State prison at Jackson, defendants herein, agreed to “hireand let ” to the Illinois Broom Company, another defendant herein, “for the term of eight years from and including the 15th day of February, A. D. 1903, the labor and services of 50 convicts.” Said Illinois Broom Company agreed to employ these convicts in shops within the prison walls ‘ ‘ in the business of manufacturing brooms and whisks. ” While defendants were proceeding to perform this contract, complainants, some of whom are journeymen broom makers, and some of whom are manufacturers of brooms, in this State, commenced this suit in equity for the purpose of enjoining the performance of said contract. The case was heard in the circuit court upon pleadings and testimony taken in open court, and a decree rendered in favor of complainants upon the ground contended for by them that the performance of this contract was forbidden by section 3, art. 18, of our State Constitution, reading:

“ No mechanical trade shall hereafter be taught to convicts in the State prison of this State, except the manu[329]*329facture of those articles of which the chief supply for home consumption is imported from other States or countries.”

From this decree defendants appeal, and they ask a reversal solely upon the ground that the contract in question can be and will be performed without violating the constitutional provision above quoted.

The testimony proves that the chief supply of brooms used in this State is made in this State; that the art of broom making is a mechanical trade; and that the convicts whose labor is used in performing the contract in question were, when they commenced to work thereon, entirely ignorant of said art. As this contract has been ■and is now being performed, these convicts do make perfect brooms, but no one convict makes such a broom. The work is divided into 13 branches. To illustrate: One of these branches is that of sewing the brooms, and another that of sorting the corn from which the broom is made. A convict learns to do the work in one, and only one, of these branches; that is, he learns to make one-thirteenth of the broom and no more.

Is the performance of this contract prohibited by the •constitutional provision ? That depends upon the proper construction of its language.

“ No mechanical trade shall hereafter be taught to convicts in the State prison of this State, except the manufacture of those articles of which the chief supply for home consumption is imported from other States, or countries.”

This language is clear. It prohibits the teaching to convicts in the State prison of any mechanical trade fór the manufacture of articles of which the chief supply for home consumption is made in Michigan. The prohibition extends that far and no farther. It does not prohibit convicts being taught any trade for the manufacture of artilles of which the chief supply for home consumption comes from without the State. And I should not say that it prohibits the manufacture of any articles whatso[330]*330ever — even those of which the chief supply for home consumption is derived from home manufactories — provided, the .convicts are taught no mechanical trade. It does not follow, however, that this provision does not, and was not-intended to, affect the manufacture of such articles. Convicts cannot manufacture those articles without being-taught the trade unless they already know it. The people, when they adopted this provision, may very well be-assumed to have known what we all know, that there would be among the convicts in the State prison so few skilled mechanics that the possibility of a profitable manufactory being therein conducted without teaching the-convicts the trade of said manufacture was a very remote-one indeed. It follows, therefore, that the enforcement of this provision prevents — and we may therefore properly assume that it was intended to prevent — such manufacture.

The claim is made by defendants that, since the Constitution prohibits teaching and does not prohibit manufacturing, the labor of convicts may be used in manufacturing, even though said convicts are thus taught the mechanical trade of making the articles thus manufactured. This is to contend that the constitutional provision in question prohibits the teaching of a mechanical trade as an educational measure, but permits its teaching as a step in industrial production. That is, that it prohibits theoretical teaching, but permits practical teaching. What evidence is there that the people in adopting this constitutional provision intended to prohibit only theoretical teaching ? There is certainly no such evidence in the language of the Constitution. That prohibits the teaching of mechanical trades. Presumably this means all teaching— practical as well as theoretical — of mechanical trades. It certainly prohibits practical teaching, for that, when the Constitution was adopted, was the ordinary, if not the only, method of teaching a mechanical trade. As we do not find in the Constitution any evidence to limit the* [331]*331apparent scope of this prohibition, our right to look elsewhere for such evidence may be questioned.

“Possible or even probable meanings, when one is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.” Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.), pp. 89-91.

In this case, however, it is proper that we should consider such evidence, for without considering it we cannot sustain defendant’s contention, and by considering it — as will hereafter appear — we only strengthen the conclusion we reach without it. We proceed therefore to state that evidence which is the history of the adoption of the constitutional provision under consideration. That history will be found both interesting and instructive.

Act No. 77 of the Laws of 1839 authorized the authorities in control of the State prison to use the labor of convicts in “manufacturing and mechanical businessthe only restriction being that the employment furnished should be “most beneficial to the public and best suited to their (the prisoners’) various capacities.” Act No. 81 of the Laws of 1842 authorized the prison authorities to enter into contract “letting the convicts for said labor (the labor of said convicts) of all or any of the branches now carried on or may hereafter be carried on in said prison.” In 1843 the platform of the democratic party (then the dominant party in this State) contained this resolution:

“Besolved, that this convention earnestly recommend the next legislature of the State to enact such laws in relation to the penitentiary discipline that the, mechanical labor of the convicts shall not come into competition with the mechanical labor of our citizens.”

Governor Barry, who was elected upon this platform, in his annual message, in January, 1844, recommended legislation in accordance therewith. The house committee on State prison, to whom was referred this part of the governor’s message, reported:

[332]*332‘ ‘ The inspectors of the State prison in their report, and also the governor in his message, recommends and suggests the propriety of establishing by law at this session of the legislature, a prison discipline, relative to mechanical labor, by giving it such direction as will prevent competition between convict and free labor. * * *

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Related

McDowell v. Fuller
150 N.W. 353 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1915)
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164 Mich. 369 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1911)

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Bluebook (online)
108 N.W. 667, 145 Mich. 327, 1906 Mich. LEXIS 767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manthey-v-vincent-mich-1906.