Mann v. Mineral County Detention Center

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 7, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00560
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 THADDEUS TYSON MANN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00560-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 MINERAL COUNTY DETENTION 9 CENTER, et al.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Plaintiff Thaddeus Tyson Mann brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated 14 at Mineral County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1-1.) On December 27, 2024, this Court 15 ordered Mann to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the 16 full $405 filing fee on or before February 28, 2025. (ECF No. 4.) The Court warned Mann 17 that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file a fully complete application to proceed 18 in forma pauperis with all three documents or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action 19 by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) The Court’s order came back as undeliverable to the address 20 that Mann provided to the Court. (Id. at 5.) The deadline to file an application to proceed 21 in forma pauperis or pay the $405 filing fee has passed, and Mann did not file a fully 22 complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, or file an 23 updated address with the Court. 24 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 25 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 26 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 27 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 28 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 2 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 3 Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 4 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 5 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 6 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 7 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 8 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 9 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 11 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Mann’s 12 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 13 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 14 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 15 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 16 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 17 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 18 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 19 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 20 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 21 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 22 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 23 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 24 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 25 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 26 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 27 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 28 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 1 || unless Mann either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or pays 2 || the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting 3 || another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays 4 || the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here do not 5 || indicate that this case will be an exception: because Mann’s mail from the Court is being 6 || returned as undeliverable, it is unlikely that a second order would even reach him. Setting 7 || another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth 8 || factor favors dismissal. 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 10 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 11 || prejudice based on Mann’s failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 12 || pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s December 27, 2024, 13 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 14 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Mann wishes to pursue his 15 || claims, he must file a complaint in a new case. 16 DATED THIS 7" Day of March 2025. 17

19 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28