AFFIRMEI) as Modified; Opinion Filed March 26, 2013.
In The QInitrt øf ppIatEi fift1 L1iitrirt uf !Jrxas at 1a11wi No. 05-1 1-00867-CR
PATRICK RASHAI) MANNING, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F08-63011-l
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Lang Opinion by Justice Moseley
A jury convicted Patrick Rashad Manning of endangering a child and assessed
punishment at two years’ confinement. In a single issue on appeal, Manning contends the
evidence is legally insufficient to prove the child was in imminent danger. The background of
the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite
them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum
opinion. TEx. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We modify the trial court’s judgment to correct the
spelling of Manning’s first name and affirm the judgment as modified.
We review the evidence under the legal sufficiency standard of review. See Jackson v.
Viiginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Adarnes v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), ccii. denied, 132 S. Ct, 1763 (2012). In a legal sufficiency review, “we view all of the
evidence in the liht most hivorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’ Adames, 353
S.W.3d at $60. This standard “recognizes the trier of fact’s role as the sole judge of the weight
and credibility of’ the evidence after drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence.” Id. We
measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. See Id. (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.
Crim. ApP. 1 997)).
As applicable here, a person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that places a child
younger than 1 5 years in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental
impairment. Tux. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 22.041(c) (West 2011). It is presumed that a person engaged in such conduct “if the person manuflictured, possessed, or in any way introduced into
the body of any person the controlled substance methamphetamine in the presence of the child.”
id. § 22.04lff-l)(1). “Imminent” means “ready to take place, near at hand, impending, hanging threateningly over one’s head, menacingly near.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
The indictment alleged that Manning intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with
criminal negligence engaged in conduct placing P.M., a child younger than fifteen years of age,
in imminent danger of death, bodily, injury and physical and mental impairment by leaving
illegal drugs and by selling illegal drugs in the presence of the child and by having a firearm in
the presence of the child.
Pursuant to a search warrant, police entered Manning’s one-bedroom apartment to search tr contro led sstaiiees. Inside, police found Manning. another adult male, and Maniiin’s
tour-year old child. Aeord ing to police. Tanning was sitting at a table and ran to the bedroom
when poi ice entered the apartment. Fhc other man was apparently knocked to the floor by the
door when police entered lie apartment.
The child was sittinu in a chair within fifteen feet of the kitchen table. On the table.
police discovered a loaded handgun, cocaine, and marijuana. On a chair next to the table was
another loaded handgun. Inside a cabinet in the kitchen police discovered several tablets in pill
bottles that were later determined to contain methamphetarnine. The handguns were not secured
in any way. Police fhund other firearms in the bedroom.
In Manning’s police interview, he admitted he lived at the apartment and admitted selling
cocaine and marijuana. hut denied knowledge of the ecstasy tablets found in the kitchen cabinet.
Manning said his son did not live at the apartment, but Manning had picked him up from school
the day of the arrest.
Officer Steve Junker testified as an expert about drug distribution Junker testified that
having a four-year old around drugs could he dangerous because the child could take the drugs
and overdose. He also testified that having unsecured, loaded firearms around a child could lead
to the child shooting himself or someone else. He explained there is a danger of drug houses
being robbed and the child could be caught in a shoot-out.
Manning contends the evidence shows his son was never in imminent danger and that the
danger was at all times only potential. Manning asserts there is no evidence he left the child
alone in proximity to the drugs and firearms or that Manning was intoxicated or unable to
supervise the child.
Manning testified he picked his son up from school. When they got to the apartment. there were no drugs or firearms on the kitchen table, Manmng’s friend, Jerrod Patterson, was
there. Manning told his son to sit down and watch TV. Manning went to the restroom and when
he came out, the police entered the apartment.
The Jury was entitled to credit the testimony of the police ofticers that cocaine and
marijuana were in plain view on the kitchen table along with loaded handguns on the table and
on a chair next to the table. The child was sitting approximately fifteen feet away from the table.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational Jury could
reasonably conclude that leaving an unrestrained four-year old child in close proximity to loaded,
unsecured handguns, and to cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine placed the child in
imminent danger. See Butler v. State, No. 14-09-00067-CR, 2010 WL 547055, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.i Feb. 1 8, 2010, no pet.) (not designated fbr publication) (concluding
that near presence of narcotics to unrestrained children in vehicle and evidence that marijuana
was smoked inside the vehicle with children present was legally sufficient to support conviction).
Considering all the evidence (including that summarized above) in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found Manning guilty of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adames, 353 S.W.3d at
860. Thus, we overrule Manning’s sole issue.
We note that Manning’s first name is misspelled in the judgment. During introductions
before voir dire, defendant and his counsel pointed out that his name was actually Patrick, not
Parick. There was evidence at trial that appellant’s name is Patrick, not Parick. The trial court
noted the name change on the docket sheet.
We may modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified. TEX. R. App. P.
43.2(b); see also Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27—28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberrv v.
-4- Siaw. 813 S.W.2d 526. 529 (rex. App.
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AFFIRMEI) as Modified; Opinion Filed March 26, 2013.
In The QInitrt øf ppIatEi fift1 L1iitrirt uf !Jrxas at 1a11wi No. 05-1 1-00867-CR
PATRICK RASHAI) MANNING, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F08-63011-l
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Francis, and Lang Opinion by Justice Moseley
A jury convicted Patrick Rashad Manning of endangering a child and assessed
punishment at two years’ confinement. In a single issue on appeal, Manning contends the
evidence is legally insufficient to prove the child was in imminent danger. The background of
the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite
them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum
opinion. TEx. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We modify the trial court’s judgment to correct the
spelling of Manning’s first name and affirm the judgment as modified.
