Manson v. State ex rel. Lee

66 Ind. 78
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1879
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 66 Ind. 78 (Manson v. State ex rel. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Manson v. State ex rel. Lee, 66 Ind. 78 (Ind. 1879).

Opinion

Howk, J.

On the 14th day of April, 1879, the appellee’s relator, John Lee, filed in the court below his complaint, duly verified, against the appellant Mahlon D. Manson, Auditor of State of the State of Indiana, as sole defendant, and thereon moved the court for an alternative writ of mandate, in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. On the same day, the appellant Manson voluntarily appeared and waived the issuing of such alternative writ of mandate, and filed his demurrer to the relator’s verified complaint, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against him, or to warrant the relief prayed for therein. On the 18th day of April, 1879, the court overruled the demurrer to the complaint, and to this decision the appellant Manson excepted.

On the 24th day of April, 1879, the appellant Manson [80]*80withdrew his answer before that time filed, and answered the relator’s verified complaint, in substance, as follows:

“ Comes now Mahlon D. Manson, Auditor of State, respondent, and, for answer to said petition or complaint, says he has no interest whatever in the proceedings of said relator, except to see that his warrant for said salary shall be issued [by him], as such Auditor of State, to the proper person entitled by law to receive such warrant and salary, as such prison director, and therefore he respectfully prays the judgment and direction of this honorable court, in the premises.”

On the same day last named, the appellants Robert Dykes and John W. Baker filed in said, cause their verified petition, in substance, as follows:

“ The undersigued represent to the court that they have a real and substantial interest- in the matters involved in this cause ; that they were duly elected, commissioned and qualified as directors of the northern prison, in said State of Indiana, and have been and are now serving as such directors, under their said election by the General Assembly of said State to the said position; that they have served as such director’s, are now serving as such, and have been ever since the 12th day of March, 1877, and that they are now lawfully entitled to have paid to them the salary of said office of prison directors, which salary, in said cause, is claimed by the relator. Wherefore they pray that- they may be made parties defendants hereto, and be permitted to plead and answer as defendants in said cause.”

The prayer of said petition was granted by the court, and,, on their own application, the appellants Dykes and Baker were made parties defendants in this cause, and allowed and directed to answer the relator’s complaint.

No amendment was made by the appellee’s relator to his verified complaint, but the appellants Dykes and Baker demurred thereto, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against [81]*81them, “or justify any proceedings against them.” This demurrer was overruled by the court, and to this ruling they excepted.

The appellants Dykes and Baker then answered the relator’s complaint: First, by a general denial thereof; and, secondly, by an affirmative or special paragraph, the substance of which we will give hereafter. To this second paragraph of answer the relator replied in two paragraphs, the first of which was a special reply, and the second was a general denial,

Upon the affidavit of the appellants Dykes and Baker of the bias and prejudice of the presiding judge of the court below, the cause was removed from before him, and, “ with the consent and approval of the parties,” the Hon. Livingston Howland was duly appointed as special judge “ to hear, try and determine said cause.”

The issues joined were tried by the coui’t without a jury, and a finding was made that the relator, John Lee, by virtue of his election and qualification as director of the Indiana State Prison North, mentioned in the appellee’s complaint, was, on the 11th day of March, 1879, entitled to the office of director of said prison, and then was in„the possession of said office, and in the exercise and performance of the duties thereof; that the relator was subsequently wrongfully excluded from said prison, and from the performance of the duties of said office, by the appellants Dykes and Baker; that, ever since the last named date, the relator had been and then was entitled to the office of director of said prison, and to exercise the duties and receive the salary of said office ; that the terms of office of the appellants Dykes and Baker, as directors of said prison, ceased and determined on the said 11th day of March, 1879, and that their subsequent exercise of the duties of said offices of directors of said prison, and their exclusion of the relator and Frederick Hoover from said [82]*82prison, and from their offices as directors thereof, was unauthorized and illegal; that a peremptory mandate should be issued to and against the appellant Manson, Auditor of State, requiring him to audit and issue his warrant on the. Treasurer of State for the relator’s account for his salary, as a director of said prison, mentioned in his complaint; and that a peremptory mandate should also be issued to and against the appellants Robert Dykes and John "W. Baker, requiring them and each of them to cease to attempt to furthei; exercise or perform the duties of the office of a director of said prison, or to longer or further exclude the relator from the said prison, or from the performance and exercise of the duties pertaining to his office as a director of said prison.

The appellants jointly moved the court for a new trial, which motion was overruled, and to this ruling they severally excepted, and judgment was then rendered by the court upon and in accordance with its finding, from which judgment this appeal is now here prosecuted.

In this court, the appellant Manson separately, and the appellants Dykes and Baker jointly, assigned as errors the decisions of the circuit court in overruling their respective demurrers to the relator’s verified complaint, and all the appellants jointly assigned as error the decision of the court in overruling their motion for a new trial.

It is necessary, we think, to a proper understanding of the questions presented and discussed by counsel* in this case, and of our decision of those questions, that we should first give a summary at least of the facts alleged by the appellee’s relator, in his verified complaint.

The relator alleged, in substance, that, in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly of this State, approved March 5th, 1859, entitled “An act to provide for the erection of a new prison north of the National Road, election of officers therefor, making appropriations, and for the regulation of the same,” the Governor of Indiana, on or about [83]*83the 11th day of March, 1859, appointed and commissioned three named persons as directors of said Indiana northern state-prison, to serve as such for the term of two years from the said 11th day of March, 1859, and until their successors should he elected and qualified, the General Assembly, by which said act was passed, having failed to elect directors thereunder.

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243 P. 355 (Montana Supreme Court, 1926)
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Bluebook (online)
66 Ind. 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manson-v-state-ex-rel-lee-ind-1879.