Manrique v. United States
This text of Manrique v. United States (Manrique v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
Manrique v. United States, (1st Cir. 1993).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
July 20, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 92-2326
NESTOR FERNANDO-MANRIQUE,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
______________
____________________
Nestor Fernando-Manrique on brief pro se.
________________________
A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and Jeffrey A. Locke,
__________________ ________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Appellant Nestor Fernando-Manrique
__________
appeals from the denial of his motion to set aside his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. We have carefully reviewed
the record, the parties' briefs and the district court's
decision. Based on the detailed and diligent analysis
contained in Judge Skinner's 23-page Memorandum and Order
which disposes of most of appellant's claims, we affirm the
court's judgment for essentially the reasons Judge Skinner
has stated. However, the Memorandum and Order
understandably, given the prolix nature of appellant's
pleadings, failed to identify two issues. We therefore add
the following.
The first claim is that the PSI failed to contain
any information concerning the amount or purity of the
cocaine involved in appellant's offense. Appellant alleges
that due to the omission of this information from the PSI he
has been denied hearings before the Parole Commission on four
occasions. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
rejected a similar claim concerning an omission in the PSI of
any information concerning the drugs involved in the offense
in United States v. Katzin, 824 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1987). The
_____________ ______
court stated:
In this case, Katzin objects that
because the PSI never included the
disputed facts, the court had no
opportunity to make findings. But the
very fact that the court did not even
have the information available to it
demonstrates that it did not rely on the
disputed facts in making the sentencing
decision. This lack of reliance means
that there was no prejudice to the actual
sentencing decision. In addition, there
could be no misleading of parole or
prison officials because the disputed
information did not come to them with any
indication of judicial approval.
Id. at 239-40. Because appellant cannot demonstrate that the
___
sentencing court relied on the information, he cannot
establish that he was prejudiced. Appellant is not left
without remedies, however. Under the parole regulations, he
may dispute any information that the Parole Commission uses
in setting his parole status. See 28 C.F.R. 2.19(c). He
___
also may appeal a parole decision to the National Appeals
Board. See id. 2.26.
___ ___
The second claim is that the PSI contained
erroneous information concerning the estimated parole
guidelines.1 Specifically, appellant points out, and the
government agrees, that the Salient Factor Score of Four
listed in the PSI is wrong. This score, combined with
appellant's Offense Severity rating of Five, resulted in an
estimate of 48 to 60 months imprisonment before release on
____________________
1. The Parole Commission uses two variables to set probable
parole ranges. The first is the "Offense Severity" and the
second is the "Salient Factor Score." See 28 C.F.R. 2.20.
___
This score represents a defendant's prior criminal history
and predicts the risk of parole violation. Id. The
___
probation officer combines the two scores to arrive at an
estimate relative to how much time an inmate probably will
serve before being released on parole.
-3-
parole. Rather, due to the fact that appellant has no prior
convictions, the proper Salient Factor Score is Ten. This
would reduce the customary time served before release to 24
to 36 months. Appellant essentially argues that the judge
relied on the 48-60 month estimate in imposing the ten-year
sentence. Applying the correct Salient Factor Score of Ten,
appellant calculates, should have resulted in a five-year
sentence.
This claim fails. Although it is true that a
sentence based on "misinformation of a constitutional
magnitude" or "materially untrue" assumptions of fact may
violate due process, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
_____________ ______
447 (1972), not every type of error is cognizable on
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
United States v. Tucker
404 U.S. 443 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
United States v. Katzin, Harry A/K/A "Porky"
824 F.2d 234 (Third Circuit, 1987)
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Bluebook (online)
Manrique v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/manrique-v-united-states-ca1-1993.