[Cite as Manning v. Gallagher, 2025-Ohio-2781.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
ANDREA MANNING, :
Relator, : No. 115192
v. :
JUDGE KELLY A. GALLAGHER, :
Respondent. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED DATED: August 1, 2025
Writ of Procedendo Motion No. 585467 Order No. 586643
Appearances:
Andrea Manning, pro se.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Bridget E. Dever, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
Relator Andrea Manning, pro se, seeks a writ of procedendo ordering
respondent, Judge Kelly A. Gallagher, to “close out pending issues” so that she could
“proceed with the appeals process” in Manning v. Cleveland [sic] Metro. Hous. Auth., Cuyahoga C.P. CV-23-989917. For the reasons that follow, relator’s request
for relief is moot, and respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On December 12, 2023, Manning, pro se, filed a complaint against
defendants “Cleveland [sic] Metropolitan Housing Authority” and “Union Square
Apartments” in Manning v. Cleveland [sic] Metro. Hous. Auth., Cuyahoga C.P. CV-
23-989917 (the “underlying action”).1 Her complaint stemmed from concerns about
a neighbor in her housing complex against whom she had obtained a protection
order. Manning alleged that defendants had failed to take appropriate action in
response to the protection order and her related safety concerns and had retaliated
against her due to her complaints about the situation. After service was completed
on both defendants, defendant Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority
(“CMHA”) filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. No appearance
was entered on behalf of Union Square Apartments, and CMHA made no mention
of Union Square Apartments in its answer or motion.
1 The procedural background is based on our review of the publicly available, online
docket in the underlying action and Manning’s appeal in Manning v. Cleveland Metro. Hous. Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114429. See State ex rel. Fischer Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-3891, ¶ 3, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (observing, in original action, that “[t]his court is permitted to take judicial notice of court filings that are readily accessible from the internet”); Patterson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2019-Ohio-110, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (setting forth procedural history relevant to mandamus action based on review of “publicly available dockets”), citing Cornelison v. Russo, 2018-Ohio-3574, ¶ 8, fn. 2 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8. Further, an event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record. State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo, 89 Ohio St.3d 227, 228 (2000) (appellate court may take judicial notice that a writ action is moot). On September 24, 2024, the trial court granted CMHA’s motion for
summary judgment on, among other grounds, that CMHA was immune from
liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.02. The trial court’s September 24, 2024 judgment
entry did not mention Union Square Apartments or Manning’s claims against Union
Square Apartments and did not contain any Civ.R. 54(B) language. Manning
appealed to this court.
After seeking briefing from the parties on the issue, this court, sua
sponte, dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order based on the
apparent pending claims against Union Square Apartments and the absence of
Civ.R. 54(B) language in the judgment entry. Manning v. Cleveland Metro. Hous.
Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114429 (Jan. 16, 2025).
On April 4, 2025, Manning filed a “motion requesting 54(B)
language” in the underlying action, “request[ing] that the court take some action
regarding still pending issues so that I can move forward with the appeals process.”
On June 4, 2025, Manning filed the instant petition seeking a writ of procedendo to
compel respondent to “close out pending issues so that I can proceed with the
appeals process.”
On June 18, 2025, respondent issued the following journal entry:
The court clarifies that “Union Square Apartments” is the physical location where the alleged events took place, not a defendant in this action. Union Square Apartments is a residential property owned and managed by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”), the entity against whom all claims have been asserted. All factual allegations referenced in the complaint pertain directly to CMHA in its capacity as property owner and provider of onsite management services. As such, no separate and distinct claims have been asserted against Union Square Apartments. The court’s dismissal of CMHA resolves all claims raised in the complaint. Therefore, the court[’]s order of September 24, 2025 [sic] resolves this matter in its entirety, and constitutes a final appealable order.
On June 20, 2025, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, attaching a
copy of the June 18, 2025 journal entry. Respondent argues that, based on this
entry, Manning’s request for a writ of procedendo is moot.
Manning did not timely file an opposition to respondent’s motion to
dismiss.
II. Law and Analysis
“‘A writ of procedendo is an extraordinary remedy in the form of an
order from a higher tribunal directing a lower tribunal to proceed to judgment.’”
State ex rel. Bechtel v. Cornachio, 2021-Ohio-1121, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel.
