Mansilla-Jimenez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-1365
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 19 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YOSELIN CAROLINA MANSILLA- No. 24-1365 JIMENEZ; ASHLIN CELESTE Agency Nos. VELASQUEZ MANSILLA; LEVI A213-019-811 ANTONIO MANSILLA-JIMENEZ, A213-019-822 A213-019-813 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, TALLMAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Yoselin Carolina Mansilla-Jimenez and her minor children are

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). natives and citizens of Guatemala. 1 Petitioners seek review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision to adopt and affirm the Immigration Judge’s

(IJ’s) decision to deny all of Petitioners’ claims for relief.

“Where the BIA affirms the IJ ‘and also adds its own reasoning, we review

the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which it relies.’”

Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019)). “We review legal

questions de novo.” Id. “We review the BIA’s factual findings underlying its

determination[s] that a petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under CAT for substantial evidence.”

Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021). Substantial evidence is a

“highly deferential standard” and “we must accept the BIA’s factual findings as

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” Salguero Sosa, 55 F.4th at 1217–18 (internal quotations omitted). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and we deny Mansilla-Jimenez’s petition

for review.

1. Petitioners fail to address the agency’s independently dispositive finding

1 The children seek asylum as derivative beneficiaries and do not seek relief or protection separate from her application. They are not entitled to assert a derivative claim for statutory withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Unless otherwise noted, references to Petitioner in the singular are to Mansilla-Jimenez as the lead Petitioner.

2 24-1365 that Petitioners could relocate within Guatemala to avoid future persecution and that

it would not be unreasonable for them to do so. Hussain, 985 F.3d at 649. Because

Petitioners failed to show “that it would be unreasonable to expect [them] to relocate

to avoid future persecution, [Petitioners] failed to provide evidence to compel

reversal of the BIA’s decision[] to deny asylum” or to compel reversal of the BIA’s

decision to deny Petitioner statutory withholding of removal. Id.

2. As for the CAT claim, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding

that Petitioner did not meet her burden of proving that it was “more likely than not

she will be tortured if returned to Guatemala.” She presented insufficient evidence

that she had been subjected to past torture or that the government of Guatemala was

interested in torturing her or would acquiesce in such torture. See Singh v. Garland,

57 F.4th 643, 659 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that substantial evidence supported denial

of CAT relief where petitioner “could safely relocate within” home country and the

country reports “demonstrated only a fear based on general, rather than

individualized, conditions.”).

3. “We ‘will reverse the BIA’s decision on due process grounds if the

proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case.”’” Hussain, 985 F.3d at 642 (quoting Colmenar v.

INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000)). The petitioner must also show “substantial

prejudice.” Id. (quoting Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000)). The BIA

3 24-1365 did not violate the Petitioners’ due process rights by adopting and affirming the IJ’s

decision. By citing its decision in Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA

1994), it signified “that it had conducted an independent review of the record and

had exercised its own discretion in determining that its conclusions were the same

as those articulated by the IJ.” Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc); see also Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th

Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that BIA’s streamlined decision denied petitioner due

process of law).

PETITION DENIED.

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