We review the evidence under the legal sufficiency standard of review. See Jackson v.
Viiginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Adarnes v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), ccii. denied, 132 S. Ct, 1763 (2012). In a legal sufficiency review, “we view all of the
evidence in the liht most hivorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’ Adames, 353
S.W.3d at $60. This standard “recognizes the trier of fact’s role as the sole judge of the weight
and credibility of’ the evidence after drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence.” Id. We
measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. See Id. (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.
Crim. ApP. 1 997)).
As applicable here, a person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that places a child
younger than 1 5 years in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental
impairment. Tux. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 22.041(c) (West 2011). It is presumed that a person engaged in such conduct “if the person manuflictured, possessed, or in any way introduced into
the body of any person the controlled substance methamphetamine in the presence of the child.”
id. § 22.04lff-l)(1). “Imminent” means “ready to take place, near at hand, impending, hanging threateningly over one’s head, menacingly near.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012).
The indictment alleged that Manning intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with
criminal negligence engaged in conduct placing P.M., a child younger than fifteen years of age,
in imminent danger of death, bodily, injury and physical and mental impairment by leaving
illegal drugs and by selling illegal drugs in the presence of the child and by having a firearm in
the presence of the child.
Pursuant to a search warrant, police entered Manning’s one-bedroom apartment to search tr contro led sstaiiees. Inside, police found Manning. another adult male, and Maniiin’s
tour-year old child. Aeord ing to police. Tanning was sitting at a table and ran to the bedroom
when poi ice entered the apartment. Fhc other man was apparently knocked to the floor by the
door when police entered lie apartment.
The child was sittinu in a chair within fifteen feet of the kitchen table. On the table.
police discovered a loaded handgun, cocaine, and marijuana. On a chair next to the table was
another loaded handgun. Inside a cabinet in the kitchen police discovered several tablets in pill
bottles that were later determined to contain methamphetarnine. The handguns were not secured
in any way. Police fhund other firearms in the bedroom.
In Manning’s police interview, he admitted he lived at the apartment and admitted selling
cocaine and marijuana. hut denied knowledge of the ecstasy tablets found in the kitchen cabinet.
Manning said his son did not live at the apartment, but Manning had picked him up from school
the day of the arrest.
Officer Steve Junker testified as an expert about drug distribution Junker testified that
having a four-year old around drugs could he dangerous because the child could take the drugs
and overdose. He also testified that having unsecured, loaded firearms around a child could lead
to the child shooting himself or someone else. He explained there is a danger of drug houses
being robbed and the child could be caught in a shoot-out.
Manning contends the evidence shows his son was never in imminent danger and that the
danger was at all times only potential. Manning asserts there is no evidence he left the child
alone in proximity to the drugs and firearms or that Manning was intoxicated or unable to
supervise the child.
Manning testified he picked his son up from school. When they got to the apartment. there were no drugs or firearms on the kitchen table, Manmng’s friend, Jerrod Patterson, was
there. Manning told his son to sit down and watch TV. Manning went to the restroom and when
he came out, the police entered the apartment.
The Jury was entitled to credit the testimony of the police ofticers that cocaine and
marijuana were in plain view on the kitchen table along with loaded handguns on the table and
on a chair next to the table. The child was sitting approximately fifteen feet away from the table.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational Jury could
reasonably conclude that leaving an unrestrained four-year old child in close proximity to loaded,
unsecured handguns, and to cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine placed the child in
imminent danger. See Butler v. State, No. 14-09-00067-CR, 2010 WL 547055, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.i Feb. 1 8, 2010, no pet.) (not designated fbr publication) (concluding
that near presence of narcotics to unrestrained children in vehicle and evidence that marijuana
was smoked inside the vehicle with children present was legally sufficient to support conviction).
Considering all the evidence (including that summarized above) in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found Manning guilty of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Adames, 353 S.W.3d at
860. Thus, we overrule Manning’s sole issue.
We note that Manning’s first name is misspelled in the judgment. During introductions
before voir dire, defendant and his counsel pointed out that his name was actually Patrick, not
Parick. There was evidence at trial that appellant’s name is Patrick, not Parick. The trial court
noted the name change on the docket sheet.
We may modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified. TEX. R. App. P.
43.2(b); see also Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27—28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberrv v.
-4- Siaw. 813 S.W.2d 526. 529 (rex. App. Dallas .• 1991, pet. red) (recognizing court’s authority
to correct clerical cmws contained in the judgment). Accordingly. we modify the trial court’s
judgment to reflect the correct spelling of appellant’s first name.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
J MOS
Do Not Publish TEX. R. Art’. P. 47.2(b) I 10867F1J05
-5- (!tnirt til Appit1 _Fjf11i :E1iLrict ni t; at UaIlaL.;
JUDGMENT
PATRICK RASHAD MANNING, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Appellant No. 2. Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No, F08-630l 1-I. No. O5l 1MO867CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley. Justices Francis and Lang participating. THE STATE OF TEXA S Appellee ,
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIEfl as follows:
Defendant’s name is modified to read “Patrick Rashad Manning.”
As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 26th day of March, 2013.
Jl\l \IOSI.[.IY ii •S•F l( ‘1