Mignella v. Indus. Comm., 2019-Ohio-463, ¶ 7. “‘A writ of procedendo is proper
when a court has refused to enter judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding
to judgment.’” State ex rel. Dodson v. Phipps, 2024-Ohio-4928, ¶ 13, quoting State
ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 2013-Ohio-1762, ¶ 7. Such a writ does not instruct the lower
court as to what the judgment should be; it merely instructs the lower court to issue
a judgment. State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462 (1995). A writ of procedendo
is appropriate upon a showing of a clear legal right to require the respondent to
proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Dodson at ¶ 13;
State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 7.
“Procedendo will not compel the performance of a duty that has
already been performed.” State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Roberts v.
Marsh, 2020-Ohio-1540, ¶ 6. Where a relator seeks to compel an action that has
been performed during the pendency of the proceedings, the procedendo claim
becomes moot. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 8-9.
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Manning’s
request for a writ of procedendo is moot because respondent has issued a journal
entry explaining that “Union Square Apartments is not a defendant, but rather a
property owned and managed by CMHA,” that “there were no separate or distinct
claims directed at Union Square Apartments,” and that “the court deemed its prior
entry granting summary judgment against CMHA to be dispositive of all claims.” As
such, respondent contends, “the requested act that is the subject of this action has
been completed.” Manning has not filed a response to respondent’s motion to
dismiss and, therefore, has not disputed that the action is moot based on the trial
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[Cite as Manning v. Gallagher, 2025-Ohio-2781.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
ANDREA MANNING, :
Relator, : No. 115192
v. :
JUDGE KELLY A. GALLAGHER, :
Respondent. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED DATED: August 1, 2025
Writ of Procedendo Motion No. 585467 Order No. 586643
Appearances:
Andrea Manning, pro se.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Bridget E. Dever, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
Relator Andrea Manning, pro se, seeks a writ of procedendo ordering
respondent, Judge Kelly A. Gallagher, to “close out pending issues” so that she could
“proceed with the appeals process” in Manning v. Cleveland [sic] Metro. Hous. Auth., Cuyahoga C.P. CV-23-989917. For the reasons that follow, relator’s request
for relief is moot, and respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On December 12, 2023, Manning, pro se, filed a complaint against
defendants “Cleveland [sic] Metropolitan Housing Authority” and “Union Square
Apartments” in Manning v. Cleveland [sic] Metro. Hous. Auth., Cuyahoga C.P. CV-
23-989917 (the “underlying action”).1 Her complaint stemmed from concerns about
a neighbor in her housing complex against whom she had obtained a protection
order. Manning alleged that defendants had failed to take appropriate action in
response to the protection order and her related safety concerns and had retaliated
against her due to her complaints about the situation. After service was completed
on both defendants, defendant Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority
(“CMHA”) filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. No appearance
was entered on behalf of Union Square Apartments, and CMHA made no mention
of Union Square Apartments in its answer or motion.
1 The procedural background is based on our review of the publicly available, online
docket in the underlying action and Manning’s appeal in Manning v. Cleveland Metro. Hous. Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114429. See State ex rel. Fischer Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-3891, ¶ 3, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (observing, in original action, that “[t]his court is permitted to take judicial notice of court filings that are readily accessible from the internet”); Patterson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, 2019-Ohio-110, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (setting forth procedural history relevant to mandamus action based on review of “publicly available dockets”), citing Cornelison v. Russo, 2018-Ohio-3574, ¶ 8, fn. 2 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8. Further, an event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence outside the record. State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo, 89 Ohio St.3d 227, 228 (2000) (appellate court may take judicial notice that a writ action is moot). On September 24, 2024, the trial court granted CMHA’s motion for
summary judgment on, among other grounds, that CMHA was immune from
liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.02. The trial court’s September 24, 2024 judgment
entry did not mention Union Square Apartments or Manning’s claims against Union
Square Apartments and did not contain any Civ.R. 54(B) language. Manning
appealed to this court.
After seeking briefing from the parties on the issue, this court, sua
sponte, dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order based on the
apparent pending claims against Union Square Apartments and the absence of
Civ.R. 54(B) language in the judgment entry. Manning v. Cleveland Metro. Hous.
Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114429 (Jan. 16, 2025).
On April 4, 2025, Manning filed a “motion requesting 54(B)
language” in the underlying action, “request[ing] that the court take some action
regarding still pending issues so that I can move forward with the appeals process.”
