Mansfield & Sandusky City Rail Road v. John P. Veeder & Co.

17 Ohio St. 385
Ohio Supreme Court·Decided December 15, 1848·Published·Cited by 15 cases

Opinion

Birchard, C.

J. A preliminary question necessarily arising upon the exceptions to the report of the special Master is, how far conclusive is the decision of the Company’s engineer ? In the original reference, the Master was required to adopt as conclusive, the estimate of the Company’s engineer as to the quantity and quality of the work unless fraud be shown, or mistake, or undue influence, or want of good faith, such as is the subject of relief by the ordinary principles of Chancery. From a careful consideration of the various clauses of the contract, it seems to us that both parties contemplated relying upon the engineer’s judgment and science in estimating the amount of work to be paid for, and the price also to be paid in all cases where the terms of the contract do not fix the rate of compensation.

The contract itself is drawn with less precision than most contracts for labor upon the public works of the State, which have fallen under my observation. Many, indeed most that I [396] have seen contain an agreement that the decision of the engineer final and conclusive in any dispute which may between the parties. Such was the contract between Easton and the Pennsylvania & Ohio Canal Company; 13 Ohio Rep. 81. With such a stipulation, -there would be very little room to doubt the conclusiveness of-the decision fairly made by the chosen umpire of the parties. It could not or ought not to be relieved against, upon any principle more loose than the rule given to the special Master as his guide by the Court of Common Pleas. But it is urged strongly that the terms of the engagement entered into by the respondents, do by no means bind them so rigidly. The question to be decided is one that ought to be so viewed by a Court of equity as to accomplish the intentions of the parties. They are in a Court of equity, and each seeks to stand upon his equitable rights, as they are fixed and controlled by the terms and spirit of their contract. The last claim of the second article of the agreement provides that “ in cases where the said second party may be obliged to excavate fast rock, shale rock, or hard pan, the additional compensation is to be determined by the said engineer.” This, as has been already said, does not in terms make the decision final, yet the force of the language is such as, in our estimation, to leave no doubt that the parties understood that they were both agreeing to abide his decision.

If we are right in this particular, it would follow that his opinion should be conclusive, unless susceptible of being relieved against for some of the causes specified in the order of reference. It was the duty of the Company to keep in their employ an engineer, capable, honest and free to exercise a sound, disinterested and impartial judgment in estimating the additional compensation, or, to employ the words of the contract, “to determine it.”

The engineer in the Company’s employ, after the completion of the work, estimated the entire excavation at the contract price of nine cents per cubic yard, making no additional allowance for excavating about thirty-five thousand cubic yards of a [397] hard material, which cost from twenty-five to forty cents per yard. In this the Master’s report sustains him. The great question of difficulty, in this case, arises upon this The inquiry is, was the material thus difficult of excavation the substance contemplated by the parties and designated by the term hard pan. That the parties contemplated encountering a substance difficult to be removed, which was not common earth or rock, either fast or shale, is beyond doubt, but what they meant by this word is not clear. The term is not of very common use among men of science. It is not defined in treatises upon geology, and yet is here employed to denote a substantive and component part of the earth. Many practical men, and some who possess in a good degree both practical and scientific knowledge have, been called upon to testify what is to be understood by the term. It is singular that no two of them define it exactly alike. Yet it has long been a name in popular use among farmers and well diggers to denote a hard earthy substance, composed of gravel, sand and clay, very compact, nearly impervious to water and too hard to be excavated by the spade. And, as we believe, was and has been in this State, since the Geolological Survey of the State in 1837, used to designate a hard, compact earth, generally composed of sand and pebbles, cemented by clay, or clay combined with other ingredients.

In the Geological Report to the Legislature in 1838, Mr. Briggs, Assistant Geologist, in describing the limestone region of Wood.county, says: “ Resting on the limestone is a blueish clayey stratum, in which are sometimes found pebbles of primitive and secondary rocks. At some localities, where the pebbles predominate, it assumes the character of a blue, compact hard pan, while at others it is nearly free from these coarser materials.”

Again, in Mr. Kelly’s well, in the south part of Montgomery township, Wood.county, the following arrangement of the material was observed:

[398]*3981. Surface loam.

2. Yellowish loamy clay, 10 feet.

3. Blue hardpan 15 do.

4.Limestone.

The same deposites are found in the Black Swamp. Their average thickness is,

1. Dark soil, 1 foot.

2. Yellowish sand, 2 feet.

3. Blue hardpan, 3 feet, resting on brownish yellow limestone. — Geological Rep. 1838, p. 115.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Mansfield & Sandusky City Rail Road v. John P. Veeder & Co., 17 Ohio St. 385 (Ohio 1848).

17 Ohio St. 385 (Mansfield & Sandusky City Rail Road v. John P. Veeder & Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Irons v. Maginnis (In re Irons)
572 B.R. 877 (N.D. Ohio, 2017)
Neidler v. Donaldson
9 Ohio Misc. 208 (Seneca County Probate Court, 1966)
Gibson v. Anderson
5 Ohio Law. Abs. 166 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1927)
McMerriman v. Schiel
108 Ohio St. (N.S.) 334 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1923)
Chaffin v. Dixon
13 Ohio App. 1 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1920)
Stewart v. Oneal
237 F. 897 (Sixth Circuit, 1916)
Holmden v. Craig
31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 461 (Cuyahoga Circuit Court, 1909)
Robbins v. Smith
17 Ohio C.C. Dec. 91 (Ohio Circuit Courts, 1903)
Richardson v. Cincinnati Union Stockyard Co.
8 Ohio N.P. 213 (Ohio Superior Court, Cincinnati, 1901)
Miller's Appeal
6 A. 715 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1886)
Colston v. Bishop
1 Ohio C.C. 460 (Ohio Circuit Courts, 1886)
McArthur v. Scott
113 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1885)