On June 4, 2025, Manning filed the instant petition seeking a writ of procedendo to
compel respondent to “close out pending issues so that I can proceed with the
appeals process.”
On June 18, 2025, respondent issued the following journal entry:
The court clarifies that “Union Square Apartments” is the physical location where the alleged events took place, not a defendant in this action. Union Square Apartments is a residential property owned and managed by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”), the entity against whom all claims have been asserted. All factual allegations referenced in the complaint pertain directly to CMHA in its capacity as property owner and provider of onsite management services. As such, no separate and distinct claims have been asserted against Union Square Apartments. The court’s dismissal of CMHA resolves all claims raised in the complaint. Therefore, the court[’]s order of September 24, 2025 [sic] resolves this matter in its entirety, and constitutes a final appealable order.
On June 20, 2025, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, attaching a
copy of the June 18, 2025 journal entry. Respondent argues that, based on this
entry, Manning’s request for a writ of procedendo is moot.
Manning did not timely file an opposition to respondent’s motion to
dismiss.
II. Law and Analysis
“‘A writ of procedendo is an extraordinary remedy in the form of an
order from a higher tribunal directing a lower tribunal to proceed to judgment.’”
State ex rel. Bechtel v. Cornachio, 2021-Ohio-1121, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel.
Mignella v. Indus. Comm., 2019-Ohio-463, ¶ 7. “‘A writ of procedendo is proper
when a court has refused to enter judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding
to judgment.’” State ex rel. Dodson v. Phipps, 2024-Ohio-4928, ¶ 13, quoting State
ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 2013-Ohio-1762, ¶ 7. Such a writ does not instruct the lower
court as to what the judgment should be; it merely instructs the lower court to issue
a judgment. State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Sherrills v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 72 Ohio St.3d 461, 462 (1995). A writ of procedendo
is appropriate upon a showing of a clear legal right to require the respondent to
proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Dodson at ¶ 13;
State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 7.
“Procedendo will not compel the performance of a duty that has
already been performed.” State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Roberts v.
Marsh, 2020-Ohio-1540, ¶ 6. Where a relator seeks to compel an action that has
been performed during the pendency of the proceedings, the procedendo claim
becomes moot. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bechtel at ¶ 8-9.
Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Manning’s
request for a writ of procedendo is moot because respondent has issued a journal
entry explaining that “Union Square Apartments is not a defendant, but rather a
property owned and managed by CMHA,” that “there were no separate or distinct
claims directed at Union Square Apartments,” and that “the court deemed its prior
entry granting summary judgment against CMHA to be dispositive of all claims.” As
such, respondent contends, “the requested act that is the subject of this action has
been completed.” Manning has not filed a response to respondent’s motion to
dismiss and, therefore, has not disputed that the action is moot based on the trial
court’s June 18, 2025 journal entry.
A petition is subject to dismissal when, after presuming the truth of
all material factual allegations of the relator’s petition and making all reasonable
inferences in his or her favor, it appears beyond doubt that the relator is not entitled
to the relief requested. State ex rel. S.Y.C. v. Floyd, 2024-Ohio-1387, ¶ 12. Although,
generally, a court may not consider evidence outside the petition when evaluating a motion to dismiss, an exception exists when an event causes a case to become moot.
Id.
Based on our review of the publicly available, online docket for the
common pleas court in the underlying case, including respondent’s June 18, 2025
journal entry, Manning has received the relief she requested in her procedendo
claim. Accordingly, her petition is moot and subject to dismissal. See, e.g., id. at
¶ 15-16; State ex rel. Dodson, 2024-Ohio-4928, at ¶ 11-14; State ex rel. Roberts v.
Hatheway, 2021-Ohio-4097, ¶ 5 (“An action in procedendo becomes moot when the
court performs the duty requested.”).
Further, Manning’s petition is procedurally deficient. Manning has
not properly captioned her petition in the name of the State on the relation of the
person applying, and her petition does not comply with Civ.R. 10(A), which requires
a relator to list the parties’ respective addresses in the case caption — providing
further potential grounds for dismissal. See, e.g., Nikooyi v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Prosecuting Dept., 2020-Ohio-3730, ¶ 5-7 (8th Dist.); Mankins v. Jackson, 2015-
Ohio-5155, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.).
We, therefore, grant respondent’s motion to dismiss. Costs assessed
against respondent; costs waived. The clerk is directed to serve on all parties notice
of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B). Complaint dismissed.
_________________________ ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR